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PREf'ACE
How should the common costs of an enterprise be shared "fairly" among its
beneficiaries? This problem is widespread, both in public enterprises and also
within private firms. It arises in the pricing policies of public utilities providing
telephone services, electricity. water, and transport. It occurs in the
cost-benefit analyses of public works projects designed to serve different consti-
tuencies. such as a multipurpose reservoir. It is implicit in the determination of
access fees or user charges for common facilities such as airports or waterways.
In private corporations it occurs in the form of internal accounting schemes to
allocate common and overhead costs among different divisions of the firm. It even
crops up in such routine matters as how to allocate travel expenses among the
sponsors of a business trip, or how to share the expenses of running a club among
its members.
Such cost allocation problems typically exhibit two features:
(i) costs must be allocated exactly, with no profit or deficit;
(ii) there is no objective basis at hand for attributing costs directly to
specific products or services.
The goal of analysis is to devise criteria and methods for solving these prob-
lems in a just. equitable. fair, and reasonable manner. Cost allocation is thus ulti-
mately concerned with fairness. The methods and principles of cost allocation
that are likely to find acceptance must somehow be grounded in primitive,
common-sense ideas of fairness and equity.
But precisely what is meant by the word fair? According to Webster (1981),
it stems from fagar. an Old High German term meaning "beautiful". Fair means.
firstly, "attractive in appearance: pleasant to view". Significantly. a secondary
meaning is "pleasing to hear: inspiring hope or confidence often
delusively ... specious". It is closely connected to such ideas as just, equitable,
impartial, unbiased, objective. "Fair ... implies a disposition in a person or
group to achieve a fitting and right balance of claims or considerations that is
free from undue favoritism even to oneself ... Just stresses, more than ja.ir. a
disposition to conform with. or conformity with the standard of what is right. true.
or lawful, despite strong, especially personal, influences tending to subvert that
conformity" (Id).
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Fairness involves a balancing of demands, equal treatment, a concern with
legitimacy, lack of coercion. In effect, it provides a basis for voluntary consent.
Indeed, one could propose the following empirical test of a "fairness principle": is
it sufficiently compelling to cause parties with diverse interests to voluntarily
agree to its application? Whether the reader finds the cost allocation principles
proposed in subsequent chapters compelling will of course depend to some degree
on taste, for fairness is partly in the eye of the beholder.
Two approaches to achieving fair allocations may be distinguished. One is
strictly normative: all of the objective data are at hand and the problem is to de-
vise an appropriate formula for making an allocation based on these data. Such
techniques are typically encountered in cost-benefit analysis or internal account-
ing schemes in corporations, The second approach is to design a procedure - e.g.,
a court trial, an arbitration rule, an auction, or a competitive market - that seems
fair and impartial a priori, and by its functioning produces an allocation (which
might or might not seem fair a posteriori). Most of the chapters in this volume
deal with normative criteria and solutions, but some are concerned with pro-
cedural allocation mechanisms. In both cases game theory plays an important role:
cooperative game theory in the design of normative formulas, and noncooperative
game theory in the design of procedures.
Despite its numerous practical applications, there has until recently been
relatively little theory, and even less empirical observation, about how cost alloca-
tions are, or ought to be, accomplished. Traditionally the subject has been
regarded by economists and accountants as at best a necessary evil. In the
economics literature one solution is prominent - "Ramsey pricing" (Ramsey, 1927;
Baumol and Bradford, 1970) - but, despite over 50 years of writing on the subject
by economists, Ramsey pricing has not found general acceptance by rate-makers
and cost-benefit analysts. Similarly, the accounting literature has, until
recently, given the problem short shrift. It is even claimed by some that cost allo-
cation is an irrational activity that should be indulged in rarely if at all (Thomas,
1974). (For a more balanced range of views within the accounting profession, see
Moriarity, 1981, and also Chapter 2 below.)
The aim of this volume is to explore three issues from diverse points of view.
First, what methods are in current use by firms, public utilities, government agen-
cies, accountants, and managers of public facilities? Second, are there general
principles of allocative fairness that are supported by observation, common sense,
and logic? Third, can theory characterize different methods in terms of their fair-
ness properties and identify new ones?
The volume is divided into two parts. Part I deals with the mathematical for-
mulation of cost allocation problems, the definition of solution concepts, and their
characterization axiomatically by general principles of equity. Part II deals with
applications to airports, reservoirs, telephone networks, and public rate-making
in general. The first part is fairly technical mathematically, while the second is
more accessible to the general reader.
Chapter 1 focuses on game-theoretic methods of cost allocation. Four cases
are used to illustrate how cost allocation problems can be modeled as cooperative
games: sharing municipal water costs, imputing costs to purposes in multipurpose
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reservoirs, setting airport landing fees, and allocating business trip expenses
among sponsors. The most important allocation methods are defined, including the
Shapley value, the core, the nucleolus, the separable costs remaining benefits
method, Aumann-Shapley pricing, and Ramsey pricing. The pros and cons of
these methods are weighed from a normative standpoint, and then certain princi-
ples of allocative fairness distilled that axiomatically characterize particular
methods. The argument suggests that the Shapley value (or Aumann-Shapley pric-
ing) and the nucleolus are the most robust and satisfactory methods. Which is
most appropriate depends on the structure of the problem at hand.
Chapter 2, by Gary Biddle and Richard Steinberg, gives a scholarly survey
and critique of the literature on cost allocation in the firm. They observe that
objectivity and verifiability of the data on which allocations are based is of
pa.ramount importance to accountants, who can be held legally liable for the accu-
racy of financial statements. However, firms also employ internal allocation
schemes for purposes of accounting and control that are subject to less stringent
accounting standards. Biddle and Steinberg cite a 1981 study which found that 80
percent of the firms surveyed allocated some portion of the costs associated with
corporate management and service departments among the firm's constituent divi-
sions. They describe several methods that figure prominently in the accounting
literature, including those of Moriarity, Louderback, Balachandran-Ramakrishnan,
and Gangolly. The core and the Shapley value are also analyzed from an account-
ing perspective. They conclude that, while cost allocation forms an integral part
of managerial incentive structures and financial accounting systems in firms, the
methods advanced in the theoretical literature have not had much practical
impact as yet on accounting practices.
In Chapter 3, Mirman, Tauman, and Zang treat the problem of allocating the
joint costs of production among the outputs of a firm. They demonstrate why the
Aumann-Shapley pricing mechanism is particularly desirable from a normative
standpoint. They explain the mechanics of Aumann-Shapley pricing using simple
examples, and show the difficulties inherent in other approaches, such as modi-
fied forms of marginal cost pricing. They also point out tha.t Aumann-Shapley
prices can be computed relatively easily when the firm's cost function is
estimated by linear programming techniques. Finally, they extend their axiomatic
framework to handle the problem of allocating fixed. costs of production among dif-
ferent product lines.
Martin Shubik, who in the early 19S0s originated the idea of applying game-
theoretic ideas to cost accounting, raises in Chapter 4 a number of important
questions about the modeling of cost allocation problems. He points out both the
advantages and the pitfalls of the characteristic function as a modeling device:
while economical. it ignores crucial distinctions in the information available to the
parties, the specifics of coalition formation, the sequencing of moves, and the pos-
sibility of threats. In some cases it may be more appropriate to model the problem
by a strategic or extensive form game, although there are often difficulties in
specifying such models. Shubik suggests a novel approach to bounding the set of
reasonable allocations in a cooperative game by defining the notion of an upper
and a lower characteristic function, based on the partition function form. The
central point, however, is that cost allocation is an exercise in modeling; thus the
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full diversity of interested parties, their purposes, and the goals of allocation
must be recognized before meaningful solutions can be obtained. He predicts that
accounting for the combinatorics of joint costs and revenues may prove to be the
next major breakthrough in accounting - analogous to the development of
input-output and national income accounts - and, as in those cases, the potential
usefulness of the theory will stimulate the collection of necessary data to carry
out the calculations.
In Chapter 5 Ted Groves addresses the issue of how cost allocation in the
firm may affect the reliability of information reported to central management by
decentralized divisions. Groves treats the case of a firm providing some common
good or service (e.g., computing facilities) for the nonexclusive use of its auto-
nomous divisions, the full cost of which is allocated by a prescribed method
amoung the various divisions. It is assumed management does not know the true
demands of the divisions for the service. He shows the impossibility of concocting
a method that allocates costs exactly and implements the optimal level of service
by inducing the divisions to report their true demands. In other words, no full
cost allocation scheme is both efficient and incentive-compatible.
This result stands in contrast to a somewhat different situation portrayed in
Chapter 1 (Section 6). Suppose that management can designate specific amounts
of the service for the exclusive use of each division. In this case a mechanism can
be designed in which divisions bid the amounts they are willing to pay for the
designated levels of service. It can be shown that a noncooperative equilibrium
exists that results in an efficient level of service and covers all costs. Moreover,
if the cost game has a nonempty core, then full costs can be allocated exactly.
The concluding chapter of Part I, by Terje Lensberg, views cost allocation
within the broader framework of economic welfare. He poses the following ques-
tion: under what circumstances is the decentralized allocation of costs and bene-
fits within public enterprises and firms "consistent" with an allocation that is fair
for society as a whole? In other words, what characterizes societal allocations
that have the property that they seem fair when viewed by any subgroup of
society (assuming the others' allocations are fixed)? This "consistency" or "sta-
bility" principle (together with several regularity properties) implies that the
allocation must maximize some additively separable social welfare function on the
space of feasible alternatives. In other words, in order for an allocation to be
locally stable, it must meet some global optimization criterion. Commonly advo-
cated social welfare functions of this type include classical utilitarianism, the
Nash social welfare function. and a refinement (due to Sen) of Rawls's maximin cri-
terion. Within this framework, Lensberg provides new axiomatizations of particu-
lar allocation rules, such as those of Nash and Rawls, and a normative framework
for treating decentralized allocation problems in relation to global concepts of
social welfare.
The first chapter of Part II represents a scholarly, fascinating exploration
by Edward Zajac into the public's perception of what constitutes justice and fair-
ness in economic allocation. Drawing on his experience with the outcomes of pub-
lic utility rate cases in the United States, combined with examples culled from
economic history, politics, and the law, Zajac formulates six Propositions of per-
ceived economic injustice - on the theory that examples of injustice are easier
to pinpoint than justice per se. He finds that these Propositions not only conflict
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in some cases with economists' notions of economic efficiency, but to some extent
with each other. Zajac's point is that justice (or the lack of justice) means balanc-
ing conflicting principles, the quest for economic efficiency being only one
ingredient in achieving that balance.
Chapters 8 and 9 focus on the specific issue of allocating costs and set ting
prices in the telecommunications industry. In Chapter B. William Sharkey summar-
izes the economic, technological, and regulatory aspects of telecommunications in
the United States. He then shows how concepts from cooperative game theory can
be used to clarify several important issues, including cross-subsidization between
markets, and inefficiencies that result from the fragmentation of markets by the
competitive entry of other firms. He also discusses the special structure of cost
allocation problems on fixed networks.
Chapter 9, by Nicolas Curien, summarizes recent French telecommunications
pricing policy. Using estimates of marginal costs as a reference point, he
describes a methodology for computing the amount of cross-subsidization between
different services such as long-distance traffic, local traffic. and network access.
and between different classes of users such as businesses, households, and coin
telephones. He concludes. based on recent French data. that local traffic tends
to subsidize long-distance traffic, that general traffic tends to subsidize network
access. and that businesses subsidize household and coin telephone use. He also
draws attention to cross-subsidizations between peak and off-peak users, between
urban and rural customers, and between different uses of the same network such
as voice and data transmission. He concludes by pointing out that the goals of
economic efficiency and subsidy-free pricing may be outweighed by other politi-
cal, economic. and equity considerations in setting French pricing policy.
In Chapter 10. Michel Balinski and .Francis Sand describe a procedure for
allocating landing rights at congested airports. The number of scheduled landings
or take-offs in a particular hourly period (called "slots") are limited by the capa-
city of the airport. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) establishes quotas on the number of these slots at certain airports. and par-
cels them out among the different airlines by "scheduling committees" composed
of industry representatives. Balinski and Sand investigate an auctioning pro-
cedure for achieving a more economically efficient allocation of these slots. In
this method, repeated bidding for slots occurs simultaneously across different
markets, which allows airlines to take into account the complex interdependence
among the slots that they require for scheduling flights. It thus represents an
approach to allocating public rights of access by competitive bidding.
In the final chapter, Norio Okada describes in detail how the "separable
costs remaining benefits method" is employed in Japan to attribute costs to the
different purposes served by multipurpose reservoirs: flood control, irrigation,
power, and industrial and municipal supplies. Using Japanese engineering data
from the Sameura Dam project. which was built between 1963 and 1970. he gives a
detailed account of the cost allocation process, including all of the codicils and ad
hoc assumptions needed to make the analysis complcte. It thus forms a sobering
antidote to the earlier theory, which often takes the problem of estimating the
relevant data for granted.
This diverse compendium suggests that theory has moved rapidly in recent
years, but is still far in advance of actual practice. Indeed the challenge to
theory is to become both simple and robust enough to be practical. For this
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effort to be successful more careful experimentation and observation in conjunc-
tion with theorizing seems to be called for. If this volume serves no other pur-
pose, it is hoped that it may stimulate further research of this type.
H. Peyton Young
Washington. D.C.
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CHAPT1':R 1
3
M~~THODS AND PRINCIPLES O:P' COST ALLOCATION
H. Peyton Young
1 Introduction
A central problem in ;Jlanning the provision of goods or services by a public
enterprise is determining a "fair-" or "just" allocation of the common costs of pro-
duction. Examples include setting fees for the use of a common facility such as an
airport, a transit system, a communications network, a canal, or a reservoir'. Such
enterprises, whether strictly public (like a reservoir), or publicly regulated (like
telephones) are generally required to "stand on their own bottoms": prices must
be set to exactly cover costs, possibly including a mark-up to cover the costs of
capital. The economic ideal - marginal cost pricing - does not have this property
except in very special cases.
In practice, arrencies and firms use simple costing formulas and criteria to
solve such problems. A case in point is the "separable costs remaining benefits"
method employed by water resource planning agencies to cost out multipurpose
reservoir projects. This method is defined in Section 3. Other less sophisticated
devices include allocating costs in proportion to some criterion such as number of
customers, revenues, profits, or usage rates if the latter can be unambiguously
defined. The defect with these methods is that they almost completely ignore the
problem of motivation: why, for example, should agents accept an allocation that
exceeds their opportunity costs or willingness to pay?
The aim of this chapter is to survey cost allocation methods from an
axiomatic perspective. What are the essential principles and properties that
characterize different methods? In answering this query we must bear in mind
that principles which seem compelling in one context may not be so in another.
There is no "method for all seasons". Nevertheless, the axiomatic method does
narrow down the plethora of possibilities to a handful of reasonable choices: the
Shapley value, the core and certai:1 particular core solutions like the nucleolus,
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Ramsey prices when demands are known, and outcomes of demand revelation
mechanisms when demands are :-lot known. General context, the level of informa-
tion, and - not least - precedent, all playa role in determining which pr-inciples
and methods seem most apt for a particular problem.
2 Problem Formulation and Examples
~any of the salient features of cost allocation can be captured in the follow-
ing simple format. Let N =(1,2, "', n I represent a set of potential customers of a
public service or public facility. Each customer will either be served at some tar-
geted level or not served at all. In other words, a customer i EN will either get a
telephone or not, take a train ride or not, hook up to the local water supply or
not. The problem is to determine how much to charge for the service, based on
the costs of providing it.
The cost data are summarized by a joint cost function c (3). which is
defined for all subsets 3 eN of potential customers. c (3) represents the least
cost of serving the customers in 3 by the most efficient means. The cost of serv-
ing no one is assumed to be zero: c (¢) =O. c is called the characteristic func-
tion of a cost game.
A cost allocation method is a function rp defined for all N and all joint cost
functions c on N such that
(1)
where xi is the charge assessed customer i.
Example 1: Multipurpose reservoirs. One of the most perplexing examples
of joint cost allocation is the multipurpose reservoir. Suppose that a dam on a
river is planned to serve several different regional interests, such as flood con-
trol. hydro-electric power. navigation. irrigation. and municipal supply. The dam
can be built to different heights, depending on which purposes are to be included.
The cost function associated with such a problem typically exhibits decreasing
marginal costs per acre-foot of water impounded up to some critical height of the
dam. after which increasing marginal costs set in due to technological limitations.
The water resource planning problem is how to apportion the costs among the dif-
ferent purposes.
This problem has a rich history dating back to the creation of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) in the 1930s (see the historical accounts by Ransmeier,
1942 and Parker. 1943). Certain cost allocation formulas suggested for the TVA
system are still in use today (in modified form) by water resource agencies. includ-
ing the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of the Interior.
Table 1,1 shows a joint cost function, based on actual TVA data, for three
"purposes": navigation (n), flood control (f), and power (p). (Ransmeier, 1942,
p 329).
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Table 1.1 TVA cost data for navigation (n), flood
control (f ), and power (P) (thousands of dollars).
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Coa.lition
¢
!nl
!fl
!p l
!n,f l
In ,p l
!f,P l
!n,f ,p l
----
Cost
o
163,520
140,826
250,096
301,607
378,821
367,370
412,584
Example 2: Municipal cost sharing. The second example is one of invest-
ment planning, and is based on actual cost data derived from an engineering study
(Young et al., ~982). The Skane region of southern Sweden consists of 18 munici-
palit;es, including the city of Malmo (see Figure 1.1). Each municipality requires a
certain minimum supply of water that it can either buy from outside sources, pump
from its own wells, or obtain by cooperating with some or all of the other munici-
palities in a regional system. Each municipality i has a minimum alternative cost
or opportunity cost of supply r: (i), assuming that no Ggreement with the others
is reached. ~imilarly, each potential coalition 8 of municipalities has a minimum
alternative cost c (5) of supplying just the members of 5 by the most efficient
means available, independently of the others.
Figure 1.1 Skane, Sweden, and its division into groups of municipalities.
The value c (8) is determined by engineering considerations, i.e., by estimat-
ing the least-cost routing of pipes and pumping stations. c (8) is defined so that it
includes the possibility that some or all members of 5 develop independent on-site
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sources if this is the least-cost alternative of supplying S. Under these c i ,'-
cumstances c: will be subadditive:
c (S) + c (T) ~ c (S u T) for all disjoint S ,r
since the cost of serving two disjoint groups includes the possibility of serving
them separately. This amounts to a reasonable convention in defining the cost
function, but we shall not assume it in the sequel without special notice.
In practice estimating the costs of 218 -1 =262,143 coalitions is impossible.
However, the municipalities fall into natural groupings based on geographical loca-
tion, existing water transmission systems, and hydrological features that deter-
mine the best routes for transmission networks. These conditions can be used to
aggregate the 18 municipalities into six units, denoted by A, H, K, L, M, T, as
shown in Figure 1.1. The cost function is given in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Costs of alternative supply systems (millions of Swedish crowns).
Coalitions are separated by commas if there are no economies of scale from
their combination.
------- -----_._-- -_._--~-------------~~----_._.-... _----_.._-----------
Group Total Cost Group Total Cost Group Total Cost
-- ------ -_.-.--
A 21.95 AHK 40.74 AHKL 48.95
H 17.08 AHL 43.22 AHKM 60.25
K 10.91 AH,M 55.50 AHK,T 62.72
L 15.88 AH,T 56.67 AHL,M 64.03
M 20.81 A,K,L 48.74 AHL,T 65.20
T 21.98 A,KM ~3.40 AH,MT 74.10
A,K,T ~4.84 A,K,LM 63.96
AH 34.69 A,LM 53.05 A,K,L,T 70.72
A,K 32.86 A,L,T 59.81 A,K,MT 72.27
A,L 37.83 A,MT 51.36 A,LMT 73.41
A,M 42.76 HKL 27.26 HKL,M 48.07
A,T 43.93 HKM 42.55 HKL,T 49.24
HK 22.96 HK,T 44.94 HKMT 59.35
HL 25.00 HL,M <15.81 HLMT 64.41
H,M 37.89 HL,T 46.98 KLMT 56.61
H,T 39.06 H,MT 56.49 AHKL,T 70.93
K,L 26.79 K,LM 42.01 AHKLM 69.76
KM 31.45 K,L,T 48.77 AKHMT 77.42
K,T 32.89 K,MT 50.32 AHLMT 83.00
LM 31.10 LMT 51.46 AKLMT 73.97
L,T 37.86 HKLMT 66.46
MT 39.41
AHKLMT 83.82
~------------------_.------------ -------- -------_.~---~-----_..- -_.._._-
Example 3: Airport landing fees. Landing fee schedules at airports are
often established to cover the costs of building and maintaining the runways. The
capital cost of a runway is essentially determined by the size of the largest air-
craft using it. Suppose that there are m different types of aircraft using an air-
port and that ck (l.,;,k ,.::: m) is the cost of building a runway to accommodate an air-
craft of type k. Index the types so that 0 <c 1 < ... <em' and let Co =O. Let Nk
be the set of all aircraft landings of type k in a given year (say n k in number) and
let
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m m
N= UNk,n = L; n k .k =1 k =1
Each "player" i in N represents an aircraft using the airport exactly once. The
cost game is defined as follows:
c (S) =max! ck : S n Nk ~ ¢ !
Table 1.3 gives cost and landing data for Birmingham airport in 1968-69, as
reported by Littlechild and Thompson (1977).
Table 1.3 Aircraft landings, runway costs, and charges at Birmingham airport,
1968-69.
----_._----~~---~~---~~~-
Number of
AircrClj't
Aircraft 1'ype Landings
n i
Fokkcr Friendship 27
Viscount 800
Hawker Siddeley Trident
Britannia
Caravelle VI R
BAC 111 (500)
Vanguard 953
Comet 4B
Britannia 300
Corvair Corronado
Boeing 707
42
9,555
288
303
151
1,315
505
1,128
151
112
22
Annual Charges
Capital (Shapley
Cost Value)
ci xi
65,899 4.86
76,725 5.66
95,200 10.30
97,200 10.85
97,436 10.92
98,142 11.13
102,496 13.40
104,849 15.07
113,322 44.80
115,440 60.61
117,676 162.24
Example 4: Travel expenses. An itinerant mathematician is invited on a lec-
ture tour originating in Washington, with stops in New York, Boston, and Chicago.
The total fare is $540. The problem is how to allocate the fare "fairly" amonp, the
trip's three sponsors. The data of the problem shown below are the alternative
costs that would be incurred if the traveler had to make either three separate
trips, or one trip involving two of the sponsors and a separate trip for the third,
etc.
- - ~_._- ----_.~------~- -------_._--
!NY! + lBOS! + !cHIl = 120 + 180 + 420 720
!NY,BOS! + CHI 180 + 420 = 600
!NYj + !BOS,CHI! 120 + 510 630
BOS + !NY,CHI! 180 + 480 = 660
!NY,BOS,CHI! = 540 540
---~~-
Suppose instead that the traveler gives three lectures in Boston, two in New
York, and one in Chicago, the cost data remaining as before. A problem in modeling
arises: Are the different lectures the primary entities to which costs are
assigned? Or is it the sponsors? (Or is it the minutes of lecture time?) The
answer depends on the context. If, for example, the lectures are deemed to be
the primary objects of allocation, then the cost function would be defined OIl the
set N of all six lectures as follows. c (i) would be $180 if i is a lecture in Roston,
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t120 if i is a lecture in :'-Jew York and $420 if it is the lecture in Chicago. c (i ,j)
would be $480 if i is in :'-Jew York and j is in Chicago, and $120 if both i and j are
in New York, and so forth. In short, c (5) is the least cost of supplying each set 5
of lectures, and the allocation of costs is made (by whatever method) on a per-
lecture basis.
3 Cost Allocation and Cooperative Game Theory
3.1 The Core
The foundations of cooperative game theory were laid down in the treatise of
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(1914). The idea of the "core" of a game, which received only passing mention
from these two founding fathers, was later developed by Gillies (1953) and Shap-
ley. Interestingly, the core was foreshadowed in the early literature on
cost-benefit analysis. A case in point is the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of
1933 as analyzed by Ransmeier (1942) (see also the excellent review by Straffin
and Heaney, 1981). The Act stipulated that the costs of TVA projects be specifi-
cally allocated among the purposes involved, the principal ones being navigation,
flood control, and power. Ransmeier suggested several criteria for judging cost
allocation methods:
The method should have a reasonable logical basis... It should not result in
charging any objective with a greater investment than would suffice for its
development at an alternate single purpose site. Finally, it should not charge
any two or more objectives with a greater investment then would suffice for
alternate dual or multiple purpose development. (p 220)
In terms of the joint cost function c (5) these requirements state that, if Xi
is the charge to purpose i, then in addition to the break-even requirement
2:: Xi =c (N) the following inequality should hold for every subset 5 of purposes
N
(including singletons),
2::xi ~ r:(5) .
S -
(2)
This condition is known as the stand-alone cost test. Its rationale is evi-
dent: if cooperation among the parties is to be voluntary, then the calculus of
self-interest dictates that no participant - or group of participants - be charged
more than their "stand-alone" (opportunity) costs. Otherwise they would have no
incentive to agree to the proposed allocation.
A related principle of cost allocation is known as the incremental cost test.
It states that no participant should be charged less than the marginal cost of
including him. For example, in Table 1.1, the cost of including n at the margin is
c (n,f ,p) -c (f ,p) = 45,211
In general, the incremental or marginal cost of any set S is defined to be
c (N) -c (N -5), and the incremental cost test requiies that the allocation x f:.R N
satisfy
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(3)~Xi?c(N)-c(N-S) forallSCN
s
IWhereas (2) provides incentives fo:" voluntary cooperation, (3) arises from con-
siderations of equity. For, if (3) were violated for some S, then it could be said
that the coalition N -S is subsidizing S. In fact, (2) and (3) are equivalent given
Lhe assumption of full cost allocation ~Xi =c (N).
N
The core of c, written Core (c), is the set of all allocations :z: €RN such that
(2) [equivalently (3)] holds for all SC.N. The core is a closed, compaet, convex
subset of R N . Unfortunate~y, it may be empty, even if c is subadditive.
The core of the TVA cost game is illustrated in Figure 1.2. In this figure, the
top vertex x n represents the situation where all costs are allocated to n; the
right-hand vertex the case where all costs are allocated to P. etc. The core is
fairly large, reflecting the rapidly decreasing marginal costs of building higher
dams. To illustrate other possibilities, let us modify the TVA cost data in one
respect: imagine that total costs c (n.f ,p) increase to 515,000 due to a cost over-
run (the other costs remaining as before). The core of this modified TVA cost
gamc is shown in enlarged form in Figure 1.3.
X n == 163,520
I'
xf == 33,763
,
xp == 250,096
------:f----------~"'1_---~____\,...._xn == 45,214
xp == 412,584
Xf == 412,584
Figure 1.2 The core of the TVA cost game.
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X f = 140,826
Xp = 213,393
Xn = 147,630
X n = 163,520
X f = 136,179
Figure 1.3 The core of the modified TVA cost game (enlarged).
3.2 Nonemptiness of the core
When is the core nonempty? It is not enough that c be subadditive. For
example, the following 3-person cost game is subadditive but has an empty core.
c (1) =c (2) =c (3) =6
c (1,2) =c (1,3) =c (2,3) =7
c (1,2,3) =11
The reason is that the inequalities on the charges
xl +x 2 :<;;7, Xl +x 3 :<;;7, x 2 +x 3 :<;;7, (4)
when summed, imply that 2(x l +x 2 +x 3):<;;21, which contradicts the break-even
requirement xl+x 2 +x 3 =11.
A natural but quite strong condition guaranteeing the nonemptiness of the
core is that c be concave (or submodular)
c (S u T) + c (S n T) :<;; c (S) + c (T) for all S. TeN (5)
For each i €N and S eN define i's marginal cost contribution relative to
S by
i _ {c (S) -c (S -i) if i €S
c (S) - c (S +i) -c (S) if i t. S . (6)
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The function c i (S) ls the derivative of c with respect to i. It may be veri-
fied that c is concave if and only if for all i the derivative of c with respect to i
is a monotonically decreasing function of S,
(7)
(8)
(9)
Theorem 1 (Shapley, 1971): lfr: is concave then the core of c is nonempty.
3.4 Costs versus benefits
In cooperative game theory it is customary to focus on the gains each coali-
tion of players can realize rather than on the costs directly. Given a cost func-
tion r:, one way of defining the potential gain of a coalition S is the savings lts
members can achieve by cooperating instead of going alone:
v(S) =Z;c(i)-c(S) for allSeN
S
v (S) is called the value of S, and v is the characteristic function of the cost-
savings game. Note that v(¢) =O.
In some sltuations net profits or benefits. rather than costs, are the primary
objects of allocation. For example, if r: (S) is the cost of a firm producing a subset
of outputs S eN, and r i is the revenue from product i ~N, then the net proflts
from S are given by the characteristic function
v(S) =Z;ri -c(S) .
S
The net profitability of different combinations of divisions is a a natural con-
cern for corporate management interested in acquiring or disposing of certain
divisions.
Whether costs or beneflts are the primary focus of attention depends on the
context. An allocation method rp may be applied to any characteristic function (c
or v) whether it represents costs or benefits. In principle, of course, it would be
desirable if the two approaches give equivalent results. In general, say that two
characterisUc functions u and v are strategically equivalent if for some scalar
a "t' 0 and vector b f:.R N , u =av + b; that is
u (S) =av(S) + ~ bi for all SeNs
An allocation method rp is covariant if
rp(av + b) = arp(v) + b
(10)
(11)
Most (though not all) of the methods we will discuss are covariant. As a prac-
tical matter, in most applications it is the costs that are known. Benefits are
often conjectural and subject to manipulation or distortion. Hcnce the main focus
will be on cost functior.s. Methods for determining demand are trcated in
Section 6.
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(12)
(13)
4.1 The separable costs remaining benefits method
The TVA asserted that its allocation of joint costs was not based on anyone
mathematical formula, but on judgment (TVA, 1938). As Ransmeier (1942) wryly
observes, "there is little to recommend the pure judgment method for allocation.
In many regards it resembles what Professor Lewis has called the 'trance method'
of utility valuation" (p 385). :--Jevertheless, according to Ransmeier, the TVA did in
fact use a method and merely "rounded off" the resulting allocations in the light
of judgment. This method, called the "alternative justifiable expenditure method",
is a variant of an earlier proposal called the "alternate cost avoided method", due
to Martin Glaeser, professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin (see
Ransmeier, 1942, pp 270-5). It has become, after further refinements, the princi-
pal textbook method used by civil engineers to allocate the costs of multipurpose
reservoirs, and is known as the "separable costs remaining benefits method"
(SCRB): see James and Lee (1971).
The separable cost of a purpose i E: N is its marginal cost si =
c(N)-c(N-i). The alternate cost for i is c(i), and the remaining bene/it1 to
i (after deducting its "separable cost ") is
r i =c(i)-si
The SCRB method assigns costs according to the formula
Xi =si + ;:j [C(N)-t Sj ].
N
In other words, each purpose pays its separable cost and the "nonsepclrable
costs" c (N) - r. s j are then allocated in proportion to the remaining benefits. The
N
implicit assumption is that all ri ~ 0, which is the case if c is subadditive.
For the TVA modified cost data of Figure 1.3, the separable costs, remaining
benefits, and corresponding allocation of total costs are sl:;lOwn in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4 The SeRB method applied to the modified TVA data of Figure 1.3.
----._--- ------_.-
n / p Total
Alternate eost c (i) 163,520 140,B26 250,096 ,554,442
Separable cost si 147,630 136,179 213,393 497,202
Remaining benefit,
r i =c(i)-si 15,B90 4,647 36,703 57,240
Allocation of nonsep. cost 4.941 1,445 11,412 17,79B
Allocation 152,571 137,624 224,B05 515.000
A simple manipulation of (12) reveals that the SCRB method can be given a
succinct formulation in terms of the cost-savings game v, For each agent i E: N let
vi(N) =v(N)-v(N-i) rerresent the marginal cost savings att.ributable to i.
Given the charges xl' ... , x n ' let Yi =c (i) -Xi represent the savings imput.ed to
i. The SCRB imputes savings according to the formula
Yi = vi (N) v (N) for all i
~vj (N)
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In other words, the SCRB allocates cost savings in proportion to i 's marginal
contribution to cost savings (see Straffin and Heaney, 1981). This solution has
also been proposed for general games v as a means of minimizing players' "propen-
sity to disrupt" the solution (Gately, 1974).
4.2 The Shapley value
Imagine that the participants in a cost allocation problem are rational agents
who view the outcome as being subject to uncertainty. They might reason about
their prospects as follows. Everyone is thought of as "signing up", or committing
themselves, in some random order. At each stage of the sign-up the allocation rule
is myopic: each player must pay the incremental cost of being included at the
moment of signing. The assessments will therefore depend on the particular order
in which the players join.
Instead of actually proceeding in this way, rational agents might simply evalu-
ate their prospects from the comfort of their armchairs by calculating their
expected payoffs from such a scheme. Assume that all orderings are a priori
equally likely. The "expected" cost assessment for i is then
x = L; ,IS-il!IN-Si!ci(S)
i SeN I N I!
;ES
(14)
where c i (S) is the marginal cost of i relative to S, and the sum is over all subsets
S containing i.
Formula (14) is known as the Shapley value of the characteristic function c
(Shapley, 1953). It may be interpreted as the average marginal contribution each
player would make to the grand coalition if it were to form one player at a time.
The Shapley value for the revised TVA cost game is:
X n =151,967-2/3, xf =134,895-1/6, x p =228,137-1/6 .
This allocation is not in the core (see Figure 1.4) since
X n + x p = 380,104-5/6 > 378,821 = c (n ,p)
It can be shown (Shapley, 1971) that if c is concave, then the Shapley value is in
Core (c).
4.3 The nucleolus and its relatives
If the core conditions are considered of primary importance (as in public
utility pricing, for example), the Shapley value may not do. An allocation method
rp is a core allocation method if rp(c) E: Core (c) whenever Core (c) rc ¢. What con-
stitutes a reasonable and consistent way of selecting a unique point from the
(nonempty) core of a game?
A standard answer to this question is to select an allocation that makes the
least-well-off coalition as well-off as possible. The problem is to agree on a mean-
ing of "well-off". One tack is to say that coalition S is better off than T, relative
to an allocation x , if
c(S)-L;x i > c(T)-L;xiS T (15)
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(16)
The quantity e (x ,S) =C (S)-~xi is called the excess of S relative to x.
S
To find an allocation x that minimizes the maximum excess e (x ,S) over all
proper subsets rp eS eN is a problem in linear programming:
max ~
subject to e (x ,S) ~ ~ for all S ~ ¢,N
and ~xi =c (N)
N
If there is a unique optimal solution x* to (16), this is the nucleolus of c. If
not, use the following tie-breaking rule. Order the excesses e (x ,S), ¢ cS eN,
from lowest to highest, and denote this (2n -2) vector by e (x).
The nucleolus 2 (Schmeidler, 1969) is the vector x that maximizes e (x)
lexicographically, i.e., for which the value of the smallest excess is as large as
possible and is attained on as few sets as possible, the next smallest excess is as
large as possible, and is attained on as few sets as possible, etc. It can be demon-
strated (Schmeidler, 1969) that there is a unique x that minimizes e (x). The proof
is based on the observation that if x' and x" maximize e (x), then e [(x' + x ") I 2]
is strictly larger lexicographically than either e (x ') or e (x ") unless x' := x".
The idea of the nucleolus is to find a solution in the core that is "central" in
the sense of being as far away from the boundaries as possible (see Figure 1.4).
There is some arbitrariness in the definition of the metric. however. A reasonable
variant of the nucleolus is to define the excess of a coalition on a per capita basis:
e (x ,S) =[c (S) - ~ xi] I I S I. The above construction then defines the per cap-
S
ita nucleolus; (or "normalized" nucleolus; Grotte, 1970). As will be seen in Sec-
tion 5 below, the nucleolus is probably superior to the per capita nucleolus from
an axiomatic perspective.
Solutions for the Swedish municipal cost-sharing game by various methods are
compared in Table 1.5. .
Table 1.5 Cost allocations for the Swedish municipal cost-sharing game by the SCRB,
Shapley value, nucleOlus, and per capita nucleolus.
A H K L M T Total
_.__._-----"----
SCRB 19.54 13.28 5.62 10.90 16.66 17.82 83.82
Shapley 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 83.82
Nuc. 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 18.32 19.49 83.82
PC. Nuc. 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 18.54 19.71 83.82
-------------_._-----------_._----~-------_._---_._ .--------
5 Principles of Cost Allocation
Faced with a host of competing methods, what basis is there for choosing
among them? Each is computationally seductive; each has a certain mathematical
charm. The question remains: what are the fur:damental properties that an allo-
cation method should enjoy? We focus on three general types of <",llocative princi-
ples that apply not only to cost sharing but to other allocation problems as well.
These are: (1) additivity: if an allocation problem decomposes naturally into
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subproblems. can their solutions be added?; (2) mono tonicity: as the data of the
problem change. do solutions change in parallel fashion?; (3) consistency: are
solutions invariant when restricted to subgroups of agents? Not surprisingly.
these properties cannot all be satisfied simultaneously. Nevertheless, taken in
various combinations and strengths. they provide a framework for determining
which met.hods are most appropriate to the situation at hand.
Throughout, several basic properties of an allocation method l' will be taken
for granted. These are the break-even (or "efficiency") constraint:
~ rp i (c) = c (N) for all C and N. A second and very significant assumption is that
all of the data relevant to the allocation problem are contained in the cost func-
tion c. This leads to the natural requirement that. if c is symmetric with respect
to some two players i and j (Le .. if interchanging i and j leaves c invariant).
then rpi(c) = rpj(c). This symmetry assumption rules out "biased" methods that
allocate everything to player number 1. for example. It also rules out methods
that allocate on the basis of information contained in c and some other criterion
(such as size. usage rate, etc.). For a discussion of asymmetric solutions. see
Shapley (1981).
5.1 Additivity
For accounting purposes it is often convenient to assign costs to different
"cost categories" such as operations. planL maintenance. interest expense, and
marketing. In theory. each such category (denoted k = 1 ..... m) gives rise to a
different joint cost function C/c (S) on the given set N of activities or products.
The sum of these cost functions
m
~ c/c(S) =c(S)
/c =1
represents the total joint cost function. From an accounting standpoint it would
bc desirable if the allocation process could be carried out separately for each of
the cost categories. The total allocation of costs would be the sum of the cost
assip,nments in each category, and we would like this total allocation to be
independent of the parti.cular way the costs are categorized.
A cost allocation method rp is additive if for any joint cost functions c and c'
on N, 1'(c +c') = rp(c) +rp(c'), where c +c' is defined by (c +c')(S) =c(S) +c'(S)
for all S i;:;N.
In any cost game c on N. a player i is a dummy if i contributes nothing to
any coalition; Le., if ci(S) = 0 for all Sc.N. The dummy axiom states that if i is
a dummy in c, then rpi (c) = O.
Theorem 2 (Shapley. 1953): There is a unique allocation method that satisfies
the dummy and additivity axioms, namely the Shapley value.
The proof of this result relies on the following lemma. which shows that any
cost function can be decomposed into a linear combination of "primitive" ones.
For each nonempty subset R eN define the primitive cost function cR as follows:
{
1 if S"2R
cR(S) = 0 if S~R .
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Lemma (Shapley, 1953): Any cost junction c can be expressed as a weighted
combination of primitive ones:
(17)
The proof is obtained by letting
and verifying that (17) is an identity.
To prove Theorem 2. let rp be a method that satisfies dummy and additivity.
For any nonempty R c. N, the dummy axiom implies that rpi (cR) =0 for all it R.
Since cR is symmetric with respect to all i€R and since ):;rpi(cR) =1, it follows
N
that
(18)
In other words, rp is uniquely determined on all primitive cost functions. By (17)
and additivity, rp is uniquely determined on all games. Since the Shapley value
obviously has the claimed properties, it follows that rp is the Shapley value.
For the airport game (Section 2, Example 3), the Shapley value has a particu-
larly simple interpretation and is easy to compute (LittIechild and Owen, 1973).
All aircraft of type k are charged the same amount xk where
x k = ~ [l(C! -c! -~) / ~ n J.] .! =1 j =1
The cost of serving the smallest types of aircraft is divided equally among the ai:'-
craft of all types, then the incremental cost of serving the second smallest type is
divided equally among all aircraft except those of ,the smallest type, and so forth.
The proof follows by observing that for all S,
m
0' (S) = L: ck (8)
k =1
where each cost function ck (S) has the form ck (S) =ck -ck -1 if S' contains a
player of type j ~ k, and ck (3) =0 otherwise. The Shapley solution for Birming-
ham airport is shown in Table 1..3.
5.2 Monotonicity
Stated broadly. monotonicity means that if some player's cor:tribution to all
coalitions to which he belongs increases or stays fixed, then that player's alloca-
tion should not decrease. This concept is relevant to situations in which em alloca-
tion is not a one-shot affair, but is reassessed periodically as new information
emerges. For example, operations and maintenance costs will typically be allocilLed
annually or even quarterly; investment costs may have to be reassessed ex post if
there is a cost overrun.
In its most elementary form, monotonicity says that an increase in c (N) alone
does not cause any player's allocation to decrease. We sc,y that rp is monotonic in
the aggregate if for all c, c and N
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(19)c (N) ? c(N)and c (5) = c (5) for all 5 ~ N
implies rpi (c) ::> rpi (c) for all i eN
Thi.s ver'sion of monotonicity was first stated for cooperative games by Megiddo
(1974). It is analogous to "house monotonicity" in apportionment (Balinski and
Young, 1982) and to monotonicity in bargaining problems (Kalai, 1977).
It. is a simple exercise to show that both the Shapley value and the per cap-
ita nucleolus are monotonic in the aggregate and that they allocate any change in
c (N) equally among the players.
Both the SCRB and the nucleolus are egregiously non-monotonic. To illus-
trate, consider the SCRB allocation of 515,000 in total costs given in Table 1.4.
Suppose that total costs increase by 3 .. 000 due to a cost overrun. Then the separ-
able cost of each player increases by 3,000, and the total nonseparable costs
decrease by 6,000. The new allocation is x n =153,781, xI =139,581, xp =224,636.
Thus the overrun is allocated as !:J.xn = 1,210, !:J.xf = 1,957, and !:J.xp = -169. In other
words, p enjoys a rebate from a cost overrun.
The nucleolus suffers from the same defect. In the Swedish municipal cost-
sharing game, if total costs increase from 83.82 to 87.82. the nucleolus allocates
the cost overrun in the amounts:
A
0.41
H
1.19
K
-0.49
L
1.19
M
0.84
T
0.84
(20)
Hence K reaps a gain out of the group's loss.
Monotonicity in the aggregate can be generalized to changes in the value of
any coalition. A method rp is monotonic if an increase in the cost of a particular
coalition implies. ceteris paribus. no decrease in the allocation to any member of
that coalition. That is. for all c, c and TeN.
c (T) ::> c(T) and c (5) = c(5) for all 5 ~ T
implies rpi (c) ::> rpi (c) for all i c T
It is readily verified that (20) is equivalent to the following definition: rp is
monotonic if for all c £. and every fixed i EN.
c (5) ? c(5) whenever i E5, and c (5) = c(5) whenever i ~5
implies rpi (c) :::-: rpi (c) .
The following "impossibility" theorem shows that monotonicity is fundamen-
tally incompatible with staying in the core.
Theorem 3 (Young, 19B~)a): For [ N I ::> 5 there ex7.sts no monotonic core alloca-
tion method.
The proof is by eXample. Consider the cost function c defined on
N = !1,2,3.4,5l as follows:
18
c (5"1)
c (5"3)
c (5"5) =
c (3,5)
c(1,3,4)
c (1,2,4,5)
=
=
=
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3 c (5" 2)
9 c (5"4)
9 c (5"5) =
c (1 ,2,3)
c (2,4,~)
c (1,2,3,4,5)
= 3
9
11
For 5" ;;'5"1' ... ,5"5,5"5' ¢, define c (5") = min c (5"k)' and let c (¢) = 0
Sk:JS
If % is in the core of c, then
E xi ..:; c (5"k) for 1 ..:; k ..:; 5
Sk
adding these five relations we find that 3 E xi ..:; 33 whence Exi ..:; 11. But
N N
E xi = 11 by definition, so all inequalities E xi ..:; c (5"k) must be equalities. These
N ~
have a unique solution, % = (0,1.2,7,1), which constitutes the core of c.
Compare the game C, which is identical to c except that c(5"5) = c(5"6) = 12.
A similar argument shows that the unique core element is now ii = (3,0,0,6.3). Thus
the allocation to both 2 and 4 decreases when the value of some of the sets con-
taining them monotonically increases. This shows that no core allocation pro-
cedure is monotonic for I N I = 5, and by extension for I N I ;:.. 5.
Monotonicity refers to monotonic changes in the value of a single coalition, or
in the value of coalitions containing a single player. It is more likely in practice
that, over a period of time, some coalitions will increase in value and others will
decrease. These changes may occur by chance, or they may be under the control
of the players themselves.
A classical instance of a cost allocation problem in which the players can
manipulate the value of the coalitions is the apportionment of overhead costs
among the divisions of a firm (Shubik, 1962). Corporate management may employ an
internal cost accounting scheme to provide incentives for divisions to perform
more efficiently. Yet non-monotonic allocation methods have just the opposite
effect: by providing perverse incentives they reward inefficiency and sloth.
To illustrate. let N now denote a set of divisions (or product lines) in a firm,
each represented by a manager. For each 5" eN, c (5") represents the costs of
those divisions doing business without benefit of the others. The numbers under
the (partial) control of a division manager i are the costs of the coalitions i
belongs to. Suppose that manager i improves efficiency by lowering the costs of
all sets 5" of which he is a member. Simultaneously, other product managers may
be engaged in decreasing certain of the numbers c (T), or through mismanagement
increasing them. This adjustment process yields a new cost function cost c on N.
We can unequivocally say that i 's contribution to costs is lower in C than in c if
C i (5") ~ c i (5") for all 5" e N (21)
A method rp is strongly monotonic (does not create perverse incentives) if
whenever (21) holds for C, C, and i, then rpi (c) ~ rpi (c). Strong monotonicity obvi-
ously implies monotonicity.
Theorem 4 (Young, 1985a): The 5"hapley value is the unique allocation method
that is strongly monotonic.
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Note that the Shapley value is not the only monotonic allocation method.
since equal division [xi = c (N) / I N I for all i J has this property and is additive
too.
5.3 Consistency
If attention is restricted to concave cost functions. then the Shapley value is
in the core. is additive. and strongly monotonic. In short, it is a uniquely desir-
able method for such problems. If we consider cost functions that are not concave
and the allocation problem is one-shot, it may be more desirable to choose a
method that guarantees a solution in the core whenever the core is nonempty.
The core has important applications to the pricing policies of regulated
monopolies (Faulhaber. 1975; Zajac. 1978; Sharkey. 1982). Let (r l' r z . .... r n )
denote the revenues from products !1.2..... n l = N of a public utility. If these
violate the core conditions for some subset 5 of products, ~ r i >c (5). then a corn-
S
petitoI' might be able to enter the market. undercut the prices of the regulated
firm and steal a portion of his business (namely. the products in 5) while making a
positive profit. Moreover, if c is subadditive. the regulated firm would be left in
the unenviable position of producing the set N -5 at a loss. since
c (N) -c (5) :s c (N -5) and r; r i >c (5) imply r; r i <c (N -5).
- S N-S
For such problems the nucleolus has a strong claim to being the preferred
method. The argument for the nucleolus is based on the following general alloca-
tive principle. A globally valid. acceptable. or "fair" allocation should also be
seen as valid. acceptable. or "fair" when viewed.by any subgroup of the claimants.
In effect, no subgroup should want to "re-contraet". This concept is known vari-
ously in the literature as consistency or stability. It has been applied to a wide
variety of allocation problems. including the apportionment of representation
(under the name "uniformity". Balinski and Young, 1902); taxation rules, Young.
1985c), bankruptcy allocation methods (Aumann and Maschler. 1985). cooperative
games (Sobolev, 1975), surplus sharing (Moulin. 1985), and bargaining problems
(Harsanyi, 1959; Lensberg. 1982. 1903).
To illustrate the consistency concept for cost games, consider the nucleolus
x of the revised TVA cost game as pictured in Figure 1.4. Players nand p might
reason about their situation as follows. If f's allocation is granted to be
XI =138.502.5, this leaves a total of 376,497.5 to be divided between nand p.
The range of possible divisions (holding XI fixed) is represented by the dotted
line segment through x labeled L. In effect, L is the core of a smaller (or
"reduced") game on the two-player set !n ,p J. The question is: does xn . xp
represent a fair division relative to this reduced game? The answer is yes if we
accept the nucleolus as a fair division concept. The reason is that the nucleolus
of any two-person game with a nonempty core (which is simply a line segment) is
the midpoint of the core. As shown in Figure 1.4. the nucleolus bisects each line
segment through it in which the coordinate of one player is held fixed. In other
words. the nucleolus is still the nucleolus when viewed by any pair of players. The
same conclusion holds for every subgroup of players.
This leads to the following general definition. Let c be any cost game on a
set N (with or without a core) and let x be an allocation of c. ~ Xi = c (N). For
N
20 H. Peyton Young
any proper subset T r:. N (T ~ ¢), the reduced cost game for T re lative to % is the
game cT,% defined on all subsets S of T as follows:
cT % (S) = min l c (S uS') - ~ xi I, for ¢ eSc T (22)
'S'r.:.N-T S'
cT % (T) = ~ xi
, T
CT,%(¢) =0 .
An allocation method rp is consistent if for every set of players N, every
cost game c on N, and every proper subset T of N, rp(c) =% implies rp(cT ,%') =%T'
Note that this definition applies to all cost games c, whether or not they have a
nonempty core.3 It is a rather remarkable fact (and straightforward to check)
that the nucleolus is consistent.
Xf = 140,826
F
Nucleolus
x = 147630 "n '
136,179
/ x n = 163,520
__ xp = 221,130.25
X n = 155,367.25
SCRB
• _ Shapley value
Figure 1.4 Solutions of the TVA modified cost game.
Theorem 5 (Sobolev, 1975): The nucleolus is the unique allocation method
that is covariant and consistent.
Recall that a method rp is covariant if rp( ac + b) = arp(c) + b for every non-
zero scalar a and every n -vector b. In other words, changing the units in which
costs are measured, or translating the baselines from which they are measured,
does not materially affect the outcome. The nucleolus is clearly covariant. The
property is an important one from a practical standpoint, because there is often a
question as to which cost components ought to be included in the joint cost func-
tion c (S), and which should be attributed directly to particular players. In the
mathematician's lecture tour, for example, one might include in c the costs of local
travel (e.g. taxi fares), or attribute them directly to particular lectures and leave
them out of c. In the Swedish cost-sharing problem one could either attribute
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(23)
(24)
local pumping costs to individual municipalities separately or else include them in
the joint cost function. The covariance property says that, insofar as such costs
are additive and separable, the resulting allocations should be equivalent.
6 Economic Efficiency and Demand Revelation
Formulating the cost allocation problem as a cost game sweeps several impor-
tant issues under the rug. In particular. the cost game says nothing about agents'
willingness to pay. If a cost allocation method assigns charges that exceed the
benefits received, the agents might refuse to pay. There is a further problem: if
benefits are not incorporated into the analysis, how is one to choose the optimal
set of customers to serve? In specifying the set N, the cost game takes the
optimal set for granted. Assuming that benefits are known, how should they be
incorporated into the allocation process?
To answer this question, consider a cost game c (5), 5 eN. Suppose that each
agent i EN has a known utility of being served, u i . To keep matters simple, think
of u i as i's willingness to pay for receiving a fixed level of service (e.g., for hav-
ing a telephone installed). The net benefit of serving the set 5 of customers can
be defined as
(3(5) = Z; u i - r: (5)S
An economically efficient set is one that maximizes (3(5), say S*. The value
of a coalition 5 eN can be defined as the maximum net benefit obtainable by serv-
ing some, or all, of its members:
v (5) =' max (3(R)
Rc.S
v is called the benefit game. Note that by definition v (5) ~ v (T) ~ v (¢) = 0,
whenever 5:;T; also v(i) = max lUi -c(i),O j. If benefits are known, v can be
computed and an allocation y = (Y1' ... ,Yn ) defined, where ~ Yi = v (N). ForN
example, y might be obtained by applying the Shapley value, the SeRB method,
the nucleolus, or any other method directly to the game v. For every allocation of
benefits y, and every choice of efficient set S* eN, there is a concomitant alloca-
tion of costs, namely
{
U i -Yi if i ES*
Xi = 0 if i 't S*
Unfortunately, benefits do not have the same aura of reliability and objec-
tivity that costs do. They are too easily subject to manipulation: agents will have
an incentive to misreport their true benefits if this strategy results in lower
assessed costs.
Suppose, then, that cach agent's willingness to pay is known only to himself,
but that the cost function is common knowledge. Is there a bidding procedure or
incentive system that implements an efficient decision and allocates costs
exactly? Essentially the answer is no. For any general allocation mechanism that
exactly covers costs there is always some situation in which it pays some indivi-
dual to distort the result by sending a false signal.
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Nevertheless positive results can be obtained by relaxing these require-
ments and exploiting the special structure of cost allocation problems. Namely, it
is possible to design a straightforward demand revelation mechanism that covers
costs and selects an economically efficient set S*. Moreover, for certain impor-
tant classes of cost functions, one can do this without generating any surplus, ie.,
so that assessments exactly equal total costs.
Given a subadditive cost game c, the idea is to let each a!J,ent announce his
willingness to pay - not necessarily the true one - and to select an "apparently"
efficient set on this basis. (If there are ties the auctioneer has discretion in
which efficient set to select.)4 Each member in the selected set pays his bid; the
others pay nothing and are not served. This is called the demand revelation
game. There always exists a set of bids such that no set of agents can deviate
from these bids and each improve his gain. At such an equilibrium (called a
strong equilibrium) the set of bids accepted (i.e .. the set of agents served) will
be efficient relative to the true demands, and costs will be covered (though not
necessarily exactly). The payoff to agent i is Yi =u i -bi if i is served and bi is
his bid, and Yi =0 if i is not served.
We can illustrate this with an example. Consider again the TVA cost data of
Table 1.1, and suppose that the benefit to each of the three purposes is
un =125,000, uf =150,000, up =275,000. The costs c (5), net benefits (3(5) , and
values v (5) are shown in Table 1.6.
The "true" bids bn = 125,000, bf =150,000, and bp =275,000 are nol an equili-
brium: at these bids the set In J ,p l uniquely maximizes bids less costs, hence all
bids will be accepted; but each of the players can lower his bid (say by 10,000)
and thereby raise his payoff by 10,000, because even at these lower bids the set
In,f ,p l still uniquely maximizes bids less costs, so all bids will be accepted.
Is there a set of bids, and a selection of bids to accepl, from which there is
no incentive to move? The answer is yes. For example, suppose that n lowers his
bid from 125,000 to 45,214, the others staying put. Then both of the sets In,f ,p l
Table 1.6 A benefit game using TVA data.
¢
lnl
Ul
lp l
In,f l
In,p l
U,pl
In,f ,p l
c (5)
o
-38,520
9,174
24,904
-26,607
21,179
57,630
137,U6
v(5)
o
o
9,174
24,904
9,174
24,904
57,630
137,416
and U ,p l maximize bids net of cosls at 57,630. Next suppose that f :owcrs his
bid from 150,000 to 117,274, and p lowers from 275,000 to 250,096. Then total bids
equal total costs. Moreover, no agent can lower his bid further without being
excluded and receiving a payoff of zero. If any group of agents should lower their
bids, at least one of them will receive a payoff of zero. Hence the bids
bn =45,214, bf =117,274, bp =250,096, with all bids accepted. constitutes a
strong equilibrium with payoffs
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== 125,000 - 45,214
= 150.000 - 117,274
275.000 - 250,096
79.786
== 32,726
24.904
This allocation y is in the core of the benefit game (see Table 1.6) in the sense
that ~Yi ~ v (8) for all 8 c: N. This is a special case of the following result.
S -
Theorem 6 (Young, 1980): Let c be a subadditive cost game on N. and u E RN a
vector of benefits. The associated demand revelation game has a strong
equilibrium, and for any such equilibrium the set selected is efficient and
the total of accepted bids covers total costs. Moreover, if the benefit game v
defined as in (23) has a nonempty core, then there exist strong equilibria at
which the total of accepted bids exactly equals total costs, and the payoff vec-
tors from such equilibria correspond one-to-one with the allocations in Core
(v).
7 Aumann-Shapley and Ramsey Pricing
An alternative formulation of the cost allocation problem familiar to econom-
ists involves a firm producing n homogeneous products in quantities ql' ... , qn ~ O.
Costs are given by a production junction F: R~ -R, where F(q) is the joint
cost of producing the "bundle" q = (ql' ... , qn)' Assume that F has continuous
first partial derivatives everywhere on the <;iomain R~ (one-sided on the boundary)'
and that F(O) = 0 Given a target level of production q* > O. the goal is to find
unit prices p = (Pl' .... Pn) for the n goods such that costs are exactly covered:
(25)
This is the break-even constraint. By suitably defining F, one can include in
this formulation the cost of capital, or a percentage mark-up over cost.
An n -vector p satisfying (25) is a solution of the problem (F.q*). A
method is a function 1fi defined on all problems (F,q*), and all n ~ 1. such that
1fi(F.q*) = p is a solution of (F,q*).
Most of the concepts introduced previously have their analogues in this set-
ting. We briefly mention two of them. F may decompose naturally into a sum of
different cost categories
F(q) = Fl(q) +F2(q) for all q ~ 0 . (26)
In this case it would be desirable if the cost allocation process could be simi-
larly decomposed. 1fi is additive if (26) implies that for all q* > 0,
(27)
As shown by Biliera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1982) (see also
Rillera, Heath, and Verrecchia. 1981), additivity, together with several additional
regularity conditions, uniquely characterizes the following pricing method, which
is based on the Aumann-Shapley value for non-atomic games (Aumann and Shapley.
1974):
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(2B)
1
Pi = JeaF(tq*) I aqd dt for all i
o
These Aumann-Shapley prices satisfy the break-even constraint, and are
additive. Intuitively. Pi represents the average marginal cost of i along the ray
from 0 to the target q* .
Aumann-Shapley prices have an important incentive property analogous to
strong monotonicity in cost games. Imagine that each product line i is supervised
by a division manager. The manager's concern is that his division looks profitable
- indeed his bonus may depend upon it. Whether it is profitable depends on how
costs are imputed to his division, and hence on the cost allocation formula. From
the point of view of corporate headquarters. the purpose of an accounting scheme
is to encourage product managers to innovate and reduce costs. In short, its
interest is in a method that rewards efficiency. How can increases in efficiency
be measured with respect to individual products? A natural test is to say that i 's
contribution to costs decreases if aF(q) I aqi decreases for all levels of output
q.
A method 'if! is strongly monotonic if for all production functions F,G and
for every fixed i.
aF(q) I aqi ;::>- aG (q) I aqi for all q ~ 0
(29)
implies'if!i(P,q*);::>-'if!i(G,q*) forallq* >0 .
Together with the analog of symmetry, strong monotonicity characterizes the
Aumann-Shapley method uniquely (Young, 19B5b).
Aumann-Shapley prices may be computed from the piecewise linear produc-
tion function that arises from solving a cost-minimizing linear program.
Another method of cost allocation, which is popular in the economics litera-
ture, is "Ramsey pricing". As above. assume that there are n homogeneous divisi-
ble goods produced in the quantities q =(q l' ...• qn) and a joint production func-
tion F(q) having continuous first partial derivatives on the domain q ;::>- O. In Ram-
sey pricing, the demands for the products are factored into the calculation. To
simplify matters. assume that demands for the products are independent:
qi =u i (Pi) is the amount demanded of product i when prices are set at Pi' u i
is assumed to be strictly monotone decreasing in Pi and continuously differenti-
able. The target level of production, q*, is not given a priori as in the Aumann-
Shapley setting, but is derived from the demand and cost information. The idea is
to set prices and production levels so as to maximize benefits net of costs ("net
social product"). One measure of net social product is total consumers' surplus
over all products, minus the costs of production:
q,
n
maximize Seq) = ~ J u i - 1(t) dt -F(q)
i =10
(30)
There are two constraints on this maximum problem. The first is implicit in
the formulation: namely, the same price Pi is charged to all consumers of i (Le.,
pricing is nondiscriminatory). The second is the break-even requirement
~Pi qi -F(q) =0 . (31)
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(32)
(33)
Solving (30) subject to (31) is a standard exercise in constrained optimization.
Form the Lagrangian
A necessary condition for the optimal target q is that for all i
8F au1. -1 8F
-1() ( ) + A -1() + () ( ) = 0 .U1. q1. --8- q u1. q1. q1. 8 q1. --8- q
q1. q1. q1.
Let Pi = u1.-1 (q1.)' c1. = 8F / aq1. (q), which is the marginal cost of producing
i. and 1']1. = (Pi / q1. )(8q1. / 8P1.)' which is the elasticity of demand for i, and is
always negative since u1. is decreasing. Then (32) has the simpler expression
A 1
(c1. -Pi) / Pi = 1 + A --;;;;
In other words, a necessary condition for optimality is that, for each i, the
percentage by which marginal cost differs from price is inversely proportional to
the elasticity of demand for i.
Prices satisfying (33) are known as Ra.msey prices, after Frank Ramsey
(1927) who applied similar reasoning to determining optimal methods of taxation.
They have been discussed extensively in the economics literature (see Manne,.
1952; Baumol and Bradford, 1970; Boiteux, 1971). Their essential property, in
industries with declining average costs, is that the percentage mark-up over mar-
ginal cost is greater the more inelastic the demand for the good is. As W. Arthur
Lewis (1949) put it:
The principle is ... that those who cannot escape must make the largest con-
tribution to indivisible cost, and those to whom the commodity does not matter
much may escape. The man who has to cross Dupuit's bridge to see his dying
father is mulcted thoroughly; the man who wishes only to see the scenery on
the other side gets off lightly. (p 21)
The inherent fairness of such a criterion may strike the reader as debatable.
For example, should low-income families who need telephones for emergencies sub-
sidize long-distance usage by businesses? The Ramsey principle might well lead to
such a result. Certainly there is no guarantee that Ramsey prices are subsidy-
free, Le., are in the core of a suitably defined cost game. From a practical point
of view, Ramsey prices may be difficult to estimate, since they rely on demand
elasticities that may not be known. For these and other reasons Ramsey pricing,
while interesting in theory, has not thus far found much practical acceptance.
8 Conclusion
There is no shortage of plausible methods for cost allocation. The essence of
the problem, however, lies not in defining methods, but in formulating principles
and standards that should govern allocations, and then determining which methods
satisfy them.
Minimal data of the problem are the total costs to be allocated, and the
objects to which costs are to be assigned. In specifying the latter one must be
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clear about when two cost objects are comparable, Le., would be assigned equal
costs in the absence of other information. The cost objects could be divisions of a
firm. dollars of revenue from different products, individual consumers, classes of
consumers, stops on a trip, lectures given on a trip .... etc. Their identity varies
greatly from one situation to the next.
The second element of the problem is estimating the cost associated with
each subset of cost objects. The specification of these costs for all subsets
defines a cost ga.me on the cost objects, which are called "players". Computing a
cost for each of 2n subsets of n cost objects is daunting if n is larger than 4 or
5. In practice the structure of the problem often allows simplifications. For
example, airport-type cost games. in which costs depend only on certain critical
thresholds, are manageable even for very large n. Other situations may allow the
grouping of players and allocating costs hierarchically, first among groups and
then within each group. (There is no guarantee. however, that the outcome will be
the same as if costs had been allocated in one fell swoop.)
A third element of the problem is the anticipated benefit from the project.
Economic efficiency suggests that the optimal set of cost objects is the one that
yields the greatest benefits net of costs. In principle, the allocation of benefits
can be carried out using the same methods that apply to the allocation of costs. If
demands are not known, however, then serious difficulties arise in trying to design
a cost allocation scheme that implements an efficient decision. One reasonable
approach is to employ a competitive bidding scheme that generates an efficient
decision and at least covers all costs.
From a normative standpoint, four general principles stand out as important
criteria for judging cost allocation methods. These are: monotonicity, additivity,
consistency. and staying in the core. The last two seem most compelling for one-
shot investment problems, or in public utility pricing where cross-subsidization is
a major issue. In this case the nucleolus seems to be the best choice, although it
should be noted that another core solution - the per capita nucleolus - has the
advantage of being monotonic in the aggregate, which the nucleolus is not.
An impossibility theorem states that no core solution method is fully mono-
tonic, and only the Shapley value is monotonic in the strongest sense. The Shap-
ley value can also be characterized as the unique method that is additive and allo-
cates no costs to "dummy" players. On the other hand, the Shapley value is not
necessarily in the core. The Shapley value seems well suited to situations in which
costs are allocated in parts, or are reallocated periodically, but it is not satisfac-
tory when core solutions are required.
In sum. there is no all-embracing solution to the cost allocation problem.
Which method suits best depends on the context. the computational resources,
and the amount of cost and benefit information available.
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Notes
1 If the benefit u i from purpose i is known, then the remaining benefits are defined
by rt = min!ut,c(i)!- St.
2 This is sometimes called the "pre-nucleolus", since Schmeidler's definition
required in addition that xi ~c (i) for all i. If c is subadditive these constraints
are automatically satisfied.
3. The definition of the reduced game (and hence of consistency) is inconsistent
unless c has a nonempty core and :Jt: Ecore(c). The reason is that, by analogy with
the definition of cT,z on the other coalitions, we should have
CTz(T) = min !c(TuS')-Lxt!
'S' .. N-T S'
but this is strictly less than LXt (for some T) unless :Jt:Ecore(c). Thus Sobolev's
T
result seems most persuasive when applied only to the class of games c having
nonempty cores. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the proof of Theorem 5
can be carried out on this restricted class.
4. The auctioneer is constrained to choose a set that maximizes bids net of costs. In
case of ties, some choices may yield an equilibrium, others may not. The claim is
that some bids exist, and some way of breaking ties exists, that is a strong equili-
brium. Thus in a very limited sense the auctioneer could be considered a player
too, although his only function is to break ties efficiently. In practice, ties rarely,
if ever, occur; instead some stopping rule is imposed that allows bids to converge.
Experiments conducted at IIASA with the six-person Swedish municipal cost-
sharing game show that this convergence is remarkably rapid: a solution in the
core or nearly in the core was usually found within ten bids.
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COMMON COST AI.LOCATION IN THE FIRM
Gary C. EJiddle and Richard !::J1einberg
1 Introduction
31
'!'wenty years ago, Martin Shubik (1962) suggested that the Shapley value of a
game be used to allocate accounting costs. While that suggestion has spawned a
number of cost allocation proposals based on game-theoretic constructs, the,se
studies comprise only one of several major streams of cost allocation research.
Because these various approaches have developed independently. they often
employ dif:cring assumptions, definitions, and methodologies. The resulting diffi-
culties in comparine alter!1ative proposals may help to explain their limited
acceptance.1
This study provides a framework in w!'1ich the major streams of cost allocation
research are evaluated and compared, with a special emphasis on those areas
which relate to common cost allocation in the firm. This paper is a condensed ver-
sio!1 of "Allocations of Joint and Common Costs" by Biddle and Steinberg (1984).
Section 2 clarifies cost allocation concepts and explores some initial attempts to
ex~lain why cost allocations are made. Section 3 examines proposals for allocating
common costs. Section 4 separately examines those common cost allocation propo-
sals which employ game-theoretic concepts. Section 5 suggests some directions
for future research.
2 The Practice of Allocating Costs
Allocatinr, costs is perhaps the most ubiquitous of accountinr, activities.
Costs are allocated among firms' divisions, products, and accounting periods for
use not only in the preparation of external financial reports, but also in a variety
of managerial decisions. Uncomfortable with the ad hoc nature of many traditional
cost allocation practices, researchers have proposed a number of "improved" cost
allocation schemes. Before these proposals can be compared, however, their
diversity requires the developme!1t of a common set of concepts and definitions.
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2.1 Alternative Cost Concepts
To an economist, "the ultimate economic cost of any activity is to be inter-
preted as the alternative opportunities foregone" (Hirschleifer, 1976, p 299).
Applied to a traditional comparative statics analysis, this opportunity cost con-
cept implies that the marginal, average variable, and average cost curves include
returns to all factors of production including capital (see Turvey, 1969).2 These
curves, which are often used to illustrate optimal output decisions, are actually
simplifications of more complex relationships. As Alchian (1971) has observed,
economic costs depend not only on output but also on the output rate, the time
until the first unit is produced, and the lenp,th of the production run. Analyses
relating costs and output levels implicitly hold these other factors constant.
Economists also employ a distinction betwcen short and long run, which recognizes
that for certain decisions, factors like production technology and plant size can-
not be altered, giving rise in the short run to related fixed costs. Through these
concepts economists have emphasized the importance of identifying relevant costs
for a given decision: choosing short-run production levels by equating marginal
costs and revenues is a well known example.
Certain practical considerations have led accountants and managers to
develop alternative cost concepts. Potential legal liabilities associated with finan-
cial statement and tax disclosures have produced an accounting emphasis on
objectivity and verifiability. This precludes the use of opportunity costs in
accounting statements which are based on historical costs instead. Historical
costs are easy to measure since they are the acquisition costs paid by a firm for
goods or services in past arm's-length transactions. Historical costs and estimates
of future historical costs are also often used in managerial decision-making. The
need for an objective basis for managerial performance evaluation and contracting
provides one explanation. In addition, historical costs may provide cost-effective
approximations of some of the cost concepts recommended by economists. For
example, historical direct labor costs and materials costs plus variable overheads
are often assigned to production units on a constant per unit basis. When an addi-
tional per unit amount representing a fixed manufacturing overhead is added to
these variable costs, full absorption costs are obtained. These costs are not
unlike the economist's concepts of average variable and average manufacturing
costs, respectively.
2.2 Cost Allocations Defined
A cost allocation is defined here as the efficient partitioning of a cost among
a set of cost objects. 3 Borrowing a more descriptive term from Demski (1981), a
cost allocation is required to be "tidy", meaning that all of a cost is allocated, no
more and no less. This definition in no way assures that allocated costs will be
useful. Usefulness depends jointly on the nature of the cost being allocated, the
allocation method selected, and the decisions to be based on the allocated costs.
Generally accepted accounting principles and tax regulations require cost
allocations. While their use in managerial decision-making is more controversial,
available evidence suggests that many managerial decisions also depend on allo-
cated costs (Hughes and Scheiner, 1980; Thomas, 1980; Fremgen and Liao, 1981).
The role of cost allocations in providing information for managerial decisions
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suggests that the cost allocation process should begin with a determination of the
appropriate cost cor.cept for the decision being madc. For example. output deci-
sions should depend on marginal rather than average costs. The allocation pro-
cess is completcd by identifying the costs to be allocated and then applying an
allocation method 4 Subsequent sections emphasizc the importance of linking the
selection of a method with the decisions to be made. 5
Because jointncss is a pervasive cost characteristic, the term joint has been
applied to a wide range of cost allocation settin!?s. Jointness occurs because a
firm finds it less costly to incur costs relating to two or more cost objects simul-
taneously than to incur costs individually for each. A distinc tion is drawn
between two major classes of cost allocations based, in part. on the sources of
these cost savings. Using terms that have often been used interchangeably, this
study distinguishes between joint and common costs. 6
joint cost applies to a setting in which production costs are a nonseparable
function of the outputs of two or more products. The nonseparability of the cost
function and the joint production of the products reflect cost savings due to what
Baumol et at. (1982) have termed economies of scope. Economies of scope arise
when it is less costly to jointly produce (given amounts of) a set of products than
to separately produce subsets of the products. While economies of scale for the
separate (subsets of) products is sufficient to produce economies of scope, it is
not necessary. Economies of scope can exist for a set of products even though
there are diseconomies of scale for all subsets. Baumol et at. (1982) show that in
marokets accessible to potential entrants, economies of scope is both a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of multiproduct firms. 7
The focus in joint cost settings is the allocation of the joint production costs
to the joint products and the uses (and usefulness) of the allocations in output
decisions. The classic example of a joint cost setting is where a packing house
allocates the cost of a steer between its beef and hide. This joint production pro-
vides obvious economies of scope. In this case. and in similar situations found in
agriculture, manufacturing, chemical production and mining, the products are pro-
duced in (more or less) fixed proportions. In other joint cost settings, such as
petroleum refining, it is possible to vary the product mix (i.e., within some range
it is possible to produce more gasoline and less kerosene from each barrel of
crude oil).
Common cost applies to a setting in which production costs are defined on a
single intermediate product or service that is used by two or more users. Common
production is undertaken due to cost savings related to economies of scale.8 An
example is the common provision of computer services to two or more divisions of a
multidivision firm. (The term division is used for units ranging from individuals to
affiliated companies in decentralized firms.) Because the cost objects in common
cost settings are often cost or profit centers assigned to individual managers, allo-
cations of common costs are often the subject of intense discussion and negotia-
tion. In the absence of outside markets for intermediate goods, division and ser-
vice department managers may have incentives to behave like monopolists or
imperfect competitors to the detriment of firm-wide profits. Thus, whereas joint
cost allocations emphasize output decision incentives, common cost allocations
emphasize incentives to potential users to participate in the common provision of
a product or serviceY
34 Gary C. Biddle and Richard Steinberg
2.3 Motives fOT Allocating Costs
Economists have long considered certain cost allocations unnecessary and
possibly misleading since according to their models optimal decisions should
depend on unallocated costs10 Stigler (1966, p 165), for example, has warned that
"any allocation of common costs to the product is irrational if it affects the
amount of the product produced, for the firm should produce the product if its
price is at least equal to its minimum marginal cost." Because few managers have
heeded calls to modify or terminate their cost allocation practices, researchers
have recently begun to examine positive explanations for allocations of costs. 11
Zimmerman (1979, p 504), for example, asked "why rational, maximizing individuals
would want to allocate costs." He addressed this question by suggesting two set-
tings in which roles for allocations may arise. Drawing on the work of Williamson
(1966), Zimmerman first proposed that the imposition of a lump-sum tax in the form
of a fixed overhead allocation would cause division managers to reduce spcnding on
perquisites.12 However, and as Zimmcrman observed, this result relies on a wealth
effect - the managers consume less of all normal goods because they are, in
effect, poorer. There is no reason to expect them to accept such a tax as long as
other employment opportunities are available. 13 Moreover, the effect of
Zimmerman's tax in no way depends on there being a cost to allocate. Nor is it
linked to the size of the cost (see Baiman, 1981). Zimmerman did not explore the
possibility that allocations of variable costs might be used to reduce perquisite
consumption through their effects on marginal wagc rates.14
A second setting examincd by Zimmerman was the use of fixed cost alloca-
tions in providing long-distance telephone services [a Wide-Area Telephone Ser-
vice (WATS) line] for a university's faculty members. Zimmerman observed that
one justification for charging some allocation of the fixed lump-sum costs is that
these allocations will proxy for the degraded service, delay, and capacity costs
associated with the use of a common resource by users. A more formal approach
to this problem is presented in Billera and Heath (1982).
Demski (1981) specifically identified three cost allocation motives: decompo-
sition, motivation, and coordination. He then asked whethcr the cost allocation
mechanisms derived from these motives could be represented as game-theoretic
solutions. In contrast to normative studies. the desired properties of cost alloca-
tions were made endogenous by deriving them from the settings in which demands
for allocation arise. This representational approach need not be confined to a
consideration of game-theoretic allocations, but could be used to similarly examine
the consistency between other cost allocation motives and methods. If a proposed
cost allocation method is found consistent with a given motive, then we might feel
more sympathetic toward normative arguments advocating its use in settinp,s where
that motive is likely to arise. Alternatively, if we are considering methods widely
used in practice,a representational strategy may allow us to identify likely
motives for this use. (Normative implications are less clear if a method is found
inconsistent with a given set of demand settings since there is no guarantee that
an exhaustive set of demands has been identified.)
Amershi (1981) examined the demands for allocations which arise from
Demski's motivation motive in a Nash-equilibrium owner-manager (principal-agent)
relationship. He found that these settings often evoke demands for simple
schemes involving proportional allocations of overhead costs. Balachandran et ai.
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(1982) proposed that a firm's fixed cost allocations may represent capacity costs
"intended to apprise the operating divisions of the long run variable costs of their
service department usage" (p 2). However, when they examined a situation in
which both capacity and usage decisions could be made and where operating
departments provided the information used in the capacity decision, they found
that standard allocations of fixed costs seldom achieved both short- and long-term
efficiency.15
Although preliminary, the Zimmerman (1979), Demski (1981), Amershi (1981),
and Balachandran et al. (1982) studies make important contributions by emphasiz-
ing the underlying demands for cost allocations and by suggesting that allocations
may represent cost-effective means of addressing certain practical managerial
problems. As Dopuch (1981, p 6) has observed, "Too much cost allocation has been
carried out in practice to lead us to believe that it is all bad."
3 Allocating Common Costs
Whereas in joint cost settings the fundamental nonseparability is across pro-
ducts, in common cost settings costs are ultimately allocated across rational
evaluative decision-makers capable of (semi-) autonomous actions. As a result, the
focus is on ensuring their cooperation. This can be illustrated in the context of a
firm which can realize scale economics through the common provision of computer
services to two or more divisions. Depending on the level of autonomy granted
division managers, allocations may be required to induce them to incur fixed
investment costs. Alternatively, their participation may depend on comparisons
between proposed operating cost allocations and offers from external suppliers.
Even when managers are not given the freedom to contract independently, cost
allocations may influence their demands for computer services. If another
manager is given profit responsibility for the computer department, allocations
may affect the supply of services as well as their distribution.16 In the absence of
opportunities to contract with outside suppliers or intervention by upper manage-
ment, monopolistic or monopsonistic behavior may arise. Obvious incentive prob-
lems accompany allocation schemes that rely on information supplied by the divi-
sion managers.
3.1 Common Cost Allocation Practices
The pervasiveness of common cost allocations is documented in two surveys of
corporate allocation practices (Mautz and Skousen, 196B; Fremgen and Liao, 1981).
Mautz and Skousen report results from a survey by the Financial Executives
Research Foundation of allocations of noninventoriable common costs (including
research and development, advertising, administrative and financing cost, and
taxes) by 412 firms (including 212 of the "Fortune 500"). Of the 346 usable
responses, 306 indicated that these common costs were being allocated to divi-
sions. For the 255 firms that also submitted financial disclosures. the average
ratio of common costs to sales (7.83%) actually exceeded the average ratio of earn-
ings to sales (6.29%). For 63 of these firms common costs exceeded ten percent of
sales. Mautz and Skousen also found a variety of allocation methods being used.
Some firms reported using simple allocations based on single allocation bases (e.g.,
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divisional sales, assets, or investments) while others used more complex formulas
(e.g., the Massachusetts Formula).17 Some used partial and others tidy allocations.
Some firms reported using different bases for allocating the same costs. More
than 73% of the firms reported using more than one allocation method. When they
examined in detail the allocation practices of six diversified firms, Mautz and
Skousen found that by altering the methods used to allocate common costs they
could significantly change measures of divisional performance, includinp, their
rank orders.
Fremgen and Liao (1981) report the results of a survey sponsored by the
National Association of Accountants of allocations made by 123 large diversified
firms (sales greater than $15 million) from Standard and Poor's Register of Cor-
porations. They found that more than 80 percent allocated common costs associ-
ated with corporate management and service departments to their divisions.
These costs ranged from 0.02 to 44 percent of corporate sales with over 50 per-
cent of the firms indicating common costs to sales ratios in excess of 5 percent.
When asked why they allocate common costs, most firms stated that their motive
was "to remind profit center managers that [common] costs exist and that profit
center earnings must be adequate to cover those costs" (p 61). The second most
cited reason was to "fairly reflect each profit center's usage of essential common
services." However, few firms were found to allocate fixed and variable cost com-
ponents separately.
3.2 Common Cost Allocation Proposals
Researchers have often been critical of actual allocation practices, arguing
that allocations based on activity measures, such as divisional sales, or on invest-
ment measures, such as plant assets, lead managers to depart from profit-
maximizing decisions. As replacements, they have offered a series of normative
allocation proposals. Moriarity (1975), for example, proposes "a new allocation
method that eliminates many of the undesirable characteristics of current alloca-
tion bases" (p 795).
Moriarity (1975. 1976) observes that common cost settings arise because of
cost savings. 18 Thus, "rather than allocate costs directly to a cost object, it
should be possible to allocate cost savings as an offset of the cost of obtaining
services independently" (p 792). Notationally, Moriarity's approach can be writ-
ten as:
where
Mi common cost allocated to division i using the Moriarity method,
Wi the minimum cost alternative available to division i for the com-
mon good or service
min(Yi ,CC + Ii)'
Yi cost at which division i could have obtained the common good or
service independently,
CC common cost,
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The term in square brackets represents an allocation of cost savings in proportion
to minimum available costs. The total costs incurred by division i under the
Moriarity approach are Mi + Ii'
Moriarity justifies his approach by citing five "advantages of the proposed
method over existing methods" (1975, p 794). First. the cost object is never
charged more than the next best alternative method of providing the product or
service. Thus, a division manager is encouraged to utilize a common good or ser-
vice when its use results in a cost saving for the firm. As it applies to Moriarity's
method, notice that this property relates to individual rationality and does not
address the possibility that division managers may form coalitions to obtain
greater savings than they obtain from the proposed allocation. 19 Second, the allo-
cation process involves a comparison of the cost of providing common products or
services with the next best alternative. As a result, the process of making an
allocation renders the firm aware of the relative costs of common and independent
production. However, this advantage also illuminates the method's information
requirements; in order to allocate common costs the firm must obtain estimates of
independent provisions for each of its divisions.
The third advantage cited by Moriarity is that every cost object shares in
the savings resulting from the decision to incur the common cost. While Moriarity
appeals to the "fairness" of this result. fairness in this case must include savings
allocations in proportion to minimum independent cost.zo The fourth advantage is
that some cost is allocated to every cost object using the common product or ser-
vice. This result suggests that no division using a common input is subsidized and
is also motivated on fairness grounds. The fifth advantage claimed for the Moriar-
ity method is that it provides an incentive to managers to continue to search for
less costly alternative means of obtaining the common product or service. By
lowering Yi or Ii a manager may be able to lower his or her share of a common
cost.
The Moriarity method is illustrated in Table 2.1 for a three-division firm with
available cost savings of $600. The Moriarity allocations result in each division
being assigned a cost (Mi ) that is lower than its least-cost alternative (Wi)' Thus,
no single division has an incentive to reject common provision of the intermediate
product or service. However, as observed by Louderback (1976), the Moriarity
method may allocate a cost to a division that is less than its incremental process-
ing cost (/i)' Notice in Table 2.1 that for division 3 the common cost allocation is
negative. This violates the fourth advantage requiring that no division be subsi-
dized. If permitted, divisions 1 and 2 would have an incentive to form a subcoali-
tion excluding division 3.Z1
Louderback (1976) suggested a modification of the Moriarity method that
preserves its advantages. It allocates common costs in proportion to an "ability to
bear" measure, Yi -Ii:
Yi -Ii
Li = ~(Y -I ) (CC) .
j j j
The total costs incurred by division i are therefore L i + Ii (where the terms are
as defined above). To avoid subsidies, Louderback assumed that, for each
i, Yi ~ Ii' Based on the information in Table 2.1, the Louderback method results in
common cost allocations of $146 to division 1, $250 to division 2, and $104 to divi-
sion 3 (and total costs of $196, $350, and $854, respectively). Now each division's
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total cost is more than its incremental processing cost and there are no incentives
for divisions or subcoalitions to break away.ZZ
Table 2.1 The Moriarit.y met.hod applied t.o a t.hree-division firm wit.h common cost.s of
$500.
Division, Independent Incremental Minimum Allocated Moriarity Total Costs
i Costs. Yi Processing Alternative Cost Allocation, Incurred.
Costs, Ii Costs, Wi Savingsa Mi Mi +Ii
----------~----~------------~-------------
1 400 50 400 120 230 280
2 700 100 600 180 320 420
3 1000 750 1000 300 -50 700
$2000 $900 $2000 $600 $500 $1400
a r.W~ P:Wj-(CC +EIj >]Wj j jj
Another variant, suggested by Balachandran and Ramakrishnan (1981), also
preserves the advantages cited by Moriarity. It allocates common costs according
to
Wi -Ii
BRi = -=I::-(....:.W---I~) (CC)
j j j
(and assigns total costs BRi + Ii to division i). When applied to the information in
Table 2.1, this approach allocates common costs of $159 to division 1, $227 to divi-
sion 2, and $114 to division 3 (with total costs of $209, $327, and $864. respec-
tively).
Gangolly (1981) extended the Moriarity approach to a setting in which not
only the grand coalition of all divisions can benefit from the common provision of a
good or service, but where subcoalitions are also permitted to form. Thus, in the
previous example, divisions 1 and 2 could form a subcoalition excluding division 3.
In his Independent Cost Proportional Scheme (ICPS), Gangolly preserves the
Moriarity principle of "sharing cost savings in proportion to independent costs"
(p 299). Hence, the allocated cost savings (within any coalition) per dollar of
independent costs is the same for all divisions. Under the ICPS method, incremen-
tal processing costs are separately assigned; "If the estimated cost figures used in
the allocation includes additional processing costs. then the use of ICPS alloca-
tions (prior to the disaggregation of such costs) can distort allocated costs"
(p 309). In addition to the information needed to apply the Moriarity and Louder-
back methods. the ICPS approach requires common costs for each of the possibLe
subcoalition of divisions. In general. the ICPS approach requires 2n -n -2 addi-
tionaL common cost estimates where n is the number of divisions. Thus, the infor-
mation requirements increase exponentially rather than linearly in n. For a firm
with just two divisions the ICPS method is identical to the Moriarity method.
The Moriarity, Louderback, Balachandrian-Ramakrishnan, and Gangolly
methods emphasize incentives for division managers to participate in the common
provision of a good or service. Motivational benefits may be obtained even when
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managers are not allowed sufficient autonomy to contract independently. How-
ever, all three methods have severe informational requirements. Independent and
incremental processing cost estimates must be obtained for each division as well
as a common cost estimate for the grand coalition. The Gangolly approach also
requires common cost estimates for all subcoalitions. If asked to supply these
estimates, managers may have incentives to misreport. In addition, the Louder-
back and Balachandran-Ramakrishnan methods may create incentives to increa.se
costs - under certain conditions, higher incremental processing costs lead to
lower cost allocations.
Another notable feature of these proposals is that the common cost is
assumed to be invariant with respect to the allocations. This implies that either
the allocations do not influence the usage of the common good or service or, if so,
its cost is insensitive to changes in usage. Ignoring wealth effects on demands for
capacity, one potential application is the allocation of a fixed common cost. If
applied to variable costs, completely inelastic divisional demands must be
assumed. 23
When the common cost varies with usage and divisional demands are not com-
pletely inelastic, the amounts of a common good or service supplied to each divi-
sion and the allocations of its cost must be determined simultaneously. Cohen and
Loeb (1982) have suggested that the degree of publicness is an important deter-
minant of the possibility of efficient decentralization in this case. Drawing an
analogy from public and private goods,24 they define a pure common input as a
common good or service that has the properties of nonexclusion (Le., once pro-
duced it is not possible to exclude divisions) and nonrivalry (Le., consumption by
one division does not affect the amounts available to others). In contrast, a com-
mon good or service that is a pure private input exhibits both excludability and
rivalry. Examples are corporate image advertising and a lot-size materials pur-
chase, respectively. Hughes and Scheiner (1980) have shown that for pure private
inputs, tidy allocation schemes "will not necessarily produce optimal demand deci-
sions (firm-wide) under a decentralized regime where divisions are allowed to set
their demands individually, subject only to the charge formula being announced in
advance" (p 84). Although Cohen and Loeb (1982) show that optimal decentralized
decisions are possible for pure common inputs, free rider problems may hinder
this outcome.25 See Chapter 5 in this volume for related results on cost allocation
and incentives.
4 The Game-Theoretic Approach to Common Cost Allocations
In his pioneering paper, Martin Shubik (1962)26,27 proposed that as a pro-
cedure for assigning common costs and revenues (and thus profits) the Shapley
value possessed certain "desirable incentive and organization properties". Shu-
bik envisioned a highly decentralized firm with profits to be allocated among
semi-autonomous divisions.28 Each division was viewed as a player of an abstract
game with a measure of joint coordinated action given by the characteristic func-
tion, a superadditive set function defined on the set of possible coalitions of the
various divisions.29 In general. if 5 is a set of one or more divisions considered as
acting in unison, the characteristic function 1) (5) describes the profit made by
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the set S on the assumption that the remaining divisions have closed down (or
otherwise left the firm) and the optimum alternative use made of the relinquished
resources.
Because the actions taken by one division can affect the profits realized by
others. Shubik suggested that an allocation scheme should provide incentives for
joint action which would maximize firm-wide profits. In addition. given the level of
autonomy assumed by Shubik, each division participating in the joint activity
should be allocated profits at least as large as it could earn independently. Shu-
bik observed that the characteristic function can serve as the basis of an alloca-
tion scheme which satisfies these requirements. Specifically. he proposed a
restatement of the Shapley axioms in the allocation setting, leading to a solution in
which each division received a profit allocation equal to its Shapley value.30
Shubik's restatement of Shapley's properties was as follows: 31
Property 1 The profit allocated to a given division depends only upon the vari-
ous profits which can be earned by all possible combinations of one
or more divisions acting in unison.
In other words. the assignment to the divisions is based solely on the characteris-
tic function: all other information is irrelevant. Shapley (1981) calls this the
"domain" ax iom.32
Property 2 The profit allocated to a division depends symmetrically upon all
divisions of the firm.
In other words. if two firms are identical except that their divisions are called by
different names, then the procedure allocates the same profit to corresponding
divisions which are identical except in name. This property is most often
referred to as symmetry, although the terms anonymit y33 and fairness34 are also
frequently used.
Property 3 The procedure allocates all profits earned by the firm. This tidiness
property has been called efficiency by Shapley (1953)35 and Pareto
optimality by Luce and Raiffa (1957). It forms part of the definition
of a cost allocation provided in Section 2.
Property 4 A division whose presence adds nothing to the profits of any coali-
tion should be allocated no profit.
This is the dummy axiom.36
Property 5 If two independent allocation problems are combined into one prob-
lem, then for each division the profit allocated under the combined
allocation is the sum of the allocations under the two individual
problems.
This is usually referred to as additivity.37 The usual interpretation is that various
costs can be disaggregated and then allocated separately.38
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If rpt represents the profit to be allocated to division i, rpt is uniquely deter-
mined by Properties 1 to 5 to equal the Shapley value:
rpt = (s-l)!(n-s)! [v(3)-v(3-!ij)]
n!
where the summation is over the set of all possible coalitions 3, where s is the
number of divisions in coalition 3, n is the total number of divisions, and v is the
characteristic function.
This can be seen, as follows, to be the expected marginal contribution of divi-
sion i, assuming the coalitions form randomly. There are n! orderings of the divi-
sions, but only (s -l)!(n -s)! orderings where division i follows all divisions con-
tained in 3 and precedes all divisions not in 3. Hence the expected marginal con-
tribution of division i is the sum of its marginal contributions to each coalition
3, v (3) -v (3!i D, each weighted by the proportion of the orderings in which divi-
sion i completes that coalition.39 Whereas Shubik defined these marginal contri-
butions as profits, they can alternatively be defined as costs.
Shapley's bargaining procedure interpretation should now be clear. A set N
of players agrees to playa game with characteristic function v in a grand coali-
tion (the coalition consisting of all the players). Starting with a single member
(chosen randomly), the coalition randomly adds, with equal probability, one player
at a time, promising each player on his or her admission the amount by which his
or her inclusion increases the value of the coalition as determined by the function
v. The grand coalition then plays the game and obtains the amount v (N), which is
precisely the amount needed to meet all of the promises. The expectation of
player i is rpt, as shown above. Thus, as noted by Aumann and Shapley (1974), the
two characterizations of the Shapley value illustrated above are complementary:
the deductive, axiomatic approach and the constructive, interpretative approach
tend to justify and clarify each other.40 In addition to the desirable incentive pro-
perties identified by Shubik, Jensen (1977) has shown that Shapley allocations
satisfy the properties suggested by Moriarity (1975) and Louderback (1976).
As Shapley (1953) observed, his evaluation scheme depends on several
"important underlying assumptions" (p 307). One of these assumptions is that the
games being evaluated are cooperative affairs in which the players evaluating
prospects of their prospective allocations are rational decision-makers.41 Thus,
Shapley allocations most readily apply to common cost rather than joint cost set-
tings. Another underlying assumption is that the characteristic function captures
all of the information relevant to a given evaluation or allocation. Finally, although
Shapley explicitly intended his value to be an a priori evaluation, Verrecchia
(1961a) suggests that cost allocation schemes in the real world are often evaluated
ex post facto.
Proposed applications of the Shapley value include allocations of: aircraft
landing fees (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977; Dubey, 1962), the cost of public
goods and services (Loehman and Whinston, 1971), water resource costs (Young et
ai., 1962). and depreciation (Callen, 1978). Verrecchia (1961a,b, 1962) provided a
thorough discussion of a dispute among several schemes, including the Shapley
·...alue, to allocate costs (and taxes) at the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. How-
ever, aside from these examples, little additional evidence exists of actual or pro-
posed Shapley value allocations. In addition, not all of the proposed applications
have maintained Shapley's assumption regarding players as evaluative decision
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makers. Callen, for example, allocated depreciation to alternative investment pro-
jects.
4.1 Variations on Shubik's Approach
The limited number of applications may reflect the fact that although alloca-
tions based on the Shapley value possess (and are uniquely determined by) certain
desirable properties, there are also limitations. Several authors have noted that
reliance on the characteristic function may ignore other information that is
relevant in many allocation settings. For example, Roth and Verrecchia (1979)
argued that the characteristic function ignores strategic aspects. 42 They did not
find the expected marginal contribution approach to be fully compelling, since in
general there is no reason to believe that the formation of coalitions should be
regarded as equally likely events. Instead, they observed that allocations among
autonomous divisions would depend on bargaining among division managers.
Roth and Verrecchia (1979) also observed that bargaining is a costly activity.
To avoid these costs they proposed three assumptions regarding managerial
preferences from which the Shapley value emerges as a costless surrogate for the
allocation that would be obtained through bargaining. Thus, their idea in a sense
combines Shapley's two interpretations of his value - that of a unique evaluative
procedure derived from a desiderata of reasonable properties, and that of an allo-
cation procedure obtained through bargaining - with Shubik's managerial applica-
tion.
Roth and Verrecchia (1979) first assumed that a manager is indifferent
between a game in which he or she does not participate and a game in which there
are no benefits (costs) to be shared by a division. From this they obtained the
dummy axiom. Second, they assumed ordinary risk neutrality (see Roth, 1977) or
probabilistic neutrality: each manager is indifferent between being uncertain as
to which cost allocation game is played or participating for certain in a game in
which the benefit structure is simply the benefit structure implied by the uncer-
tain situation. This implies the additivity axiom. Finally, they assumed strategic
risk neutrality: each manager is indifferent between bargaining among r managers
for an uncertain outcome or receiving 1/ r of the benefit for certain. Loosely
speaking, this means that managers consider themselves to have equal bargaining
ability. This is a symmetry property. Roth and Verrecchia (1979) then showed
(with the implicit assumption of the domain axiom and tidiness) that a manager's
expected utility for playing in a game equals the Shapley value if and only if his or
her preferences obey these assumptions.
As Roth and Verrecchia (1979) observed, their conclusion depends critically
on managers' preferences obeying certain assumptions, and that otherwise Shap-
ley values might not yield entirely appropriate proxies for bargained outcomes.
Boatsman et at. (1981), for example, expressed concern with the third assumption,
strategic risk neutrality, doubting that many allocation settings would find
players viewing themselves as having equal bargaining positions. 43 However, Roth
and Verrecchia (1979) did allow for this possibility with a generalization to the
case where a manager is indifferent between bargaining among r managers for an
uncertain outcome or receiving some fraction f (r) for the benefit for certain. 44
Roth and Verrecchia (1979) presented their result as demonstrating the
Shapley value to be a fair, equitable, neutral, and costless surrogate. However, as
Common Cost ALLocation in th.e Firm 43
the authors themselves admitted, the concepts of fairness, equity, and neutrality
are somewhat broad. It also may be questioned why attention should be focused on
only these properties when accounting theory offers many others.
Concerns regarding relative bargaining power have also motivated several
other cost allocation proposals. Boatsman et a.l. (1981) suggested that bargaining
power may depend on a player's resources rather than on his or her marginal con-
tributions to a set of coalitions. They proposed the use of minimum resource
theory, which predicts that players will divide a payoff in proportion to the
resources contributed (see also Gamson, 1961). Balachandran and Ramakrishnan
(1981) observed that in many organizational settings there are situations in which
the cost or value of a resource to a coalition depends on how the other coalitions
are aligned. This motivates the use of games in partition function form, as pro-
posed by Thrall and Lucas (1963), and the corresponding Shapley value developed
by Myerson (1977). Recently, Shapley (1981) proposed a modified version of his
value that is designed to be applicable to situations in which the cost of a joint
venture is to be allocated, not necessarily symmetrically, among interested par-
ties. This is accomplished through the use of an exogenously determined vector of
importance weights, which are independent of the cost data, and represent the
proportions into which the fixed cost of a jointly used facility would be divided.
Balachandran and Ramakrishnan (19131) have argued that an attractive
feature of the Shapley value is that it considers all hypothetical coalitions simul-
taneously and thus, in a sense, is superior to other allocation methods that do not
consider all of this information. However, this also means that the calculation of
Shapley-based allocations requires enormous quantities of information. The
relevant costs (and revenues) applicable to a given allocation must be estimated
for every possible coalition of divisions. Yet accounting records typically exist
only for those coalitions which have been employed in the past. Furthermore,
obvious incentive problems may arise if division managers supply the information
on which the estimates are based. The Shapley value also entails formidable com-
putational requirements. For example, the calculation of a Shapley value for a
group of only ten divisions would require over a thousand characteristic function
values. Littlechild and Owen (1973) and, more generally, Megiddo (1978) have
shown that efficient algorithms for the computation of the Shapley value do exist
in special cases. Jensen (1977) has also suggested some simplifications in the
Shapley formula which reduce computational effort when the number of divisions
to consider is large. Aumann and Shapley (1974) give an alternative formula for the
Shapley value that is generally somewhat easier computationally. Nevertheless,
formidable informational and computational requirements remain.
4.2 The Core
Shubik cited as a favorable incentive property of the Shapley approach the
fact that the profit allocated to a division is at least as great as the profit the
division could earn on its own (individual rationality).45 Several authors have
argued that an allocation scheme should satisfy an even stronger condition (group
rationality). It requires that the sum of the profits (costs) allocated to any coali-
tion of divisions be among the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved
upon by any other coalition; that is, it must be in the core of the game.
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Hamlen et al. (1977) examined the core properties of several cost allocation
schemes including: the activity level approach (see Section 2). which is always in
the core; the nUcleolus,46 which is always in the core; and the Moriarity scheme,
which mayor may not be in the core. Balachandran and Ramakrishnan (1981)
showed that the Louderback scheme is always in the core, while Boatsman et al.
(1981) showed in an appendix to their paper that the minimum resource allocation
is always in the core.
The core criterion, however, has also been criticized. Hughes and Scheiner
(1980) showed that an allocation scheme meeting the core criterion does not
necessarily produce optimal firm-wide decisions under a decentralized system
where divisions are allowed to set their demands individually (subject only to the
allocation formula being announced in advance). Although Boatsman et al. (1981)
are correct in noting that Hughes and Scheiner inappropriately allowed demands
to vary without making the appropriate changes in the characteristic function,
the fundamental problem remains: the core property cannot ensure that a (tidy)
firm-wide allocation scheme will result in optimum divisional demands without the
intervention of a central authority.47 Nor does the core criterion necessarily
imply a unique solution. As the discussion above suggests, several allocations can
simultaneously satisfy the core criterion. Another compelling limitation of the
core criterion is that in certain cost allocation settings the core may not exist. 48
The use of the core criterion in connection with the Shapley value is even
more problematic. Even when the core exists it might not contain the Shapley
value. The superadditive set function on which a game is based implies simply that
there are incentives for forming coalitions. It is only when the set function is also
convex49 that the core is both guaranteed to exist and to contain the Shapley
value (see Shapley, 1965).50 (Gangolly (1981) found a similar relationship for the
Independent Cost Proportional Scheme discussed in Section 2.) Shapley noted that
"a convex game is based on a convex set function which means that the incentives
for joining a coalition increase as the coalition grows, so that one might expect a
'snowballing' or 'bandwagon' effect." Unfortunately, whereas superadditivity
arises naturally, "convexity is another matter".
Hamlen et al. (1980) cited the uniqueness of the Shapley value as a limitation
on managerial flexibility which may prevent the core criterion from being satis-
fied. They proposed a modified Shapley value in which the symmetry property is
relaxed by assigning weights to the divisions. However, its usefulness may be lim-
ited. While Hamlen et al. (1980) were able to show that there is always some set of
weights that result in an allocation in the core (if it exists), they were unable to
produce a rule for assigning such weights for every situation.
5 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This study has presented a critical review and synthesis of the cost alloca-
tion literature, emphasizing common cost allocation in the firm. Cost definitions
and conflicting terminologies have been clarified, allocation proposals critically
examined, and allocation practices described. The resulting taxonomy of cost allo-
cation research provides a framework in which allocation procedures can be
developed and compared.
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A striking aspect of the cost allocation literature to date is its normative
tone. Equally striking is the limited impact it has had on cost allocation practices.
Foremost among the research areas suggested by this study is a more thorough
understanding of the motives for allocating costs. A positive approach is called
for in explaining why allocated costs are so extensively employed by firms in
internal decision making and external disclosures. As observed in Section 2, cost
allocations may represent attempts to approximate economic cost concepts. Thus,
a promising line of enquiry is the continued development of (theoretical and empir-
ical) links between the allocations obtained from alternative methods and the
appropriate cost concepts for the decisions in which they are employed. Greater
attention could also be given to differences between the allocations appropriate
for ex post and ex ante applications. The axiomatic approach offers a promising
technique for deriving allocation procedures from previously specified properties.
Indeed, as pointed out by Jensen (1977) it may be easier to persuade managers to
agree on a set of axioms than to agree on a set of allocation schemes. Recent
advances in the axiomatic approach are treated in Chapters 1 and 3, this volume.
While one explanation for the limited acceptance of many allocation proposals
is their possible inconsistency with managers' motives for allocating costs,
another possible explanation is their computational complexity. Further research
could be directed toward the development of heuristic and other approximations
to previously proposed allocation schemes. It may be possible, for example, to
identify circumstances in which managers could use rules of thumb to approximate
more complicated expressions. A positive stream of this research could examine
the extent to which current allocation practices already approximate the results
obtained from the more sophisticated approaches. In addition, while many of the
methods examined in this study require extensive information sets, little attention
has been given to the expense and incentive aspects of obtaining these inputs.
Cost allocations form an integral part of most managerial incentive and
reward structures and financial accounting systems. Their widespread use attests
to their potential impact on resource allocation decisions and to their usefulness.
In spite of the extensive literature surveyed in this study, the process of explain-
ing and ultimately improving cost allocation practices has only just begun.
Notes
1. See Kaplan (1981) for a discussion of other possible reasons for the limited
interaction between managerial research and practice.
2. That marginal costs should reflect the foregone opportunities of using capital
assets is easily illustrated by considering two firms: one that purchases a com-
ponent from an outside supplier and one that produces the component using its own
equipment. In either case, the opportunity cost of the component should reflect
capital costs. Turvey (1969) terms allocations of capital replacement costs
"depreciation", a meaning which differs from its typical accounting definition.
3. That a cost allocation efficiently partitions a cost does not necessarily mean that
the set of costs to which allocation procedures are applied is either mutually
exhaustive or mutually exclusive. Efficiency in this case is a mathematical term
which simply means that the application of a cost allocation procedure to a given
cost results in a tidy partitioning. Our stipulation that allocations be efficient Is
motivated by our desire to limit the scope of the enquiry. Moreover, we feel that
partitions that are not efficient may be more fruitfully examined in the context of
transfer pricing. An alternative characterization of a cost allocation procedure
is the determination of a set of weights to be assigned to cost objects. From a
46 Gary C. Bicl.cl.te ancl. Richarcl. Steinberg
programming perspective, lhe dual of allocating cosls lo oUlpuls is allocating pro-
fils lo inputs. Also notice that less emphasis is placed on revenue allocations. As
observed by Eckel (1976, p 774), "revenue is taken as being appropriately allo-
cated to the period in which it falls, and accordingly, it is costs which will be mani-
pulated" in most accounting systems.
4. Dopuch et al. (1982) suggest a slightly different order for the cosl allocation pro-
cess. They would begin by identifying a total cost to be allocated and a sel of cost
objects and lhen apply a cost allocation method. While the impact of the resulting
allocations on managerial decisions is not explicitly recognized in their characler-
ization, Dopuch et al. separalely consider some underlying demands for cost allo-
cations (Chapter 9).
5. A similar sentiment is expressed by Demski and Kreps (1982) in their review and
critique of model-based research in managerial accounting: "We feel that the cost
allocation lilerature would benefil by increased explicit attention lo decision-
focus (p 123)."
6. Davidson et al. (1979, p 15) also draw a distinction belween joinl and common cosls:
"Common costs result when multiple products are produced together although they
could be produced separately: joint costs occur when multiple products are of
necessity produced together."
7. Specifically, Baumol et al. (1982) show that economies of scope is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of multiproduct firms in perfectly con-
testable markets (where contestable markets are those accessible to potential
entrants who can serve the same market demands and use the same production
techniques as incumbent firms and who can evaluate the profitability of entry at
the incumbent firms' pre-entry prices). Geometrically, economies of scope implies
that the hyperplane passing through the origin and the costs of given amounts of
each (subset of) products(s) produced individually lies above the cost of producing
them jointly.
8. Economies of scale are typically defined as a less than proportionate increase in
costs for a proportionate increase in outputs. Actually, a weaker condition, sub-
additivity, is sufficient to produce common cost savings. This concept is defined in
Section 3. For a related discussion see Baumol et at. (1982, Chapter 2).
9. This emphasis is echoed by Henderson and Quandt (1980, p 92): "The case of joint
products is distinguished on technical rather than organizational grounds and
exists whenever the quantities of two or more products are technically interdepen-
dent."
10. Cost allocations have also been questioned on other grounds. Thomas (1971, 1974,
1978), for example, has argued that all cosl allocations are arbitrary and incorri-
gible - this latter term meaning indefensible. His argument rests on the observa-
tion that no single allocation method is appropriate for all decision settings and
that when just one method is to be chosen, the choice must therefore rest on arbi-
trary criteria. However, it does not necessarily follow that such a choice is arbi-
trary (or incorrigible). Moreover, even though a single allocation method must
serve various users of external financial disclosures, managers are free to use
any number of allocations for their decisions; see also Eckel (1976).
11. Positive research involves the development of a language and set of hypotheses
which allow an activity to be explained and predicted; see Friedman (1953).
12. This argument employs the reasonable assumptions that division managers strive to
maximize the utility rather than wealth, that perquisites increase lheir utilities,
and that perquisites consumption is difficult for upper management (or owners) to
monitor.
13. Alchian (1965) identifies some other problems with Williamson's arguments that
also apply to Zimmerman. Specifically, Alchian recommends a three-dimensional
alternative to Zimmerman's Figure 1 which would separately identify the utilities
associated with pecuniary and nonpecuniary goods.
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14. See Rees (1973, pp 22-30) for an analysis of the effects of changing marginal wage
rates on the consumption of leisure.
15. They also examine the New Soviet Incentive Scheme, Incentive Compatible Alloca-
tions, and the Groves Allocation Scheme. While the Soviet Scheme is easier to
implement, it achieves a lower level of efficiency than the Groves Allocation. In
the New Soviet Incentive Scheme an operating division is charged a fixed amount
which depends upon the difference between the actual and forecast usage of a ser-
vice (zero if they are equal). The Incentive Compatibility approach is not an allo-
cation scheme per se, but rather a set of conditions under which truthful reporting
is an equilibrium. Thus, other allocation schemes can be evaluated according to
these conditions. In a Groves Allocation Scheme the cost allocated to one operating
division of a two-division firm equals the entire fixed service cost plus the bud-
geted level of variable cost for the other division adjusted by a subsidy that does
not depend on the forecast or actual usage.
16. In a survey of the "Fortune 1000" companies, Reece and Cool (1978) found that 95.8
percent of the 620 respondents used investment or profit centers.
17. The Massachusetts Formula gives equal weight to sales, assets, and employees.
18. Although Moriarity states his allocation scheme more generally as applying to both
joint and common cost settings, the advantages he suggests for his proposal apply
to a situation in which the cost objects are ultimately rational, evaluative decision
makers. Thus, his scheme is discussed in conjunction with common cost allocations.
19. As a result, the Moriarity method does not always satisfy the core criterion (is dis-
cussed in Section 3). See Ayers and Moriarity (1983) for a modification of the
Moriarity method that does satisfy the core criterion.
20. In this case divisions 1 and 2 receive greater cost savings ($450) than they are
allocated under the Moriarity method ($300).
22. Thus, the Louderback approach satisfies the core criterion.
23. A procedure widely used for allocating the common costs of water supply projects
among users is the Separable Cost-Remaining Benefits (SCRB) method. It is based
on the idea that common costs should be allocated essentially in proportion to the
willingness of the user to pay. The method is described in detail by Young et al.
(1982) who compare it with several other allocation schemes and conclude that it
may be "one of the worst".
24. See Samuelson (1954).
25. Cohen and Loeb (1982) suggest that many common inputs, such as the provision of
corporate legal staffs, WATS lines, and computer services, possess characteristics
of both pure private and pure common inputs. They argue that the choice of the
level of input (i.e., the numbers of lawyers, WATS lines, or size of a computer) is
analogous to the choice of the amount of a pure common input and that the choice
of its rate of use is analogous to the choice of amounts of a pure private input.
However, notice that these example_ exhibit both excludability and rivalry, albeit
at certain levels of usage. It would be an easy task, for example, to exclude a divi-
sion that paid nothing for using a WATS line or computer. They also exhibit rivalry
since their use by one division reduces the amounts potentially available to others
at the lime of use. The analogy to pure common inputs depends, therefore, on diffi-
culties inherent in measuring demands for capacity and tracing costs associated
with their use.
26. The games that Shapley examined are based on the finite theory of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). See Luce and Raiffa (1957) for game theory terminology.
27. Shubik also published a slightly revised version of his paper a year later (Shubik,
1963).
28. While Shubik explicilly states his intention to illustrate a method applicable to
allocations of costs, revenues, profits (and the setting of transfer prices), he lim-
its his discussion by speaking primarily of profits; we do likewise. It should be
noted, however, that the allocation of profit rather than revenues or costs is not
innocuous. As Hughes and Scheiner (1980) observe, profit allocations require the
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central authority to know both the separable profit functions of each user division
and the cost functions of each supplier division.
29. A set function v where v (¢) =0 is superadditive if v (S v T) ~ v (S) +v (T) for all
sets S,T where SnT= ¢. Thus, superadditivity captures th-e notion of synergy
arising from joint rather than independent action. Note that in the cost allocation
setting the corresponding condition is subadditivity, wherein v (S v T)
:s v (S) + v (T).
30. Shubik's emphasis on joint action and incentive effects is characteristic of common
cost settings.
31. Actually, Shubik (1962) presents a slightly different set of properties based on an
earlier set of axioms given by Shapley in Rand paper RM-670, which are equivalent
in that they also result in the Shapley value. The original version differs in that
the additivity axiom is weaker and that there is a homogeneity (or homogeneity of
degree one) axiom rather than a dummy axiom. In the above selling. homogeneity
means that a homogeneous increase in prices (hence in costs, revenues, and pro-
fits) results in a corresponding homogeneous increase in each of the allocations.
In other words, the unit of measurement is irrelevant. Homogeneity arises easily
as a corollary to the set of properties given above.
32. Shapley also refers to it as the hidden axiom, since several authors have inadver-
tently omilled it and arrived at erroneous results from the viewpoint of his theory.
See Shapley (1981) for more details, including a discussion of the interpretation of
his axioms given by Luce and Raiffa (1957).
33. Shapley (1953).
34. For further discussion of the concept of fairness, see Thomas (1969. 1974), Moriar-
ity (1975), Jensen (1977), Callen (1978), Hamlen and Hamlen (1981), Baiman (1981)
and Balachandran and Ramakrishnan (1981).
35. See also Coase (1946).
36. Actually, there are two essentially equivalent dummy axioms. The version given
above is the zero dummy axiom. The other is the inessential factor axiom, which in
the above selling states: If a particular division contributes the same incremental
profit to each coalition, then the division should be allocated precisely this incre-
mental profit.
37. This property is called linearity in the conte~t of nonatomic games, to be discussed
in Section 4 of this chapter.
38. However, difficulty might be encountered if an allempt is made to allocate profits
in place of costs and revenues separately. Shubik, for example, suggests truncat-
ing the profit distribution at zero when defining the characteristic function.
Specifically, he permits a manager to be able to liquidate his division in order to
guarantee himself a profit of not less than zero. Shubik allows liquidations
because in his formulation the game is the firm. In order to specify it, he includes
a central office as a player and defines all coalitions not including the central
office to have a characteristic value of zero. However, this results in an alloca-
tion being made to the central office, which may be undesirable vis ~ vis the origi-
nal intent of the allocation. (Shubik offers that this may be thought of as resulting
from a levy paid by each of the producing departments to the central office). As
an alternative to Shubik's formulation, one may wish to allow the possibility of allo-
cating a loss (which could provide useful information), as well as disallow self-
liquidation (which is perhaps more realistic).
39. Both Thomas (1980) and Hamlen et ai. (1980) point out that the Shapley value
evenly divides interaction effects.
40. Aumann and Shapley also report a non-probabilistic interpretation of the Shapley
value due to Harsanyi (1959). Imagine each coalition S of players forming a syndi-
cate which declares a dividend. Each syndicate S distributes evenly among its
members the difference between its worth, v (S), and the total dividend declara-
tions of all its subsyndicates. Harsanyi shows that the sum of all dividends
received by a player under this scheme is precisely his Shapley value. Luce and
Raiffa (1957) also suggest an interpretation of the Shapley value as an arbitration
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scheme. This is appealing, since certain aspects of arbitration seem to be
inherent in some of the cost allocation applications, notably those that are con-
cerned with fairness to division managers.
41. Shapley (1953) defines a game as "a set of rules with specified players in the play-
ing positions" (p 307).
42. A related point is made by Luce and Raiffa (1957), who suggest that since the Shap-
ley value depends only upon the characteristic function it does not adequately
reflect the threat powers of the players. In a similar vein, Aumann and Shapley
(1974) describe the term characteristic function as being misleading and
mathematically imprecise, in that v characterizes only certain coalitional - but
not strategic - aspects of the overall competitive situation. They suggest the
alternative terms worth function and coalitional worth function.
43. They also question an underlying assumption of Roth and Verrecchia (1979) that
each manager's utility function is approximately linear in the range of potential
payoffs.
44. If the fraction in the assumption is f (r) rather than 1/ r. then the utility of play-
ing a game is given by:
u(v) = Ek(s)[v(S)-v(S-!il)]
s
where
k(s) ~(_l)r-s[n-s]f(r)
r=s r-s
45. A second property also presented by Shubik as an easily proved theorem states
that any action taken by a division which increases the value of the firm as a whole
does not cause the profits allocated to that division to decrease.
46. BrieflY, the nucleolus is the solution in which the minimum excess over all coali-
tions is maximized, where a coalition's excess is defined as the difference between
the total amount allocated to its members and its characteristic value. For a for-
mal definition of the nucleolus and derivations of some of its properties, see
Schmeidler (1969).
47. As noted in Section 2, only a marginal approach can provide that result.
48. In note 38, it is pointed out that Shubik's original intention was that the charac-
teristic function in the profit allocation setting be nonnegative. However, Telser
(1978) points out, "It would be nice to have a means of converting a given charac-
teristic function into a nonnegative characteristic function without affecting the
status of the core of a given function. Unfortunately, this in general is not possi-
ble."
49. A set function v, where v(¢) =0 is convex if v(S) +v(T) ~v(SuT)+v(SnT)
for all sets S,T.
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1 Introduction
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The problem of allocation in cost accounting has received substantial atten-
tion in recent years; see, for example, Moriarity (1981a), Thomas (1969, 1974,
1980), and Zimmerman (1979) for analyses of various aspects of this problem in the
accounting context. In this chapter game-theoretic concepts are used in' what
may be called the contribution approach to cost allocation problems.
The need for allocation schemes arises in many actual applications. Some are
known as cost allocation problems; that is, the allocation of the cost of a joint pro-
duction process resulting in the output of several goods whose costs (possibly
both fixed and variable) are nonseparable. In these applications it is necessary
to allocate the total (joint) cost of production among the outputs. Similarly, there
is a dual problem in that profits must be allocated among the inputs contributing
to these profits.
The classical cost allocation problem is that of pricing the products of a
regulated industry. In this case there is a monopoly which operates on a cost,
cost plus, or fixed profit basis. Output prices that allocate the total revenue
among the outputs must be determined. A similar, but dual, situation arises when
several firms or divisions cooperate, yielding profits that are greater than the
sum of the individual profits. The problem is how to allocate these profits among
the contributing firms. The need for cost or revenue allocation encompasses a
substantially wider set of applications in which there is a need to know the contri-
bution or the average cost of one or several, but not necessarily all, outputs to
the total joint cost of producing all the outputs.
Such a need arises in accounting reporting when, for example, the value of
inventories must be assessed. Consider, as an example, a firm producing two dif-
ferent intermediate goods in a joinL production process, where some of the goods
are used for the production of final products in the present period and the rest
are kept in inventory for use in the second period. For tax reporting purposes it
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is necessary to associate some cost accounting figures to each of the two commodi-
ties to determine the net profit of the firm in each of the two periods. If a cost-
based approach is followed, then it is necessary to know the unit production cost
of the different intermediate goods. If. however. a net realizable-value approach
is adopted, then knowledge of the contribution to the total second-period net
revenue of each unit of the inputs in inventory is required. The need to know the
contribution of some outputs to joint costs arises also in the case of a firm jointly
producing both nonregulated and regulated products, or if different tax rates
apply to different jointly produced goods. or in cases where user fees must be
determined for some (say. government) services. Another application that may
call for the knowledge of actual contributions to joint costs is the determination of
transfer prices in decentralized organizations.
While the use of cost allocation models in some of the above cases is debat-
able (see. e.g.. Dopuch, 1981; Moriarity, 1981b; Zimmerman. 1979). it is obvious
that cost allocation figures are used in practice in many situations. Thus, in this
chapter we avoid the problem of the appropriateness of allocation models and dis-
cuss the determination of the contribution of outputs to joint costs (or of inputs
to joint profits) in cases where these figures are needed.
In the single-product case the contribution of each unit of the output to the
total cost is the average cost. Thus. the problem may be viewed as the determina-
tion of the average costs of each of several jointly produced goods. This chapter
is concerned mostly with cost allocation problems through a generalization of the
one-dimensional notion of average costs. Allocating profits among inputs can be
carried out similarly. as is demonstrated in Example 2.
In order to describe the problem and several solution concepts some notation
is needed. Suppose that m goods are produced, let x =(xl' X Z' ... , x m ) be a vec-
tor whose i th component xi denotes the quantity of the i th good. Also. let
F(x) =F(x 1. x z..... x m ) be the cost of producing the vector x. For a particular
vector a =(al. az am) of quantities, we wish to determine the vector of
prices p = (Pl' Pz Pm)' Here Pi represents that part of the total cost F(a).
of producing a, attributable to each unit of the ith good. namely. its (generalized)
average cost. This means that the well known cost-sharing requirement holds, Le.,
a1Pl + azPz + ... + amPm =F(a1, a z, ... , am) .
Some or all of the Pi s may be used depending upon the requirements of the partic-
ular problem. It is evident that in some applications knowledge of the price vec-
tor may affect the decision makers in determining actual market prices.
In recent years, concepts of game theory have been frequently suggested as
tools in allocation problems. Special attention was devoted to the use of the Shap-
ley value (Shapley. 1953), the core and nucleolus (Schmeidler. 1969). (See. for
example. Balachandran and Ramakrishnan, 1981; Callen. 1978; Hamlen et al., 1977,
1980; Littlechild and Thompson, 1977; Loehman and Whinston, 1971, 1976; Roth and
Verrecchia, 1979; Shubik, 1964.) However, these concepts are not as appropriate
for real contribution costing as the approach discussed in Section 2 of this
chapter. This approach. based on cost considerations only, is due to Billera et al.
(1978). who used concepts of the theory of nonatomic games due to Aumann and
Shapley (1974) to allocate the cost of the Cornell University telephone system to
its users. They suggested the use of what has come to be known as the
Aumann -Shapley (hereafter AS) price mechanism for allocating joint variable
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costs among products. The derivation of this mechanism. based on game-theoretic
concepts. is discussed in Section 2. As it turns out. this price mechanism can be
systematically calculated in many practical situations. One of these is the case in
which the minimum cost is obtained as a result of a linear programming cost minimi-
zation problem. In this case the calculation of prices involves a parametric linear
programming process. An algorithm for carrying out these calculations for tran-
sportation problem cost functions was suggested by Samet et al. (1984). This pro-
cess for the general linear programming cost function is outlined in Section 2 with
some examples.
In Section 3 an axiomatic approach to the derivation of AS prices is dis-
cussed. This approach. free of game-theoretic concepts. constitutes the main jus-
tification for the use of these prices as the real contributions or average costs of
each of the outputs. Accordingly. it can be argued that AS prices constitute a
very natural extension of average cost prices to the case of joint production of
several goods. This extension emanates from the axiomatic approach derived
independently by Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1981. 1982).
where it is shown that AS prices are characterized uniquely for a large family of
cost problems using a set of natural requirements. Billera et al. (1981) provided a
detailed discussion and interpretation of this axiomatic approach in the account-
ing context. Thus. the discussion in Section 3 focuses on justifying the use of
these prices as average cost prices. The interested reader should refer for
further ideas to Billera et al. (1981). The axiomatic approach has been extended
in several directions by Mirman et al. (1982a.b). Samet and Tauman (1980) and
Samet et al. (1984). Some of these extensions are reviewed in Section 3. The
important complementary problem of allocating fixed costs is discussed. using the
work of Mirman et al. (1983). in Section 4.
2 Game-Theoretic Concepts and Aumann-Shapley Prices
Consider a joint production process. described by a cost function F. yielding
several outputs whose quantities are given by the vector a =(a1 • a 2 ..... am)' and
suppose we wish to find the contribution of a unit of each output to the total pro-
duction cost F(a). Since most applications make use of this information to deter-
mine prices. these per unit contributions are frequently referred to as prices.
Throughout this section it is assumed that the production process contains no
fixed cost component so that only the contribution of each output to the variable
cost is determined. Hence. it is assumed that F is continuous and F(O. O..... 0) =O.
In Section 4 fixed costs are incorporated into the analysis.
Before beginning the analysis it should be stressed that. in general. the use
of marginal costs (MC) for allocation problems reflects only the contribution to the
total cost of the last unit produced. Therefore. the use of this concept as an allo-
cation tool may introduce. as is shown in Example 2 below, some severe distortions.
Yet there are cases where marginal costs do reflect the (average) contribution of
a unit output to the total cost; for example. when the production technology has
constant returns to scale. In this case. AS prices and MC prices coincide. On the
other hand. when the objective is profit maximization it may be desirable to use
MC prices since the distortions (or cross-subsidization) can be exploited to
increase profits.
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In order to discuss various game-theoretic solution concepts it is first neces-
sary to introduce several game-theorctic notions.
A game in characteristic form consists of n players dcnoted by indices
1, 2, ... , n and a characteristic function v which assigns a value v (3) to every
subset 3 of the n players. For short, we refer to this game as the game v.
Denote by N the set of all players. In game-theoretic terminology, S is a coali-
tion while N is the grand. coalition. For the cost allocation problem these con-
cepts may be interpreted in two ways. First the players may be interpreted as
the goods bcing produced so that v (3) is the cost of producing the subset of goods
3 and v (N) is the cost of producing all the goods. Such games are called good.s
games. Second. the players may be interpreted as the consumcrs who dcmand the
goods. In this case v (3) is the cost of producing those goods demanded by a sub-
set 3 of the consumers and v (N) is the cost of producing all the goods demanded
by everyone. Such games are called consumer games. An imputation of a game
v is an allocation Z =(zl' ... , zn) of v(N) among the n players of the game. Thus
Z is a vector of payments such that
Zl +zz + ... +zn =v(N) (1)
Consider a joint production process described by a cost function F of m out-
puts. Denote by 1, ... , n the individuals consuming these goods and assume that
individual i wishes to consume the quantities ex i = (exi, ...• ex~) of the m outputs.
The total consumption is thus a nonnegative vector IX.
IX =~exi
i
As already noted, this situation may be associated with two games in characteris-
tic form v and V. respectively, where v is the consumer game in which the
players are the consumers and v is the goods game in which the players are the
outputs. First we consider the game v. For any subset 3 of consumers let v (3)
be the cost of producing the total consumption ~ ex i demanded by the consumers
ie:S
in 3, namely
With this definition
v(3) =F[ ~ ex i ] .
ie:S
v (N) =F(ex) .
(2)
Any imputation z =(zl' ... , zn) of the game v satisfies
Z 1 + ... + Zn =v (N) =F( IX) and hence can be used to allocate the total joint
costs F(ex) among the n consumers. Thus allocating the total cost among thc n
consumers is the same as selecting an imputation for the game v. But this is
exactly the same issue as selecting a solution concept for a game in characteristic
form (or cooperative game with side payments). The most common solution con-
cepts are the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus, each of which has been
used to allocate joint cost. Let us briefly describe thc corc and the Shapley
value.
The core of the game v consists of all imputations of v such that the total
cost imputed to every possible coalition 3 cannot exceed the cost v (3) of produc-
ing the set of goods of coalition 3 by themselves. Otherwise there would be some
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coalition of consumers that would object to the imputation since this coalition can
produce its own consumption E (Xi more cheaply by itself. Formally. an imputa-
iES
tion z =(z l' ... , zn) is in the core of v if and only if for each SeN,
~ zi L =v (S) =F [ ~ (Xi) . (3)
iES iES
The core might be an empty set [Le., there exists no z satisfying both equations
(1) and (3)J or it may contain many imputations. Thus the core cannot, in generaL
serve as the sole criterion for allocating the total cost F(a), although it may some-
times be important to know whether a certain allocation is in the core (see, e.g.,
Mirman et al. 1982a,b).
Next consider the Shapley value. Unlike the core this solution concept asso-
ciates with each game a unique imputation. The Shapley value s = (51' ... , 5 n )
is the imputation that assigns to each of the n players in the game its average
contribution to a random coalition. The randomization is taken as follows. Con-
sider the family of all coalitions that do not contain player i and partition this
family in n -1 subfamilies having sizes 1. 2, ... , n -1. Associate with each family
the probability 1/ n -1 (namely each coalition size has equal probability of
appearing) and assume that all coalitions within each subfamily have the same pro-
bability. Now if S is a coalition that does not contain i the probability of S
occurring is
1
n
1
[n -1]lSI
(4)
where IS I is the number of players in S, 1/ n is the probability of a coalition of
size IS I , and
is the number of coalitions of this size. Hence the average contribution of i is
given by
5
i
= ~ jSI!(n - lSI -i)! [v(SU!il) -v(S)J ,
Sr:.N n!
which is the Shapley value of player i. The Shapley value was originally defined
by a set of four axioms that turns out to result in a unique imputation given by
equation (4). Note that even if the core of v is nonempty. the Shapley value, need
not, in generaL be an element of the core of v.
The allocation of F(a) among the players in the consumer game v raises some
problems. In these games only coalitions that produce the total consumption of
each of their members are studied. A player is (arbitrarily) excluded from joining
a coalition to produce just part of his or her consumption while producing the
other part with some other coalition. That is, the possible strategy of splitting a
vector of demands into several parts, each part produced with a different coali-
tion, is not taken into account in the structure of the game v and, hence, is not
accounted for in the solution allocation of this game. To take these strategies into
account it is necessary to allow coalitions to produce any quantity vector
(x 1 ,x2' ... , x m ) that is not greater than the total demand vector «(Xl' (Xl' ... , (Xm)'
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As is shown later, this approach produces a game with a continuum of players
which comprise infinitesimal quantities of commodities. An imputation in this game
results in an allocation of the cost to the goods and not to the consumers. Details
of this approach are discussed in the sequel.
Notice also that the consumers game v should not be used to determine the
contribution of outputs to cost. Once the quantity of aggregate demand deter-
mining the production cost is fixed the contribution of each output to the total
cost should also be fixed. Moreover, the contributions of each good must not
depend upon how the aggregate demand vector is split among the consumers. That
is, as long as the same aggregate output vector is produced the contribution of
each output to the total cost should be the same regardless of how this vector is
obtained. Clearly, when the consumers game v is used, the resulting contributions
depend crucially on how a given output vector is distributed among consumers. On
the other hand, contributions resulting from the goods game (Le., AS prices) do
not change if the aggregate demand remains the same, but individual consumers
are allowed to change their individual demands. Thus, if for any reason some con-
sumers decide to cooperate by changing their individual consumption vectors, but
not their total consumption vector they, as a group, do not profit.
As a first approach to a game, in characteristic form, with goods as players,
consider the finite goods game v in which each good is a player, so that there are
m players denoted by the indices 1,2.... , m. The set of all players (Le., the
grand coalition) is denoted by M. The game is defined as follows: consider the
aggregate consumption vector a and let S be a subset of the goods. Let as be the
vector which consists of those elements of a belonging to S, namely,
{
a1. if i E: S
af = 0 if i t. S .
Then v(S) is the cost of producing the quantity as of goods in S, Le.,
v(S) =F(aS )
and
v(M) = F(aM) = F(a)
Again the Shapley value of the game v may be used to find the allocation of v(M)
for the various goods. That is,
s = ~ ISI!(m -lSI -l)![V(SV!i!>-v(S)] ,
1. SeN m!
is the imputation assigned to good (player) i. Consequently, the per unit contri-
bution of good i, denoted by pf, is the ratio s1. / a1. .
There is, however, a difficulty with the use of the Shapley value for the fi-
nite game V. To show this and to give some insight into the suggested solution, we
first discuss an example. Consider the case in which the minimum cost is obtained
from the solution of a linear programming problem; that is, F is a linear program-
ming cost function. Such a function has the general form,
F(x) =min!c 1Yl + czYz + ... + cLYt!
11
subject to
Ay ~:r
and
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By ~ b
y > 0
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where y =(y l'Y 2' ... , YL) is a decision vector whose components denote quantities
of the variable inputs and c = (c l ,c 2' ... , c L) is a cost vector, % = (x l ,x2' ... , x m ) is
the output vector, b =(b 1,b 2' ...• bq ) is a vector whose components denote quanti-
ties of the fixed inputs, A is an m xl matrix determining the relationship between
the variable inputs and outputs, and B is a q xl matrix determining the relation-
ship between the fixed and variable inputs.
Example 1
Consider a firm or division producing two products A and B. whose quantities
are denoted by xA and xB' respectively, using two types of machines denoted by
the indices 1 and 2. There is one machine of type 1, and two machines of type 2.
Each machine can operate up to 400 minutes a day and process each product
separately or jointly. A unit of A requires 1 minute processing time on machine 1
or 10 minutes on machine 2. The requirements of a unit of Bare 2 and 30 minutes
on machines 1 and 2, respectively. The cost of processing a unit of A is $1 on
machine 1 and $10 on 2. while for B the costs are $3 and $25 on machines 1 and 2.
respectively. The resulting cost function is:
F(%A' xB) =min!YAl + 10YA2 + 3YBl + 25yB2 l
subject to
YA1 + YA2 ~ xA
YB1 + YB2 ~ xB
YAl + 2YB1 ~ 400
10YA2 + 30YB2 ~ BOO
YA1· YA2' YB1' YB2 ~ 0
where YAi is the number of units of A and YB1, the number of units of B. pro-
cessed on machine i, i =1, 2. Consider a specific vector of outputs
% =a. =(aA, aB) =(40.200). It is obvious that in this case the minimum cost is
obtained when YA1 =YB2 =0 and YA2 =40, YBl =200; that is. all units of A are
processed on machine 2 and all units of B on machine 1. The corresponding
minimum cost is:
F(40, 200) = 40'10 + 200'3 = $1000 .
This optimal production mix. where each product is processed on a different
machine. immediately suggests a direct costing approach that will impute $400 to A
and $600 to B. or $10 per unit of A and $3 per unit of B. The question is. how-
ever, whether these figures reflect the real contributions of A and B to the total
cost. The answer is certainly no. Product A can be processed on each of the two
machines faster than B and at a unit cost which is lower than that of B. The
minimum cost mix assigns A to 2 and B to 1 because the penalty paid if B is not
processed on machine 1 is much higher than that paid if A is not processed on this
6Z Leonard. J. Mirman, Yair Tauman, and. ll!iraet Zang
machine. It is only the existence of a joint product B that makes it more expen-
sive to produce A. Thus, it seems reasonable that the real contribution of a unit
of output A to the total cost be smaller than the contribution of a unit of B.
Now, compute the Shapley value corresponding to the two-player (A and B)
goods game, i.e., v<!A!) = F(40,O) = min!YAl + 10YAZ!' subject to
YAl + YAZ ~ aA =40
YAl ~ 400
10YAZ ~ 800
YA1' YA2 ~ 0
Hence v <!A !) =$40. Similarly, v OB!) =F(O,200) =$600, and
v(N) =v{lA, B!) =F(40,200) =$1000. Thus, the Shapley value (SA' sB) of A and
B, respectively, is
SA =[vOA!) +vOA,B!) -v<!B!>J/2
= (40 + 1000 - 600)12 = $220 ,
and
SB = [vOBl) + v<!A, B!) - vOA !)]l2 = $780 .
Denoting by (Pi, p!J) the resulting cost sharing prices of single uni ts of A and B
respectively,
pi =SAl aA =220/40 =$5.5/unit of A
PlJ =sBI aB =7801200 =$3.91 unit of B
Consequently, the per unit contribution of A obtained in this way is still greater
than that of B, but closer to our intuitive notion of the relationship between the
costs of A and B than the direct costing approach suggested above.
Hence, in this example the Shapley value for the goods game does not seem to
reflect the real contribution of these goods to the total cost F(a). Moreover, the
Shapley value fails, in general, to satisfy a desirable property, namely, "con-
sistency". (This concept of consistency is different from that defined in Chapter
1.) Again this can be demonstrated using the above example. Suppose that good B
is technically split into two goods denoted by C and D; that is, there is a new cost
function G of producing the three goods A, C, and D, given by G(aA' a c ' aD) =
F(aA , ac + aD) = F(aA , aB)' Suppose that aA =40, as before, ac =10, and
aD =190. Thus, ac + aD =200 =aB' One would expect that the contribution of
a unit of C plus a unit of D will be equal to the contribution of a unit of B calcu-
lated before the splitting took place (that is, Pt + Ph =plJ). However, as may be
verified, sA =$190, Sc =$90 and sD =$720, implying that pl =$4.75/unit,
Pt =$9/unit, and Ph =$3.79/unit. This compares with the previous price for B of
plJ =$3.9/unit. Note also that even pl is changed from $5.5/unit to $4.75/unit.
Thus a technical manipulation results in a different per unit contribution not only
for the good that was split but, in general, for all goods.
The basic reason that the finite goods game fails to result in a satisfactory
allocation is that it ignores important relevant cost information. The Shapley
value of the game v is based only on the cost of producing a finite number (2 m) of
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the vectors as for all possible coalitions S in M. The cost of producing vectors
xl'x Z' .... xm • where 0 ~ % ~ a. is not considered and therefore does not affect
the Shapley value. That is. if the value of F(x). for some %. 0 ~ % ~ a. which does
not coincide with an uf. is changed. this does not alter the -Sha~ley values. On
the one hand, the method is clearly advantageous since the amount of information
needed for the Shapley value is relatively small. (Actually, in many applications
the cost functions are piecewise linear, in which case the production cost of only
a finite number of different output vectors is sufficient to recover the entire cost
function F.) On the other hand, since the resulting imputation from the Shapley
value is based on limited information, distortions. like those demonstrated by the
above example. do occur. As is described below. to capture all the cost informa-
tion a nonatomic game structure must be used. For such a game, v, it is possible
to obtain an imputation analogous to the Shapley value corresponding to the finite
goods game 1). This imputation results in AS prices. Moreover. in many cases it is
easier to calculate AS prices rather than the Shapley prices resulting from the
finite goods game 1).
In order to capture all of the relevant cost information. we examine coalitions
of players corresponding to any output vector % = (x l'x z..... xm ) satisfying
o ~ % ~ a, where a is the actual vector of quanitities produced. To this end. con-
sider a game in which every unit of each good is a different player. If the goods
are infinitely divisible,l a game with an infinite number (or a continuum) of players
is implied. If each infinitesimal unit of a good makes a negligible (nonatomic) con-
tribution to the total cost then a nonatomic game (see Aumann and Shapley. 1974)
is implied. The uniform average of the marginal contributions of each infinitesimal
unit of each good to the cost of all perfectly sampled coalitions is its AS pri'ce.
The perfectly sampled coalitions are those coalitions represented by vectors pro-
portional to the vector a representing the grand coalition. Each such coalition is
thus of the form (t a l • t az. .... t am)' where t is a real number with 0 ~ t ~ 1.
Thus the AS price of a unit of the i th good, denoted by Pi' is
j 'l aFPi = -a-(t a1• t az• .... t am)dt. i =1 ..... mo x t
Here aF I aXi (t a) is the partial derivative of F with respect to Xt (or
equivalently, the marginal cost of the i th output) evaluated for an output level of
t a. Here t varies between 0 and 1. yielding the integration path which is the
diagonal [0, a].
For an intuitive interpretation of equation (5). assume that to obtain the out-
put level a. we start from zero outputs and increase all quantities of outputs uni-
formly so that their relative proportions are constant and equal to the propor-
tions of the vector a. In this way a homogeneous production expansion path or a
ray in the products space starting from zero and terminating at a is followed.
Suppose that for each incremental increase along the expansion path. the i th out-
put is charged its marginal contribution to the cost due to that increment. Then,
once a is obtained, the a i units of commodity i are charged their total contribu-
tions to the cost. obtained by summing (integrating) these incremental charges.
The result is the total contribution of the at units of the i th output to the total
cost. Dividing this figure by the number of units a i we obtain the average contri-
bution Pi given in equation (5).
64 Leonard. J. Mirman. Yair Tauman. and. IsraeL Zang
The formula for AS prices provides an answer to a problem raised by Thomas
(1974. p 144; 1980, p 240) concerning the nonuniqueness of expansion paths that
can be chosen in order to determine the contribution of the factors of production
to net revenue. Thus, the use of concepts from the thoery of nonatomic games
provides a unique expansion path. Moreover, AS prices and, consequently, the
uniqueness of the expansion path can be derived using an axiomatic approach (the
subject of the next section) that does not rely on the notions or concepts of thc
theory of games. Using this approach AS prices can be thought of as thc natural
extension of average costs to the case of joint production of several outputs. We
only point out here that the cost is fully allocated by the prices in equation (5),
that is,
Pl o.l +P2 o.2 + ... +pmo.m =F(o. l , 0.2,,,,, o.m )
Turning now to the calculation of the AS prices givcn in equation (5), note
first that although expression (5) uses the partial derivatives of F there is no
need, as far as the actual calculations are concerned, to impose the requirement
that these derivatives vary continuously or, equivalently, that the cost function
be smooth. In fact, it is possible to carry out a numerical integration process in
equation (5) in case there is a finite number of discrete changes (jumps) in the
marginal costs along the expansion path. The existence of jumps is a property of
many cost and profit functions; in particular, many linear programming cost and
profit functions have this property. In these cases the calculation of AS prices
becomes relatively simple because the cost or profit functions are piecewise
linear; that is, composed of different linear pieces combined to give a continuous
function. For every such linear piece the slope or marginal cost is constant. 1"01-
lowing the homogeneous expansion path from 0 to a along t a as t varies between 0
and 1, a finite number of linear pieces is encountered. On these linear pieces the
(constant) marginal cost is calculated as well as the range of values of t (both
lower and upper bounds) for which this marginal cost remains constant. Then,
these constant marginal costs are weighted by the differences between the
corresponding upper and lower bounds on t and summed. The result is the AS
price.
The marginal costs and the values of t for which they exhibit a jump can be
calculated using a specialized parametric linear programming process. The under-
lying theory and methodology for this is well established in the mathematical pro-
gramming literature and can be found in almost every linear programming textbook
(e.g., Bradley et al., 1978). See also Samet et al. (1984) for a description of a
parametric programming algorithm for computing AS prices for transportation
problem cost functions. Note, finally, that the use of parametric programming for
cost accounting allocation problems was suggested by Wright (1970) and Thomas
(1974, pp 141 -4).
Returning to Example 1 we now calculate the AS prices. To that end, we com-
pute the marginal costs of F(t 40, t 200) as t ranges from 0 to 1. It can easily be
seen that if t ~ 10/11, the capacity of machine A (the cheaper one) suffices to
process both outputs. Thus the marginal costs of A and Bare $1 and $3 per unit.
respectively. That is, additional units of A and B are processed on machine 1 at a
cost of $1 and $3, respectively. For t > 10/11 an additional unit of A is pro-
cessed on machine 2 at a marginal cost of $10, while an additional unit of B is pro-
cessed on machine 1 and costs $3, but releases 2 units of A which can be
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processed on machine 2, costing a net of 2(10) - 2(1) = $18. Thus, the marginal
cost of B is $21. Note that if an additional unit of B were processed on machine 2
it would cost $25. In this sense, good A subsidizes good B since the prodution of
good A shifts to the higher-priced process, minimizing the total cost. Finally, the
AS prices are:
[10 ] [1] 20 .PA = 1 - + 10 - = - = $1.818/umt, and11 11 11
[ 10 ] [ 1] 51 .PB = 3 - + 21 - = - = $4.636/umt11 11 11
This is a considerably more acceptable allocation than obtained using the other
approaches, since the per unit contribution of output A is much less than the
value obtained for B. In particular, this approach yields an accurate index of the
actual cost of producing each good which does not ignore the fact that good A is
subsidizing good B. Notice that these values actually allocate the total cost since
PAaA + PBaB = (1.818)40 + (4.036)200 = $1000 .
To conclude this section we also demonstrate how the contributions of the
factors of production (inputs) to profit may be determined. In this case the func-
tion F(x) is the profit function and x = (x l'x Z' ... , x m ) is the input vector.
Expression (5) then yields the per unit contribution of each input to the total
profits. A linear programming profit junction is of the form
F(x) = max!c 1Yl + czYz + ... + cLyd
11
subject to
Ay :s x
By ~ b
Y ~ 0
where x is the vector of inputs (available, say, in inventory), y is the vector of
final outputs, ci ' i = 1, ... , l, denotes the net revenue from selling one unit of Yi'
and A B are the same matrices as in the definition of a linear programming cost
function. The net revenues take into account all the costs involved in transform-
ing inputs x into outputs y. The constraints Ay ~ x reflect the technological
relationships between inputs and outputs, while the constraints By ~ b may
express some other restrictions, such as market size, machine capacities. etc.
Example 2
Two inputs (possibly in inventory), whose quantities are denoted by x 1 and
x z . are used to produce three outputs whose quantities are denoted by Yl' yz.
and Y3' The net profits of the three outputs are $100, $200, and $10 per unit of
Yl' yz. and Y3' respectively. These profits assume constant selling prices. Each
unit of Yl requires one unit of xl' while a unit of Y3 requires one unit of x z . A
unit of Yz requires 1/2 unit of xl and one unit of x z . It is impossible to sell more
than 100 units of Yz. The resulting maximum profit is given by:
F(x 1, x z) = max!100Yl + 200yz + 10y 3 l
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Y2
Yl + 2 = Xl
Y2 + Y3 = x 2
Y2 ~ 100 ,
Yl' Y2' Y3 ~ 0
Suppose that:z: = a = (101, 101) is given and that we wish to determine the contri-
bution of a unit of xl and x 2 to the total profit. For these given inputs, the
optimal production mix is 51 units of Yl' 100 units of Y2' and 1 unit of Y3 yielding
total profits of $25,110.
The marginal approach for determining contributions of factors of production
to profits suggests that the relative contributions of x 1 and x 2 should be mea-
sured according to the ratios of their marginal profits (which are the linear pro-
gramming optimal dual variables corresponding to the constraints whose right-
hand sides are xl and x2)' It is obvious that an extra unit of xl is used for Yl'
hence its marginal profit is $100, while an extra unit of x 2 is used for Y3' at a $10
marginal profit. Thus the per unit contribution of x 1 and x 2 should be in the ratio
10:1. However, a closer examination reveals that only the last units consumed of
xl and x 2 contribute to the profit in this proportion. For x 2 < 100, an extra unit
of xl is still used for Yl at $100 marginal contribution. But. an extra unit of x 2 is
used for Y 2' at a $200 contribution, together with an additional 1/2 unit of xl'
taken from those used for Y 1 at a loss of $50. Thus. the resulting marginal contri-
bution of x 2 is $150 and the ratio of the marginal contributions of x 1 and x 2 is 2:3
(as compared to the 10:1 ratio for the last units of x 1 and x 2)' Consequently,
since the 2:3 ratio prevails for most values of x 1 and x 2 ' we expect the ratio of
the contributions to be very close to 2:3 and not to 10:1.
Just for comparison, consider the finite game in which each input is a player
(Le., there are two players). Omitting the calculations, the Shapley value is
($17000, $8010) for the two inputs, respectively. This yields the per unit contri-
butions of ($169.3, $79.3) with a 2.13:1 contribution ratio which is still unsatisfac-
tory. Now let us calculate the AS prices of xl and x 2 at :z: = a = (101,101). Con-
sider F(t 101,t 101) as t ranges between 0 and 1 and determine the marginal profits
along the expansion path. Following the above discussion, if
o ~ t ~ 100/ 101,and x 2 ~ 100, the marginal profits are $100 and $150 for x 1 and
x 2 ' respectively. Similarly, if 100/101 ~ t ~ 1 the marginal profits are $100 for
x 1 and $10 for x 2' The resulting AS values are
Pl = [ 100 ]100 + [_1_ )100 = $100/unit,
101 101
P2 = (~~~ ]150 + [ 1~1 }1O =$148.61/unit,
and the ratio of these contributions is very close to 2:3. Note that, unlike the
values of the final marginal costs (100.10), these values do share the profit; that
is:
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Plal + P2a2 =(100)101 + (148.61)101 =$25110 .
There are two points that should be made here. First, for an optimal decision
it is the marginal values that should be used because they yield the correct alloca-
tion of resources for maximizing joint profits. Second, implicit in marginal valua-
tions is a cross-subsidy that must be present when maximizing profits. However,
if it is required to know the part of the profit of each unit of an input, the sug-
gested method is to use the AS price mechanism. The properties characterizing
this mechanism are discussed in the next section.
3 The Axiomatic Approach to AS Prices
In this section we review the axiomatic approach to the allocation of variable
costs2 through cost sharing prices due to Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and
Tauman (1982). This approach results in AS prices.
Our viewpoint, however, is a little different and captures aspects other than
the one dealt with by Billera et al. (1981). Consider first the special case in which
the cost function F is separable. That is, the cost of producing ai units of good i
is given by Fi (a i ) and consequently
(6)
Clearly, in this case the i th good is responsible for the part Fi (at) of the total
cost and should have the price of Fi (ai)1 a i ; that is, its average cost. Thus,
average cost plays a crucial role in attributing costs to outputs if costs are separ-
able. Unfortunately, in general, costs are not separable and it is not clear how to
determine that part of the costs which are attributable to each good. or
equivalently, how to define the average cost of each good.
The goal of this section is to develop an average cost pricing mechanism (or
formula) applicable to the general case of jointly producing several goods. Such a
mechanism, when available, will be the natural allocation tool in cost allocation
problems when the real contributions of outputs to costs are needed. The general
notion for these generalized average costs is based upon several fundamental pro-
perties satisfied by the average cost concept for the single-output case. Imposing
these properties as requirements (or axioms) yields this generalized average cost
mechanism for the multiple-output case.
First. consider the case of producing x units of a single good with produc-
tion cost F(:z:). The resulting average cost is denoted by AC(F,x). This notation
takes account of the fact that average cost depends on the quantity being pro-
duced as well as on the cost function F. Clearly AC(F.x) = F(x)1 x. This single-
output average costing formula (or mechanism) satisfies the following four elemen-
tary properties:
(1) Cost Sharing. The price AC(F,x) satisfies
x AC(F,x) = F(x)
for all values of x.
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(2) Additivity. Suppose that the cost function F can be split into two com-
ponents, say F l' the cost of production. and F 2' the cost of marketing (i.e.,
F = F 1 + F 2)' Then, for a given quantity x the average cost is the sum of the
average production cost and the average marketing cost; that is, for each x.
AC(F.x) = AC(F1 .x) + AC(F2 ,x) .
(3) Fbsitivity. If increasing production results in higher costs then the average
cost is nonnegative. Namely, if F is a nondecreasing function. then for each
x,
AC(F,x) ~ 0 .
(4) Rescaling. The average cost is independent of the units of measurement.
Suppose that F is the cost function of producing an output measured in kilo-
grams. Let G be the cost function of the same product. but measured in
metric tons. Clearly
G(x) = F(1000x) .
Then the average cost per ton AC(G.x) is 1000 times the average cost per kilo-
gram, AC(F,1000x). In general for any positive scaling factor A. if G (x) = F(Ax)
then
AC(G ,x) = AAC(F, Ax )
These four properties of the average cost for the single-product case are proper-
ties which it is desirable for average costs to satisfy. Therefore, it seems reason-
able to require that a multiproduct extension of average cost satisfy these pro-
perties. Indeed, let F be the production cost of a multiproduct firm; that is.
F(x) = F(x 1 ,x 2 , ...• x m ). Note that if F is separable [i.e .. given by equation (6)].
then these four properties are satisfied. com'ponentwise. for each good only by
the average cost AC i (Fi , xi) = Fi (x i )/ xi' Since our purpose is to define the
average cost of each output in the general case, where F is not necessarily separ-
able; namely, to obtain for each nonnegative vector x a price vector
AC(F,:I:) = [AC 1(F,x), ... ,ACm(F,x)]
where AC j (F,x) measures the average cost of producing the j th output. these
four properties are imposed as requirements on the generalized average cost.
Requirement 1: Cost Sharing. For each output vector :I: = (xl,x2' .... x m ) aver-
age costs share the production cost; that is,
Requirement 2: Additivity. Average costs remain invariant to technical manipu-
lations of the production process. That is, if F(x) is the total production cost
which is the sum of F 1(x) (assembly cost) and F 2(x) (marketing cost). then
ACj(F,x) = AC j (F1 ,x) + AC j (F2,x)
On the Use olGa/me-Theoretic Concepts in Cost Accounting 69
holds for j = 1. ... , m. That is. the average cost of output j is the sum of its aver-
age assembly cost and average marketing cost.
Requirement 3: Positivity. If the cost function F is increasing (i.e .. it costs
more to produce more). then the average costs of each good should be nonnega-
tive:
ACj(F.:z:) ~ a . for j = 1 ..... m
Requirement 1: Rescaling. A change in the scale of measurement (or units) of a
product should yield an appropriate change in its average cost. Let A1 • Az..... Am
denote the scaling factors and define
G(x) = F(A1X 1. A2X2. .... AmXm ) .
That is. G is the production cost corresponding to output quantities measured in
the scaled units. Then.
ACj(G.:Z:) = Aj AC j [F.(A1X1. A2X 2• .... ~xm)J for j = 1, .... m
For the multiproduct case. however. one additional requirement connecting
the single-product and the multiproduct case is needed. That is. two (or more)
commodities which are the same should have the same average cost. Since average
cost prices depend only on the cost function it is clear that being the same com-
modity means playing the same role in the cost function. As an illustration con-
sider the production of red and blue cars. The cost of producing x 1 red cars and
x 2 blue cars can be represented as a two-variable function F(x 1.x 2). But. in fact.
the cost of producing a red car is the same as the cost of producing a blue car.
This can be formulated as follows. There is a one-variable function C for which
C (x) is the cost of producing a total of x cars (red ones. blue ones. or both) and
F(x 1.x2) == C(x 1 + x 2) .
In this case we require that the average cost AC1[F.(xl.x2)J of a red car be the
same as the average cost AC2[F.(x 1.x2)J of a blue car which is the average cost
AC(C.x) of a car. where x = (xl + x 2).
Requirement 5: Consistency. If all goods are the same. that is. if there exists a
cost function C such that
then
AC1(F,:Z:) =AC2(F.:z:) = ... =ACm(F.:z:) =AC(C. Xl + x2 +
Bearing in mind that the desired multiproduct extension of average cost
should satisfy the above five requirements. a pricing mechanism is sought which
satisfies these axioms universally for as many cost functions as possible. This
leads to the following theorem.
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(7)
Theorem 1. The expression
(1 aF(tx 1 • tx z' ... , txm )
ACt (F.x) = Jr a dto Xt
is the one and only one satisfying Requirements 1-5 for all continuously
differentiable cost functions F with F(O) = O.
Thus, AS prices introduced in Section 2 have been obtained as the only
prices satisfying the five requirements universally for a considerable family of
cost problems. It follows that AS prices can be viewed as a natural extension of
the average cost concept. It is worth mentioning that AS prices (or AS average
costs) coincide with the standard average costs in the case where F(xl,x Z ' .... xm )
is separable and with the marginal costs if the production technology exhibits
constant returns to scale; that is. if F(Az) = AF(x).
Several extensions and applications of the above approach should be noted.
A recent different axiomatic derivation of the AS average cost prices was sug-
gested by Young (1985; see also Chapter 1). The universality of these prices was
further established by Samet et al. (1984) where it is shown that AS average costs
are the only prices satisfying Requirements 1-5. even for certain families of cost
functions that are not necessarily differentiable and including some piecewise
linear ones resulting from linear programming cost problems. Samet and Tauman
(1982) discuss the effect of relaxing the cost allocation requirement (Requirement
1). so that they could study various pricing mechanisms. In particular. they
characterized marginal cost prices using a set of requirements that are similar.
although somewhat different. to Requirements 2 -5. They also discuss other intui-
tive requirements, in particular. replacing the additivity requirement with a
separability requirement. Economic equilibrium models where AS average costs
are shown to be compatible with consumers' demand are discussed by Mirman and
Tauman (1982) and Samet et al. (1984). The importance of AS average costs in cer-
tain merging situations and in the determination of equilibrium industry structure
is emphasized in Mirman et al. (1982a.b). Finally. ~xtending the AS average cost-
ing formula to handle fixed costs as well as variable costs is the subject of the
paper by Mirman et al. (1983). Owing to the importance of this issue we discuss it
in detail in the next section.
4 The Allocation or Fixed and Variable Costs
This section is concerned with finding the contributions (or average costs) of
outputs produced jointly using a technology containing a fixed cost component.
Consider the production of quantities al' ... , am of m goods with the total produc-
tion cost given by G (a1, a z , .... am) where
(8)
The fixed cost C is a positive constant. independent of the output level and the
variable cost. Here the variable cost is given by F; that is. F(O, 0, ... ,0) = O.
If expression (7) is applied to the function G given by equation (8) and the
output vector a = (al . az ' ... , am); that is.
On th.e Use o/Ga.me-Th.eoretic Concepts in Cost Accounting 71
(1 aG(t 0.1 , t a Z ' .•.• tam)
AC i (G,a) = Jr a dto Xi
then, since the marginal costs of G are exactly those of F. the resulting prices
only cover the variable portion F(a) of the cost. It is thus clear that a major dif-
ficulty with the approach of the previous sections is that it is applicable only to
cost functions having no fixed cost component. In fact. an average costing formula
[for cost functions of the type (8)] that satisfies Requirements 1-5 of the last sec-
tion implies a contradiction. Hence. no formula simultaneously satisfies all five
requirements. To illustrate the difficulty. we consider the following example.
Exa.mple 3
Consider the production of two goods. 0.1 = a z = 1. with the cost function
G(xl'x Z) = xl + Xz + C
The consistency requirement immediately implies that the two goods should have
equal average costs. and hence
CAC1 [G .(1.1)] = ACz[G ,(1.1)] = 1 + "2 (9)
Letting G(x 1 ,x Z ) =G 1 (x 1 .x Z) + G Z(x 1 ,x Z)' where G 1 (x 1 .x Z) =xl and
G Z(x 1 .x Z) = C + x z' then the average costs for G1 and Gz. respectively. are
AC1 [G 1 .(1.1)1 =1 AC1 [G Z.(1.1)] =0
ACZ[G 1 .(1,1)] = 0 ACz[Gz.(l,l)] = 1 + C
Then to satisfy the additivity requirement
AC 1 [G .(1,1)] = AC 1 [G 1 .(1,1)] + AC 1 [G Z,(1,1)] = 1
ACz[G .(1,1)] =ACZ[G 1 .(1.1)] + ACz[Gz,(l,l)] =1 + C
This. however. contradicts equation (9) since it implies that the price of the
second commodity covers all the fixed cost.
In this section we analyze and suggest solutions to various cost allocation
problems involving fixed costs. However, we first note that a distinction must be
made between the long-run cost function and the short-run cost function. The
long-run cost function is the lower envelope of the short-run cost function. In
other words. the long-run cost function H(x l' x z. .... x m ) is the minimum cost. over
all possible technologies, of producing a given vector a of outputs. The short-run
cost function G (x l' X z . ... , x m ) given by equation (8) thus coincides with the long-
run cost function at a certain level (or levels) of output. This short-run cost func-
tion is efficient for producing these quantities. but is not efficient for producing
all output levels. The relationship between the long-run and short-run cost func-
tion is illustrated for the one good case in Figure 3.1. This figure demonstrates
the well known convention that long-run cost functions. in generaL do not have a
fixed cost component. But the implicit optimal short-run technology for producing
a particular vector of outputs has. in generaL a fixed cost component. which in
some circumstances must be allocated among the outputs. Moreover, there are
even some long-run cost functions that do have legitimate fixed cost components
(e.g .. transporting Moon dust to Earth).
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Cost
H(x)G(x)
Fixed
cost LL- •
Figure 3.1
Accordingly, two possible cases are considered. The first concerns produc-
tion of a. =(0.1 ' ...• am) using the best possible technology for producing this out-
put level. This implies that the long-run cost function is used; hence the cost is
given by H(al' ... , am)' When this long-run cost function does not include a fixed
cost component. the AS average costs formula (7) can be applied to allocate these
costs. On the other hand, it is the short-run cost function (8) that is actually
used by the firm to calculate the cost of producing a.. If the vector a. is optimally
produced by the firm this short-run cost function. which. in general, contains a
fixed cost component. coincides with the long-run cost function a. (or perhaps at a
neighborhood of a.). That is,
(10)
(11)
Hence the AS average costs which allocate long-run costs also indirectly allocate
the short-run costs including the fixed cost of producing a.. We now show what
part of the AS prices associated with the long-run technology 1I at a. is allocated
to the fixed cost C and what part is allocated to the variable cost F of the short-
run technology at the output vector a.. To that end. expression (7) is applied to
the function H. which yields the cost shar.ing prices P l' P 2' ...• Pm given by
(1 aH(t 0.1 , t 0.2 , .... tam)
Pt =Jr a dto Xi
Since H(o.) =F(o.) + C. at a., these prices cover both the variable and fixed
costs of the short-run cost function; that is.
Pl a l + .. , + pmam =F(al' .... am) + C
Consider the set of prices P l' P 2' ...• Pm that are due only
function F
(12)
to the variable cost
_ (1 aF(t 0.1 , t 0.2 , .... tam)
Pt =Jr a dto x t
These prices cover the variable cost F(o.) of producing a. that is.
p10.1 + ... + Pm am =F(a1 , .... am)
Obviously, from equations (12) and (14)
(Pl -Pl)a1 + ... + (Pm -Pm)am =H(o.) -F(o.) =C
(13)
(14)
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This means that Pi - Pi is that part of the price Pi which may be thought of as
covering the fixed cost C. This allocation of the fixed costs is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 4
Consider the production of two goods and assume that there are only two
available technologies for producing these goods. Let G l and G 2 be the cost func-
tions associated with the two technologies, and assume that
and
G2(Xl'XZ) =xl + Xz + 9 =FZ(xl'xZ) + 9 .
Since G l ~ Gz whenever 2xl + Xz ~ 9 the long-run minimum cost H(x l ,xZ) of pro-
ducing the output level (x l .x2) is given by
J3x 1 + 2x z . if 2x 1 + X Z ~ 9
ll(x l ·x Z ) -lx l + X z + 9. otherwise.
9 (6,6)
8
-----. (t6, t6)
~-----'~------'x 1
A 4.5
Figure 3.2
Consider now the production of 6 units of each commodity. Namely. IX =(6,6).
The total production cost is then H(6,6) =6 + 6 + 9 =21. For this output level
the short-run technology used is Gz. Following the preceding discussion. consider
the allocation of the total cost of 21 among the outputs. in particular. the alloca-
tion of the short-run fixed cost of 9. First allocate the long-run cost by calculat-
ing expression (11). Note that H(xl'xZ) is piecewise linear and thus, the calcula-
tion of AS average costs resembles the calculation in Examples 1 and 2. For each
value of t, 0 ~ t ~ 1. (t C(l,t C(z) =(t6.t6) denotes an output combination on the
line AB in Figure 3.2. Note also. from Figure 3.2. as long as t ~ 0.5,
(t C(l,t C(z) =(t 6,t 6) ~ (3.3); that is, only outputs on the line AD are consid~red.
For these outputs only values in the region where the long-run costs H coincide
with G l are needed. Hence the marginal costs of H (or its partial derivatives) are
those of G1 . Since G l is linear. those marginal costs are 3 and 2 for the first and
second outputs, respectively. In the same way, for t ~ 0.5 only outputs on the
line DB (i.e., where H coincides with Gz) need be considered. Consequently. the
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marginal costs of Hare 1 in this region for both the first and second outputs.
Now, for each output, equation (11) implies that the marginal costs are added.
corresponding to the various regions and weighted by the differences of the t
values corresponding to these regions. This yields
Pl = (0.5 -0)3 + (1 -0.5)1 = 2 , and
pz = (0.5 - 0)2 + (1 - 0.5)1 =1.5
Note that equation (12) holds,
2.6 + (1.5)6 =21 = H(6.6)
and hence long-run costs are allocated. To determine how the fixed cost of 9 is
actually allocated. we evaluate equation (13). Note that the output level of (6,6) is
in the region where long-run costs coincide with Gz. Hence the relevant short-run
variable cost function F Z(xl'x Z) =Xl + X z is the one to be substituted for F in
equation (13). Since F z is linear,
_ aF
z
Pl =-- =1
aX 1
_ aF
zPz =-- =1axz
Hence the parts of P 1 and P z that are used to cover the fixed cost of 9 units are
Pl -Pl =2 -1 =1
Pz - PZ = 1.5 -1 = 0.5
Thus, while the price vector (2,1.5) covers the total cost of producing the
output level (6,6), one-half of the price of the first good and one-third of the
second good may be attributed to covering the fixed cost. that is,
[1(6) + 0.5(6) = 9].
We now consider situations that require a different approach. The first
situation is when the long-run cost function has a fixed cost component and thus
expression (7) cannot be applied. Another situation requiring a different
approach is when the producer is unable to use the optimal short-run technology
for the actual production level. In this case the short-run cost deviates from the
long-run cost and therefore the allocation of the long-run cost is irrelevant. Thus,
the AS prices that allocate long-run costs are not applicable in this case. More-
over, AS prices cannot be used to allocate the short-run costs directly since, in
general, the short-run cost function contains a fixed cost component. In both
cases there is a need to allocate both fixed and variable costs. Hence, consider
the problem of allocating costs given by equation (8) when 0.1 , ... , am are pro-
duced. As has already been shown with Example 3. it is impossible to allocate such
costs in a way that satisfies Requirements 1-5 simultaneously. It turns out that it
is possible to modify the additivity requirement (Requirement 2) so that it becomes
compatible with the other requirements. To motivate this change, consider first
two intuitive formulas for allocating fixed costs. According to the first one every
unit of output bears the same share in the fixed cost. The share is
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It is easily seen that this expression strongly depends on the definition of a unit
of a commodity. If, for example, the units of the first good are scaled the amount
a1 changes, and hence the total number of units is altered. Consequently a new
per unit charge results. This, however, means that the above formula violates the
rescaling requirement. To overcome this problem consider the following charge to
a unit of good i:
that is. each good bears the same share in the fixed cost and this share is equally
divided among the units of that good. This allocation satisfies the rescaling
requirement. but fails to satisfy the consistency requirement. This happens since
one can manipulate the above charges by splitting a commodity into two irrelevant
classifications. For example. consider again the production of red cars and blue
cars in amounts a 1 and a z where a 1 ~ a z. By the consistency requirement the
charges to red cars and blue cars must be the same. But the last formula treats
these two types of cars unequally by imposing a higher proportion of the fixed
costs on the cars that are produced in the smaller amount.
In fact it can easily be shown that each price mechanism which allocates the
fixed cost independently of its variable cost violates either the rescaling or the
consistency requirements. We now show how to modify the additivity requirement
so that the resulting allocation of the fixed cost depends on the variable cost.
Suppose that the cost function G(a1• ...• am) is given by equation (8) where
F( a 1. .... am) is the variable cost and C is the fixed cost. Also assume that the
variable cost is given by the sum of F 1(a1, .... am) and F Z(a1' .... am)' that is
F(a1, ... , am) =F Z(a1, ... , am) + F Z(a1, .... am)
It remains to attribute the fixed cost to the two additive components of the vari-
able cost. Actually, it is not necessary to specify. a priori, how the fixed cost is
split between the two variable cost components. It is sufficient to require only
that there exists a way to do it! Let us require that the fixed cost be split into
two parts C 1 and C z such that C 1 + CZ =C, where the larger portion of the fixed
cost is attributed to the larger variable cost component. namely
(15)
Moreover. let the additivity property hold. Then if the total cost is split into two
components F 1 + C1 (assembly) and F z + Cz (marketing), each including a portion
of the fixed cost. the additivity requirement specifies that the average cost of
good i should be the sum of its average assembly cost and average marketing cost,
that is
(16)
Note that there is no need to determine C 1 and Cz. It is only required that once
the variable portion of F is additive, then there is a way of splitting the total
fixed cost among the additive portions of the variable cost such that:
(2*) Inequality (15) holds and the average cost formula satisfies equation (16).
Theorem 2. (Mirman et al.. 1983). The following formula is the one and only
one satisfying properties L. 2*, 3, 4. and 5 for all continuously differentiable
cost functions of the form F(x 1 • X z ' .... x m ) + C:
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(17)
Note that this equation can be written equivalently as
1 1 8F(t 0.1 , .... t C1.m )AC i [F+C·C1.1·····C1.m ] = 8 dto xi
(1 8F C 11 8F(t 0.1, ...• t C1.m )Jr -- + dt
o 8xi F(C1.1• .... C1.m ) 0 8xi
Accordingly, the first term in equation (17) is the AS average cost price
corresponding to the variable cost F( 0.1,0.2' .... C1.m ). The second term allocates
the fixed cost proportionally to the AS average cost.
Exa.mple 5
Consider the linear variable cost function
F(x 1• x2' ...• x m ) = b 1x 1 + b 2x 2 + ... + bmxm
Let all C1.i and C be positive. Then
Cb iAC i [F + C.C1.1. ...• C1.m ] =bi + ----'=----F(C1.1' ...• C1.m )
where the second term is the part of AC i covering the fixed cost, namely
m
m Cb
i
L: C1.i b i
L: C1.i ---....:....-- = C 1.=1 = Ci=l F(C1.1' ...• C1.m ) F(C1.1. .... C1.m )
Notes
1. The analysis carried out here may serve. however. as an approximation for practi-
cal situations where m indivisible goods are produced in relatively large quanti-
ties.
2. Throughout this section it is assumed that F(O. O..... 0) =O.
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CHAPTER 4
THE COOPERATIVE FORM. THE VALUl':. AND THE
ALLOCATION OF' JOINT COSTS AND BENEF'ITS
Martin Shubik
1 Introduction
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In 1953 Lloyd ShClpley published his elegant paper on the value solution of an
n -person game in characteristic function form. In 1962 I suggested that
Shapley's axioms could be reinterpreted in terms of accounting conventions and
could be used to provide a means for devising incentive-compatible cost assign-
ments and internal pricing in a firm with decentralized decision making (Shubik,
1962).
The problem of the assignment of joint costs (and benefits) is one that has
bedevilled accountants for many years. A reaction by a microeconomist oriented
towards marp,inal analysis may be: why bother to assign overheads or joint costs at
all? (see Stigler's textbook (1966, p 165) for an example). The reason for the dif-
ferent attitudes and perceived needs by accountants, economists, regulators, pro-
duction managers, tax collectors, divisional vice-presidents and others is that
they are all looking at the same institutional entity from different viewpoints.
The accountant wants the books to balance. He wants all costs allocated.
Benefits, unless they can be translated directly into money, pose difficult prob-
lems; the convention of conservatism more or less dictates that if you know that
an item is of positive worth but that you cannot quantify its value, carry it out at
zero or at a symbolic sum such as $1 for good will.
A tax accountant looks towards minimizing a specific evaluation. namely his
clients' tax bill; a tax collector may try to maximize tax revenues collected. An
economist advising on profit maximization from a given plant producing a joint pro-
duct wants to make sure that the arbitrary assignment of joint costs or profits
does not distort the profit maximization. If there are joint products, can an inter-
nal control system be designed that enables him to delegate decisions to others
who use only the information they are sent? Or is it desirable to have the decision
centralized?
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Even to this day microeconomic theory is disturbingly vague about what con-
stitutes a long-term or short-term decision. In the corporation, marketing, pric-
ing, production, product development, minor capacity change, major investment
and innovation all have different time scales. One individual's decision variables
are another individual's parameters.
Accountants must produce systems that are viable, acceptable and opera-
tional - taking into account the pressures and problems of management, custom,
law, economics, and the tax collector. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
do not form a rigid, monolithic set of rules to be obeyed in the same way that
chess players obey the rules of chess. But they are presented as a set of guide-
lines for the responsible businessman and ot.hers.
The problems in cost accounting are important and applied, but simpler ver-
sions of many of the problems encountered in the study of externalities and public
goods. The accounting profession does not attempt to solve all of the problems of
welfare that may occur to the economist, but rather tries to provide an allocation
scheme of operational worth to the institutions being served.
This paper is written from the viewpoint of economics and game theory
rather than that of the professional accountant. It may be that various nuances
of importance to the accounting profession are overlooked or treated in a some-
what different language. (In Chapter 2, Biddle and Steinberg address accountants'
concerns more explicitly.) The thrust of this investigation is in terms of cost and
revenue allocations as control mechanisms of interest to the economist, accoun-
tant, and business or public executive.
My initial interest in the joint cost problem came about in the context of con-
sulting work with Harlan Mills for a chemical company. The first example in my
paper (Shubik, 1962, p 336) was based upon the experience of what can happen if
fixed overheads are allocated by several acceptable accounting methods, yet
there are independent profit centers that can take action based on this informa-
tion. The application was by example and was ,tutorial, aimed at preventing error,
making clear the dangers in the assignment of overhead costs and pointing out
that if you wanted to have tidy accounts there was a way that could avoid the
error for overhead assignment. The same level of advice was also given to a major
oil company in terms of understanding why underestimation of demand was pre-
valent in the reporting of independent divisions.
Any abstraction results in a distortion of reality from some point of view.
Thus there is no universal all-purpose accounting scheme that can always satisfy
the needs of a variety of individuals utilizing accounting schemes for different
purposes. Cost and control accounting, stockholder financial reporting, and tax
accounting have different constituencies and purposes. Whitman and Shubik
(1979) discuss the different motivations and problems that occur just at the level
of financial accounting for stockholders, bondholders, other creditors, and
managers.
Once the full diversity of interested parties and their different purposes is
recognized - even restricting ourselves to the allocation of costs and revenues for
purposes of control and leaving aside problems involving equity or taxes - we
would still need to differentiate different parties, purpose., and problems. These
call for special considerations in both modeling and the selection of solutions.
In t.he subsequent sections our particular concern will be with the uses and
limitations of the characteristic function of an n-person game. This also involves
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an excursion into the problems posed by limits on information and by threats.
Given a well defined problem and a model that is regarded as a satisfactory
representation of the phenomenon being studied, a solution concept must be
selected. Among the candidates are the value, the core, and the nucleolus if the
problem is modeled by a characteristic function; or some variant of the non-
cooperative equilibrium if the problem is modeled in strategic or extensive form.
2 Game-Theoretic Modeling: The Cooperative Form
Three conceptually different forms of modeling have been suggested for
interactive decision making in situations which can be described as games of finite
length. They are the extensive, strategic, and cooperative forms of a game. Each
can be used to describe the same game, but at a different level of detail. Thus
each representation is best suited to a different class of questions and poses dif-
ferent levels of difficulty in mathematical analysis and in computation. Moreover,
if our purpose is to apply game-theoretic analysis to answer questions concerning
operational problems, the ability to actually compute solutions becomes important.
Much of the work in the application of game-theoretic methods to cost prob-
lems has been based upon the cooperative form of the game (see Shubik, 1962;
Littlechild and Owen, 1973; Young et al. 1982; Hamlen et al. 1977; Billera et al.
1978). Yet, as is argued here, far more attention needs to be paid to the ad. hoc
aspects of the cooperative form prior to the application of a solution concept.
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) based their cooperative solution theory
upon the characteristic function of an n-person game. This function v 'is a
superadditive set function defined on 2'n coalitions. Pro forma we may define the
worth of the empty coalition ¢ to be zero, or v (¢) =0. Consider two coalitions S
and T with no members in common. Superadditivity calls for
v(SuT) >v(S) +v(T) whereSnT = ¢
This is merely an economic incentive condition which assumes that there are no
overall losses from cooperation. There can, in general, be gains. Even this is not
an innocent assumption. If the joining together of two coalitions has any concrete
institutional meaning the mechanics of coalition formation may be expensive and
superadditivity is not a foregone conclusion.
The casual reader of von Neumann's and Morgenstern's classic might be
surprised to see the elaborate apparatus they erected in order to calculate and
justify the characteristic function. They invented an (n +l)-person game with a
fictitious player, "Nature", who loses the amount that all the real players gain.
This game is converted into a constant-sum game by introducing "Nature" as a
"dummy" player. In all con~tant-sumgames the strategic problem faced by a coali-
tion S and its compleIEent S is one of pure opposition. A gain by S is reflected by
an offsetting loss by S.
The device of inventing the extra player was introduced to try to avoid the
unpleasant modeling problems of describing the threat conditions that may exist
when coalition S confronts S in a nonconstant-sum game. Table 4.1a shows a sim-
ple 2x2 matrix game. If we calculate the characteristic function by assuming that
the opposition to S plays in a way to minimize S's gain we obtain the symmetric
function shown in Table 4.1b.
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Table 4.1a
Player 2
1 2
Player 1 ~ ~frl~~;:]
Table 4.1b
- -
v(l) =0, v(2) =0
v (12) = 10
This calculation completely masks the underlying nonsymmetry of the game, how-
ever. In order for player 1 to hold player 2 to zero he must be willing to suffer a
loss of -1000, whereas if player 2 uses his second strategy it is in player 1 's self-
interest to accept zero while player 2 obtains 10.
Shapley and Shubik (see Shubik, 1982, Chapter 6) have suggested the con-
cept of a c -ga.me, which means a game or strategic situation that is adequately
represented by a characteristic function. A simple but important example of a
c -ga.me is the cooperative version of an exchan~e economy. Any set of traders S
can trade among its members, but the coalition S has no threat beyond not trad-
ing. In the language of the economist the economic (or other) activity of S or S
generates no externalities to the other.
When, as in the example in Table 4.1a, the cost of carrying out a threat is
important we would like this fact to be reflected in the cooperative representa-
tion of the game that is used. In the development of his value solution, Harsanyi
(1959) suggested a way to evaluate threats, which for situations involving monetary
side payments can be described as
h (S) +h (S) = v (N) when SuS = N
- -
h (S) -h (S) = maxmin [payoff to S -payoff to S]
The first of these two linear equations states that the coalitions Sand S when
cooperating will obtain everything. When threatening each other they will try to
maximize the difference between their scores. This defines a damage exchange
rate where both the damage to the other and the cost of inflicting the damage are
taken into account.
The distinction between the characteristic function v (S) and the Harsanyi
function h (S) is in the modeling argument concerning how threats are treated.
One could use other arguments to decide upon the joint product obtainable by a
group S of firms, individuals, departments, or machines. A different way of look-
ing at the characteristic function is to regard it merely as a production function
with values defined only on sets of resources.
In essence the joint cost, revenue, and externality problems involve a finite
set of profit centers whose activities influence each other. When interests are
either independent (no externalities) or completely opposed it is clear how to cal-
culate v (S). (v (S) and h (S) will coincide.) When this is not so we may need to
consider the special properties of the problem at hand.
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Although for large n the number 2n becomes considerable (for
n =20. 2n =1.040.576); in actual application many combinations can be ruled out
quickly. Even though the characteristic function provides many degrees of free-
dom in modeling the economic environment it may still not provide enough. There
are at least two larger representations which merit consideration. They are the
characteristic function supplemented by a list of weights indicating the relative
importance of the players; and the game represented in partition form.
Instead of describing the game merely by the set N of players and the
characteristic function v(o), we add a vector of weights to the description. one for
each player. Shapley (1981) has suggested an application of the weighted game to
the payment of expenses; this is discussed further in Section 3. Shubik and
Weber (1981) have considered the adding of weights to players in the allocation of
costs to a defense system.
The characteristic function an~ its variants are based upon considering a
coalition S and a counter-coalition S. It is possible however that the amount a
coalition S can obtain depends upon the configuration of subgroups formed by the
remaining players. Thrall and Lucas (1963) formulated the concept of games in
partition function form and investigated an extension of the von Neumann and Mor-
genstern solution to such games. Let N = !1.2 ..... n l be the set of players and
P = !P1 .PZ' .... P r l be a partition of N into r coalitions. Let rr denote the set of
all partitions and R the real numbers. Then for each partition P there is an out-
come function Fp: P -.R which assigns an outcome Fp(Pi ) to coalition Pi given the
partition P. The function F that assigns to each partition its outcome function is
called the partition junction of the game. An n-person game in partition func-
tion form is characterized by (N,F).
Given any partition function F we can obtain upper bounding and
lower bounding characteristic functions v and vi as follows: for each subset
S of N
v (S) = max Fp(S)
!PISEPj
v l(S) = min Fp(S)
!P:SEP!
In the first instance a coalition S is given the maximum worth it can obtain as
a coset in any partition to which it belongs. In the second instance it is awarded
the minimum. These functions will not necessarily be superadditive. The partition
function picks up the possibility that the yield to a group depends not merely
upon the set of the remaining players but on the specifics of its organization.
It is easy to see that without externalities (as in an exchange economy) the
partition function and characteristic function forms coincide.
The cooperative representation of an n-person game or multidivision cor-
poration or other institution is in general far more parsimonious than either the
extensive or strategic form. which we discuss further in Section 4. The coopera-
tive representation suppresses institutional and process detail. The danger in
utilizing the characteristic function is that the threat structure present in some
situations may not be adequately represented. For many cost allocation and reve-
nue assignment problems the cooperative representation appears to be the sim-
plest and easiest to work with if it can be established that it provides an adequate
model for the problem at hand.
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3 Solutions to Cooperative Games
The principal candidates for solution concepts to games in the cooperative
form are the core, value, nucleolus, kernel, bargaining set, stable set, and several
others. It is suggested here that the two cooperative solution concepts most
appropriate to the study of allocation and incentive problems are the value and
the nucleolus. For games in extensive and strategic form the most appropriate
solution is the noncooperative equilibrium (see Section 4).
The kernel, bargaining set and stable set (see Shubik, 1982, for definitions
and discussion) are more appropriate for bargaining and sociological analysis than
for allocation problems.
3.1 The Core
When there is the appropriate economic structure to the problem at hand
the core can be defined for either a characteristic function or partition function
description. A considerable body of literature exists on the relationship between
the core of an economic system modeled as a game and the efficient price system
(see Shubik, 1959; Debreu and Scarf. 1963; and for a survey Shubik, 19111, Part
III). Yet, when the somewhat special assumptions concerning technological
independence of production and lack of externalities do not hold, there is no
guarantee that the core will exist. Although Hamlen et al. (1977) suggest the use
of core theory in evaluating joint cost allocation, the only typical situations for
which the core will probably exist is mergers, joint ventures, and cartel arrange-
ments. The existence of the core when joint production, joint revenues, externali-
ties and voting procedures are present is not guaranteed. Thus, for example, the
relationship betweens the core and Lindahl prices (see Musgrave and Peacock,
1958) is tenuous at best, as the core depends on the characteristic function,
which in turn depends upon technological and institutional restrictions on the
behavior of groups, whereas the Lindahl prices do not depend upon coalition
structure.
A key feature in determining the possibility for decentralization by priccs is
whether the economic entity being studied can be represented in cooperative
form by a totally balanced game (see Shapley and Shubik, 1968, or Shubik, 1982,
Chapter 6). Thus one way of considering limitations on individual strategic
independence is to see whether it is consistent with finding a characteristic func-
tion that defines a totally balanced game.
An interesting possibility that does not appear to have been investigated in
any detail is to use a partition function representation of the game, to evaluate
threats. As described above in Section 2, one can define upper and lower bounding
characteristic functions by giving each coalition S its largest (respectively smal-
lest) payoff in any partition of which is a coset. Then v(S) ~vl(S) for all S,
where v(S) is the upper and v 1 (S) the lower characteristic function. The lower
characteristic function will have the larger core. There is no guarantee that
either will be superadditive. However, if the upper characteristic function game
is totally balanced then the lower characteristic function game will also be bal-
anced. Thus there will be at least one and possibly two sets of shadow prices
which permit decentralized decision making, depending upon whether the cor-
porate rules limit the payoffs of S to v(S) or v 1 (S). It is possible that the upper
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characteristic function game has no core. yet the lower characteristic function
game is totally balanced. In this case a unique set of shadow prices will permit
decentralized decision making.
The point of these observations is to stress that the design of decentralized
systems has two components - the laws of physics and the laws of organizations. If
the technological facts of life are sufficiently bad it may not be possible to main-
tain a given degree of decentralization.
For the three-person game, if the lower game is balanced so is the upper
game. Suppose that
F 11,2,3j(1) = a, F!l,2,3j(2) = b, F 11,2,31(3) = c .
F!1,231(1) =0, F!l,23!(23) =1 ~ 0
F!2.13j(2) =0. F!2,13j(13) =e ~O
F!3,121(3) =0, F!3,121(12) =d ~O
F 123(123) = 1 .
Then for the lower game
v 1.(¢) = 0
v 1(1) = v 1(2) = v 1(3) = 0
v 1(12) = d, v 1(13) = e, v 1(23) = 1, d ,e.f ~o
v 1(123) = 1
Total balance requires that (d + e + 1) / 2 ~ 1. For the upper game
v(¢) == 0
vn)=a,v~)=b,v~)=c
v(12) = d. v (13) = e , v(23) = 1
v(123) =1 .
Renormalizing so that all one-person coalitions have a value of zero then checking
the total balance we obtain the necessary and sufficient condition
0.5[d +e +1 -2(a +b +c)] <l-a -b-c
which is equivalent to (d + e +1) / 2 ~ 1. The possibility for differences in total
balance for the upper and lower games starts with n = 4.
3.2 The Value
In my estimation the value and possibly the nucleolus are the two most impor-
tant solution concepts for the allocation of joint costs and revenues. We already
know how to apply the value to the characteristic function, the player-weighted
characteristic function, and the partition function. It is my opinion that the
outer reaches of generality in the application of value theory to a coalitional
structure would be to a partition function form with weighted importance to
players, but there still remains much to be done before this extra complication is
explored.
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The Shapley value was originally based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern
characteristic function. Shapley (1951, 1953) gave two versions of an axiom sys-
tem for the value. Shubik (1962) used the first to suggest accounting desiderata.
Since then, supported by the work of Aumann and Shapley (1974), various formula-
tions and modifications of the axioms for the value with a continuum of players
have been offered. Myerson (1977) has extended the axiom system for the value
to games in partition function form and Shapley (1981) has extended his axiom sys-
tem to include players with different weights. Everyone of these systems merits
consideration in terms of accounting desiderata.
The value is the natural extension of the type of thinking in economics that
made the use of marginal analysis so fruitful. In essence the value is the combina-
toric version of marginal analysis. Instead of evaluating at a single point the mar-
ginal contribution is evaluated over all combinations, where all permutations of the
players are deemed to be equally likely.
It is possible to calculate the value by assuming a continuum of players as was
illustrated by Billera et al. (1978) for many small players; still, when numbers are
few but bigger than five or six the calculation of the value is laborious unless usc
can be made of special properties. Littlechild and Owen (1973) provide an example
of a simple calculation (see Shapley and Shubik, 1969, and Mann and Shapley, 1964,
for some relatively large calculations).
3.3 The Nucleolus
We define the excess of a coalition 5 at a particular payoff vector
x =(Xl' ...• x n ) by
e (5.x) =v (5) - L: xi
iES
It provides a measure for how much more (or less) a coalition obtains in an imputa-
tion than it could obtain by acting alone. Any imputation in the core has an
excess less than or equal to zero.
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a single-point solution that always exists
and minimizes the dissatisfaction of the most dissatisfied coalition. More formally
we define the e-core of a game v to be the set of all imputations that would be in
the core if each coalition were given a subsidy of e. Now vary e until we find the
smallest nonempty e-core. This in known as the near core. This is the set of
imputations at which the maximum excess over all coalitions has been minimized.
If we were to continue to vary e for all coalitions we would wipe out the near core.
Instead we consider only those coalitions whose value is not constant on the near
core and. by varying e, minimize their maximum excess. We repeat this procedure
until only a single point remains. Littlechild (1974) and Littlechild and Thompson
(1977) have used the nucleolus as a costing allocation device.
Sobolev (1975) has produced a set of axioms from which the nucleolus can be
derived (which have not yet been published in English). An outline of these ideas
and their potential application to cost allocation is given in Chapter 1 (Section
5.3). The attractive feature of the nucleolus is that even without the axioms the
idea of an e-adjustment has a direct interpretation either in terms of subsidies
and taxes, or the minimization of claims of inequality among coalitions.
The Cooperative Form, the VaLue, and the ALLocation of Joint Costs and Bene/its 87
4 The Extensive and strategic Forms: The Noncooperative Equilibrium
The most realistic model of an organism is the organism itself. Any represen-
tation is an abstraction which removes or distorts information. If one is trying to
answer a specific question concerning the behavior of the organism, a model judi-
ciously selected may portray the features of the organism which are relevant and
simplify the analysis by obliterating detail irrelevant to the question at hand. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) provide a description of games in extensive form,
with each player having a finite set of strategies. The details of the game tree
description are well known (for an exposition by Shapley and Shubik, see Shubik.
1982). Our concern is with the modeling implications of what is included and
excluded in the extensive form.
The extensive form provides a total contingent planning or historical process
view of a game. The use of the game tree is explicitly historical. The same posi-
tion on a chess board arrived at by different sequencing of moves will lead to a
different node on a game tree for every sequence. The game tree is
process-oriented. Any path from the initial node or root of a game tree to a final
or terminal node provides a move-by-move description of a play with information
conditions indicated on the game tree.
A description of matching pennies as a game in extensive form is easy; the
full game tree for tic-tac-toe is large but could be displayed. A full game tree for
chess, though logically feasible, is technologically infeasible and operationally of
little value. The difference in complexity between the detailed description of
process in the play of a chess game and behavior in a corporation in a market is
enormous - both quantitatively and qualitatively. In particular it is easy to
specify more or less unambiguously the rules of the game for chess and identify
what is meant by a move. Two-person, zero-sum games are games of pure opposi-
tion. There is nothing to be gained by the players talking to or bargaining with
each other. Although in fact chess players may try ploys and various forms of
psychological warfare they are forbidden by the rules to do so. As a reasonable
first-order approximation, cheating can be ignored in the description of most
chess games.
When we try to portray the relatively simple three- or four-person game of
Poker or Monopoly, even though the formal rules of the game are given, much of
the dynamics of play hinges upon language and informal communication not speci-
fied in the rules of the game, and yet not clearly or expressly ruled out by the
formal rules. When are words merely words extraneous to deed and when are
words and informal communication a critical part of the process? Bargaining, nego-
tiation, contracting, the giving of promises, the offering of one's word of honor,
are all examples of the importance of verbal communication as vital parts of the
game. The perceptive book of Raiffa (1982) on negotiation serves as an important
example of the difficulties in trying to match the formal decision structure of a
game in extensive form with the squishy and poorly articulated realities of human
communication systems in quasi-cooperative and quasi-competitive situations.
Any attempt to model much of the activities of the corporation as a game in
extensive form must confront two new and critical sets of difficulties in contrast
with modeling the game of chess. Language and informal communication count and
the rules of the game cannot be easily formulated. Implicit contract, implicit col-
lusion, reputation, trust and social or institutional customs all playa role, yet
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they are extremely difficult to formalize.
The existence of a vast body of law complete with intricate documents such
as the commercial code and the law of contract testify both to the attempts and to
the incompleteness of the attempts to formalize rules of commercial behavior.
Ideally we would like to have a parsimonious description of the corporation
and to discover broad general rules of institutional control - be they accounting
measures. bonus systems, or reporting routines. Yet experience teaches us that
in the twilight of institutional complexity that characterizes large private cor-
porations, public bureaucracies, or state-owned industries. there are tax consul-
tants, lawyers, fixers, millionaires, and commissars beating the system by utilizing
details of the mechanisms overlooked by their designers (or possibly left vague on
purpose to provide loopholes for allies in a difficult game with a hidden agenda).
In sum. the extensive form places a laudable stress on process. but in general
the modeling difficulties encountered in trying to provide a full process descrip-
tion are overwhelming. The sheer complexity of amount of detail combined with
difficulties in characterizing rules limits the value of the extensive form as a
satisfactory basis from which to start an analysis. except for highly stripped
down and simplified representations.
5 Problems and Prospects
5.1 What is an Application?
An unkind caricature of much of operations research and management sci-
ence is that they consist of a set of techniques looking for a problem. The
manager undoubtedly will be somewhat institutionally oriented. He has a specific
organization to run. The economist, management scientist, game theorist and pro-
grammer often think in terms of their specialized bed of Procrustes. Thus a
manager and his accountants may view large calculations of the value or nucleolus
more as an exercise in the employment of surplus PhDs than a serious new way to
allocate costs and revenues. I do not subscribe to either a belief in this carica-
ture, or to the view that game theory models provide full answers to all of the
problems in cost accounting. My view is mildly optimistic and the remainder of
this paper is devoted to the question of what constitutes a worthwhile application.
I suggest that there are at least five levels of meaning as to what constitutes
an application of a methodology to an applied problem. In particular concerning
game-theoretic analysis as applied to cost and revenue allocation its uses are as
follows:
(1) To stop errors and challenge the basis for practices.
(2) To suggest good questions, formalized operationally.
(3) To suggest simple, better alternatives.
(4) To provide new, formal accounting control systems.
(5) To provide the calculations for specific answers to specific questions.
The first three applications are more at the level of high-level advice and
criticism rather than an explicit formal program for accounting. Experience as a
consultant, professional knowledge. and enough technological and institutional
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background can lead to identifying bad practices and to ralsmg important ques-
tions concerning current procedures. On occasion an immediate ad. hoc improve-
ment may be spotted that requires little institutional adjustment. When the cli-
mate is right, the use of modeling and computers has become more or less
accepted. When enough managers and accountants are receptive, there is a possi-
bility for a conceptual and institutional reorganization of accounting practices.
5.2 What are the Questions?
There are many different questions concerning the assignment of joint costs
and revenues and the possibility of answering them depends heavily upon ad. hoc
institutional and technological facts that determine how well the game can be for-
mulated in coalitional or other forms.
Among the more important questions are how to design a system where it does
not pay individuals to lie to the central office, the tax collector, and to whomever
else they submit their reports. In general the cooperative form is not adequate to
study problems of auditing, enforcement, and agency relationships under incom-
plete information. There is a bargaining literature based heavily upon strategic
or simple extensive form models (see for example Groves and Ledyard. 1977; Shu-
bik, 1970). Items such as the cost of spot checks and random audits call for stra-
tegic analysis. Our hope is that there are worthwhile problems where at least to a
good first approximation truth revelation is incentive compatible with the
accounting scheme. Thus we will not need to worry about the strategic structure
in detail as the appropriate incentive design has removed the need for information
distortion as part of planned strategy.
In a large corporation the choice is' not between centralization or decentral-
ization, but the degree of decentralization needed for viability and the level of
decentralization that results in optimal performance. The virtues of the price
system as an efficient decentralizing device are well known. But when externali-
ties are present the price system in general is not efficient.
A corporate central office has considerable power in deciding upon the
nature of the structure of the firm. Among the factors determining the nature of
decentralization are geographical location. nature of products, differentiation of
functions, and frequency with which some functions are needed, jointness or
separability of production processes, interlinkage of marketing of products, and
sharing of common facilities. Given that the central management has decided upon
a structure for the firm it decides upon the freedom of decision making for its
executives. the management information system, and the incentive system under
which they will operate.
In a previous paper (Shubik. 1962, p 331) I suggested a partial list of relevant
decisions that might be aided by an appropriate allocation procedure. They were:
(1) Decision on major investment.
(2) Liquidation of a department.
(3) Abolition of a product line.
(4) Introduction of a new product.
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(5) Other innovations (such as a change in distribution).
(6) The merger of several departments.
(7) The splitting of a department into several entities.
(8) Pricing, purchase of raw materials, and sales of final products.
All of these can be described as internal corporate decisions (or inner directed
decisions) in as much as the decisions are all internal to one bureaucratic struc-
ture. There are other classes of decisions where the emphasis among incentives,
power, and fair division is somewhat different, but which are also amenable to
game-theoretic methods. Four classes of problems are suggested. They vary con-
siderably in terms of differences in modeling required to arrive at an adequate
description of the game.
5.2.1 Internal corporate incentive systems
lnternal to the corporation there is an intermix of geography, technology,
economics, politics, accounting, legal and cultural conventions which limit the divi-
sional structure of the firm.
Items which may appear to be trivial to the academic economist may be of
paramount importance to those concerned with corporate control. For example,
should one keep at least three sets of books and should one openly admit to keep-
ing the three sets of books! One may want one set for the tax collector where the
operational consideration is to minimize the tax bill. Another set may be required
for stockholders and creditors and a third set for internal control and incentives.
In some countries both legal and societal pressures may leave the corporation
open to political and populist attack when large differences are found in different
sets of books. A decentralized multinational corporation such as an oil company is
faced with designing cost and revenue allocations that minimize taxes over dozens
of countries, yet which do not destroy the morale of regional directors. For exam-
ple, some years ago it would have been difficult for even the most incompetent
manager of a Venezuelan branch of an oil company to fail to report enormous pro-
fits whereas a competent manager in Great Britain would have been derelict in his
duties had he not reported losses.
If incentive payor bonuses depend upon local performance and must be justi-
fied to the stockholders then the corporation must explain why one set of books is
used for one purpose and another for the other.
If the firm is modeled as an n-person game in coalitional form, it is the gen-
eral management which has the opportunity to decide upon the number of players
and the constraints on their strategy sets. For example what limits are placed
upon the amount of money that a general manager can invest without having to see
his divisional or group vice-president? Who is permitted to generate the sugges-
tion to merge two departments, or to split a department into two?
The frequency of the need for special services, the costs of record-keeping,
accounting, calculating, auditing and communicating all enter into the decisions to
choose among markets, divisions and hierarchies. Williamson's (1975) perceptive
book spells out many of the detailed factors. These and other factors must
already have been adequately reflected in the characteristic function description
of the corporation. Furthermore, any merger of departments or institutional
change unlike the costless coalition formation in much theory may have important
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administrative costs attached to it. This needs to be accounted for. Shapley and
Shubik (1966) have suggested an approximate way to charge all coalitions an
organizational cost.
In short, prior to even discussing what solution concept to imply in any seri-
ous application much of the work involves providing a sufficiently relevant
description of the firm in cooperative form. Possibly one of the major contribu-
tions of game theory is to provide a conceptual framework and a strategic audit
(see Shubik, 1983) which provides a guideline to problem formulation and data
gathering rather than a rigid accounting system for the design of incentive-
compatible allocation schemes.
5.2.2 External corporate incentive systems
All of the problems of measurement noted for internal corporate control sys-
tems hold for external corporate problems, which can be considered as a coopera-
tive game. These include:
(1) Mergers and acquisitions.
(2) Cartel arrangements (where legal).
(3) The splitting of costs and revenues in joint ventures.
The differences here are that the players and their strategy sets are more natur-
ally identified with independent decision-making groups. Furthermore. the
number of players is usually below ten and often two or three.
5.2.3 Public goods and externalities
The literature on public utilities, public goods in general and externalities is
enormous and has been in existence for some time (see for example the collection
of Musgrave and Peacock. 1958). The treatment of these topics here is not
intended except to note the key modeling differences among public goods prob-
lems, externalities and corporate allocation problems. A major aspect of public
goods provision is that at some part of the process direct or indirect political bar-
gaining and voting is involved. A major aspect of the structure of most situations
involving externalities is that they involve a high component of legal as well as pol-
itical process. In contrast to both of these most corporate problems have a far
higher economic content combined with much better defined recording and
reporting procedures. Furthermore. for-profit operations tend to have fewer
measurement problems than public services. The work of Klevorick and Kramer
(1973) on the Genossenschaften and the work of Young et al. (1982) provide exam-
ples of public goods and externality problems at the level of municipal finance.
5.2.4 Technological. taxation and legal fair division problems
There is class of problems where the technological component may be high
and the cooperative form natural and relatively easy to define. The purpose at
hand is well defined and the players and their strategy sets are reasonably easy
to define parsimoniously. This class includes the telephone system, time-sharing
computers. aircraft loading, the sharing of joint services. peak-load pricing, and
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expense account allocation.
The problems have in common the features that moral hazard and reporting
distortion are clearly defined, minimal or nonexistent. In many of the network or
joint service problems the strategy of the users amounts to using or not using the
facility. The individuals need not be looked at as players or can be regarded as
extremely small without individual power. The characteristic function can be
looked at more as a production function than as a game of strategy.
5.3 Prospects
It is my belief that, at least in economics, a true conceptual breakthrough
shows its ultimate importance in application when it serves as the basis for a new
accounting scheme. The three accounting schemes of signal importance to the
development of the modern economy were
(1) Double-entry book-keeping, which vastly increased the possibility for
individual trade and enterprise.
(2) National income accounting, which provided a conceptual basis for much
for the economic accounting control structure of the modern nation
state.
(3) The input-output system accounting schemes, which provided major
links in accounting for production, derived demand, and final demand.
In each instance the accounting system generated data that were not previously
available. In the process of devising routines and having many professionals con-
sider the new accounting schemes, new problems, conceptual difficulties and gaps
in information gathering were discovered. The interplay between economic theory
and practice has to be sufficiently two-way if benefits are to be derived. The
next accounting revolution will occur in the combinatorics of joint costs and reve-
nues. It has already begun.
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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INCENTNE-COMPATIBLE
AND EFFICn~NT FULL COST ALLOCATION SCHEMES
The a dOTe Grove s
1 Introduction
Consider the following situation: A firm consists of n divisions or "profit
centers", i =1, ... , n, that are, for accounting or control purposes, treated as
separate units but are also connected through some firm-wide decisions. For con-
creteness, consider a single firm-wide decision such as the provision of some ser-
vice (e.g., computing facilities) that is made available to all diVisions. We suppose
that the total quantity of the good is available to each division and that its use by
one division does not diminish the availability or usefulness of the good to any
other division (thus, the good is a "public good" to the divisions).
Two basic questions confront the firm with respect to this decision. First,
the firm must decide the quantity of the good to provide and second it must decide
how to finance its provision. Concerning the decision of the optimal quantity to
purchase, it is reasonable to suppose that the value to the firm of varying quanti-
ties of the resource is given by the sum of the values of the resource to each divi-
sion. Thus, in order to determine an optimal quantity of this centrally provided
resource it is necessary to know its value to the various divisions as well as its
cost.
Now, as long as the resource is valuable to a division. the division's manager
will be interested in having more of it made available. Yet there is, of course, a
quantity beyond which, although still valuable to the individual divisions, the
resource is not sufficiently valuable to cover its marginal cost. If the center or
agent responsible for choosing the quantity of this service/resource for the firm
does not know (with sufficient precision) the value of the resource to the divi-
sions, then it must obtain this information from the divisions themselves. Thus. it
is essential for optimal decisions that the divisions report accurately or
"honestly" to the center and a nontrivial question is what incentives they have to
do so. Since we are interested only in procedures that make optimal decisions
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when provided with accurate information we confine attention to such decision
rules and ask how divisional managers might be induced to send correct informa-
tion.
We suppose that the managers of the divisions are evaluated on the basis of
their division's performance as measured by divisional net revenues adjusted for
any costs assessed them for the centrally provided resource. A full cost alloca-
tion scheme is one that divides the total cost fully among the divisions. For a cen-
trally provided public good, standard accounting practice suggests that each divi-
sion be assessed in proportion to its utilization of the resource or, perhaps, if
divisional use is not easily measured, in proportion to net divisional revenues.
Regardless of the particular scheme adopted, a full cost allocation scheme has two
features of importance for our concern. First, the cost assigned to any division
will depend jointly on all the information provided the center by all the divisions,
if the firm attempts to make an optimal decision. For example, even under an
equal sharing of costs, the total quantity of the resource purchased by the firm
will depend on all the divisions' information to the center if the center attempts
to purchase the optimal amount for the firm as a whole. The second feature of any
full cost allocation scheme is that the sum of adjustments to all divisions equals the
total cost of the resource.
Suppose that a full cost allocation scheme is specified for our firm. Every
division manager is then evaluated on the basis of his divisional revenues less the
adjustment (or cost). His evaluation, which we assume he wants to maximize,
depends on the information he provides the center in two ways. First, his infor-
mation affects the amount of the resource purchased by the center and hence his
divisional revenues. Second, his information affects his share of the cost of the
resource. Thus, in choosing what information to send, we assume he will take into
account exactly how his information will affect his evaluation. We call the full cost
allocation scheme incentive compatible if (and only if) it is always in every divi-
sion manager's interest to send correct information, regardless of the information
sent by other divisional managers. That is, if the full cost allocation scheme is
incentive compatible the "correct" information must be the information that will
always maximize the divisional mana!1er's evaluation.
The main result I wish to communicate here is: there is no incentive-
compatible full cost allocation rule if the decision rule specified must also pick
optimal decisions when supplied with correct information. Thus, either the full
cost feature, incentive compatibility, or optimality of decisions must be sacrificed.
If makin!1 optimal decisions is the main task of the procedure and managers are
trusted to follow the incentives defined by the firm, then it appears that full cost
allocation schemes are inappropriate for these purposes, regardless how useful
they might be for purposes other than making optimal decisions.
This result follows from several other results that are interesting in their
own right. The first of these is a result, due to Groves (1973) that exhibited a
family or class of incentive-compatible cost allocation rules, but which were not
full cost allocation rules. The other key result, established by Green and Laffont
(1977), showed that any incentive-compatible procedure for making optimal deci-
sions was equivalent to a member of the family of incentive-compatible cost alloca-
tion rules defined by Groves.
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2 The Formal Model
Formally, these results can be modeled as follows. Let i =0.1 ..... n denote n
divisions and a center (i = 0). Suppose profits or payoffs to the firm as a whole
are separable in all decisions ci i , i =1, ... , n. excepting the center's decisions
ci o= z. F'or example. ci i might be division i's choice of technique or the amount of
a locally available resource, etc., while cio. the center's decision. might be the
amount of a public or common input made available to all divisions or an allocation
to each division of a centrally available resource. Let profits be denoted by
n
rr(ci 1 ..... cin ; z) = .~ rri (ci i ,z) - C(z)~ =1
where C(z) might be interpreted as the full cost to the firm of the center's deci-
sion z, and 1fi (.) are the divisional net revenue functions.
Assuming the local divisional decisions ci i are to be taken after the center's
decision is made and announced. we can focus exclusively on the center's decision
by optimizing independently with respect to the local decisions. Thus, let
11'i (z) :::0 max rri (ci i . z)
al
and define the firm's payoff to be
n
11'(z) = r: 11'i (z) - C(z)
i =1
where 11'i (z) denotes the (maximized) net payoff of division i. The firm's decision
problem is then to find the center's decision z to maximize 11'(').
Now, since information is assumed to be initially dispersed, say, each division
manager i knows only his own 11'i (-) and the center knows the cost function C (-). in
order to solve the firm's problem the center must discover a sufficient amount
about 11'i ('). Suppose. therefore. that the center asks each divisional manager i to
report his function 11'i (-). The divisional manager's incentives to report "truth-
fully" or "honestly" depend on how their information will be used to evaluate their
performance. I assume divisional managers are evaluated on the basis of their own
divisional net revenues rri (ci i ,z) less an adjustment ci ,1fi (d i ,z) - c i . Since the
adjustment ci is independent of the local decisions cii . an evaluation-maximizing
divisional manager will choose d i to maximize 11'i (d i , z) and thus. I write the
evaluation as 11'i (z) - c i .
Suppose that C1 (z), .... Cn (z) is any full cost allocation scheme. Le.,
n
~ Ci(z)=C(z) forallz
i =1
and let the adjustments ci to the divisional evaluation measures be given by this
scheme: c i = Ci (z). Then, division manager i will be evaluated on the basis of the
measure 11'i (z) - Ci (z). where the function C1, ('), can depend only on the informa-
tion acquired by the center.
Since I do not assume each divisional manager necessarily reports the
"truth". Le .. sends his true net payoff function 11'1.(.) to the center. I let m1,(')
denote the i th manager's reporteci net payoff function. If. for some reason. the
divisions cio send their true net payoff functions. Le., mi (-) = 11'1. (-). then the
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center's optimal decision z* would be the solution to the program:
n
max }:; mi (z) - C(z)
z i =1
Thus, I define the center's decision rule z* (m 1 , "', mn ) for choosing z given any
messaees m 10, ... , mn 0 from the divisions by:
n
Z =z*(m 1 , "', mn ) =' argmax }:; mi(z)-C(z)i =1
Now, given the rule for choosine the decision z and the full cost allocation
scheme Ci (·), i =1, ... , n, each division manager i faces the problem of choosing
the best report mi (.) to send the center: choose mi·O to maximize with respect to
mi (.):
(1)
where mimi "" (m l' ... , mi , , mn ), and where Ci is allowed to depend directly
on all the messages mj , j = 1, , n, as well as on the decision z (m).
We say the full cost allocation scheme (C l' "', Cn ) is 7.ncentive compatible if
and only if 1fi solves the division's optimization problem; i.e., if 1fi 0 maximizes (1)
for any m j 0, j 'Fi .
I now state the main theorem of this chapter:
Theorem 1 (Green and Laffont, 1977; Hurwicz, 1975, 1981; Walker, 19713): There is
no incentive-compatible full cost efficient allor:ation scheme. More formally,
there is no decision rule-cost allocation scheme [z O,(C 1('), ... , Cn (.»] such
that
n
}:; Ci [z (m), m] = C [z (m)]: full cost allocationi =1
1ft (') =argmaX1firz(~1mi)]-Ci[z(m I mi);ml md
m j
for all m: incentive compatibility
n
Z (1f 1 , ... , TT n ) = argmax }:; 1fi (z) - C(z): efficiencyi=l
(2)
(3)
(4)
.'\Iote that in the formal statement of the theorem it is not assumed that the
messages or reports of the divisions m j necessarily be functions of the center's
decision z, i.e., be reported net divisional payoff functions. In principle, the mes-
sages (reports) migh t be anything. Also, note that the specification of the full
cost allocation scheme allows i.n the special case of a centrally allocated (private)
good for the cost to a division to depend on more tha.n just its own allocation. That
is, if
r n )
- -I, ,
z =(zl'''' zn)' C(z) - Cl .}:; zi J,,=1
then Cdz (m), m J may depend on a whole lot more than just zi (m).
The class of mechanisms (i.e., decision rule-cost allocation scheme pair)
[z('),(C 1 ('), ... , Cn (')] discovered by Groves can be defined by
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n
z(m) "= argmax ~ m i (z) - C(z)i=1 (5)
(6)Ci[z(m).m]"" - ~ mj[z(m)]+C[z(m)]+Ai(m\mi )j "'i
where Ai (m \ mi ) is a function of all reports except that of division i;
m \ m i "" (m 1 • ...• mi - 1 .mi + 1 • ...• mn ). The relevance and interest in this class
of mechanisms for the discussion here rests on the two propositions:
Theorem 2 (Groves. 1973): Any member of the class d.efined. by (5) and. (6)
above has the pair of properties that it is incentive compatible and. results
in efficient d.ecisions being chosen.
Theorem 3 (Green and Laffont, 1977): Any mechanism (d.ecision rule-cost allo-
cation scheme pair) that is both incentive compatible and. results in effi-
cient d.ecisions is equivalent to a member of the class d.iscovered. by Groves.
In fact, the main result follows from showing that no member of this class is a full
cost allocation scheme. However, one member of this family that has received
some interest is defined by
Ai(m \ mi ) = max ~ mj(z) -C(z)
z j "'i
This member of the class has the property that, while it is does not allocate full
cost exactly, that is.
n
~ Ci[z(m).m] #- C[z(m)] for all m
i =1
it always allocates at least full cost, that is.
n
~ Ci[z(m).m] ~ C[z(m)] for all m
i =1 -
Other members of this family have different relations to full cost. For exam-
ple, given a distribution on the space of possible net divisional payoff functions
1fi O. one member of the family is an expected full cost efficient allocating
scheme, that is, one such that in expectation [with respect to the probability
measure over (1f1' ...• 1fn )]. the cost of z ,C[z (1f)]. will be covered in expectation or
on average (see Groves and Loeb, 1975).
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CHAPTER 6
BARGAINING AND FAIR ALLOCATION
Terje Lensberg
1 Introduction
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In this chapter, we will look at the allocation problem from the point of view
of bargaining or fair division, a tradition initiated by John Nash's (1950) pioneer-
ing essay on cooperative bargaining.
A typical allocation problem that would fit within this framework is one in
which a number of firms plan to undertake a joint venture if they can agree on how
to share the profits from the project. The firms may settle for any agreement
they can think of, as long as it is unanimous. If there is no agreement, there will
be no project and no profits to share. Thus, we consider a situation where no
proper subset of agents can accomplish anything on their own, Le., there is no
room for coalitions. The question then is: what will be the outcome?
In Nash's framework, one attempts to gain some insight into the problem by
means of the following model. First abstract from all physical characteristics of
the particular problem at hand by representing it as a pair (S ,d), where S is a set
of feasible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility vectors, one vector for each physical
alternative or probability mixture of alternatives, and where d is the utility vec-
tor that will be the outcome in the case of no agreement between the agents (the
status quo). Now one may consider whole families of such abstract bargaining
problems and look for a set of general principles (axioms) that would describe the
behavior of the agents in any given bargaining situation. By requiring that the
solution outcome to any bargaining problem (denoted by F(S ,d» should obey these
axioms, one can hope to narrow down the set of possible candidates for a solution
(the set of possible functions F) to a class with sufficient structure to yield some
predictive power.
Clearly, nothing prevents us from looking at these principles from a norma-
tive instead of a descriptive viewpoint, e.g., as principles of fair division (Har-
sanyi, 1955), or the values of an arbiter (Raiffa, 1953). Here we will allow for both
interpretations of the model and refer to the problems (S ,d) under consideration
as collective choice problems, or simply choice problems.
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To take an example in the normative spirit, consider the problem of dividing
the costs and benefits of a public utility among its clients. Is there a division
scheme which is in some sense fair? One way to attack the problem would be to
identify a set of axioms that might reflect popular ideas of what constitutes a fair
division, and use them to limit the opportunities for discretionary action by the
management of the public utility. In somc cases, as thc one studied by Nash. the
axioms will eliminate discretion altogether by singling out a unique division
scheme.
As a third example, we may look at a society where public decisions are made
in the following decentralized fashion. There are many publicly owned or regu-
lated firms, each servicing a subset of the members of society; some municipal
electricity companies. a number of public universities, a few airlines and some
broadcasting companies. Clearly, the production and pricing decisions of each
unit will affect the welfare levels of those individuals who consume and pay for its
services. Suppose each unit is instructed to achieve a fair allocation of costs and
benefits among its clients. An interesting question is whether such decentralized
public decision making will lead to allocations that are fair for society as a whole.
Put differently, if such decentralized decision making is going to be consistent
with some overall notion of fairness, then what are the implications as to the
nature of the decision rules that would have to be followed by the decentralized
units, and what restrictions, if any, would such a requirement impose on the notion
of fairness itself?
This question will be the main topic of the present paper. Our analysis is
based on two ingredients. The first one is an axiom first used by Harsanyi (1959)
in connection with the Nash bargaining solution, and which expresses the kind of
consistency requirement mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Harsanyi's axiom differs from the ones that are usually studied within the
tradition of bargaining and fair division. It is a condition on the relationship
between choice problems involvinp. different sets of agents, while in the tradi-
tional model, the set of agents is fixed. Problems of collective choice with a vari-
able number of agents was first studied in a systematic way by Thomson (1983a),
and it is his model which is the second main ingredient in our analysis.
The results of this analysis are several new characterizations of familiar
solutions that shed some new light on the nature of those solutions. We discuss
the relationship of Harsanyi's axiom to the problem of decentralized public deci-
sion making mentioned above. The axiom can be seen as a necessary condition for
decentralized decision making to be consistent with any overall notion of fair divi-
sion, and we show that it has very precise implications as regards the nature of
the decision rules that would have to be followed by the decentralized units.
In the next section, we present the model and the axioms that we use. Sec-
tion 3 contains the results, and Section 4 contains some concluding remarks on the
potential applicability of our results to practical allocation problems.
2 The Model
The classical axiomatic model of bargaining involves a fixed set P of agents,
each equipped with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. P may be taken
to be a nonempty, finite subset of the natural integers. Let IP I be the number of
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elements in P, and let RP be the IP I-dimensional Euclidean space, indexed by the
members of P. R~ and R~+ denote the nonnegative and the strictly positive
orthant of R P , respectively. Given % ,y in R P , we write % ~ Y if % -y e:.R~, % >y
if % - Y e:.R~+ ' and % ~ Y if % ~ Y and %~y . -
A IP I-person bargaining problem is a pair (S ,d), where S is a subset of R P ,
d is an element of S. and where S satisfies the following properties:
Ai: S is compact and convex.
A2: There exists ye:.S such that y >d.
S is the set of utility allocations that can be achieved by the members of P
through unanimous agreement, and d is the outcome that will result if they fail to
agree. Thus, all subcoalitions of P can veto any outcome different from d, while
cooperation by all agents is required in order to achieve another outcome. The
existence of a point in S which strictly dominates d guarantees that all agents are
nontrivially involved in the bargaining problem. The compactness of S is a tech-
nical assumption, convexity follows if the agents may jointly randomize between
outcomes.
For simplicity, we will assume that the utility functions are normalized such
that the vector d is always the origin of~. We may then identify any bargaining
problem (S ,d) by the set S only. We will also restrict the family of bargaining
problems under consideration to sets S with the following additional properties:
A3: S is a subset of R~.
A4: If %e:.S and ye:.R~ such that y ~%. then ye:.S.
A 4 is usually referred to as comprehensiveness and amounts to assuming the free
disposal of utility. Let l:P be the class of bargaining problems S for the set P of
agents, such that S satisfies Al-A4. Such problems will be referred to as choice
problems, and will be denoted S, S', T etc. A solution is defined to be a function
F:l:P->R~, such that F(S)e:.S for all Se:.l:p . Given Se:.l:P , the vector F(S) is
called the solution outcome to S, interpreted as that compromise which is in
some sense a best resolution of the conflict among the agents in P.
We have now given a description of the basic model of the collective choice
problem. One can now proceed, as Nash (1950) did, to look for a set of axioms that
would guide the agents in their search of a fair compromise. Nash suggested four
axioms, which we state below.
(1) PrJ.reto-optimality (PO): For all S e:. l;P, if % =F(S), then % ~ Y for all
ye:.S.
Let r be the family of permutations on P. We will also sometimes treat 1e:. r as a
function from R P to itself, defined by y ""1(%) if y -r(i) =%i for all i e:.P.
(2) Symmetry (SY): For all S e:. 'if, if 1(% )ES for all % e:.S and all1e:. r, then
Fi (S) =Fj (S) for all i ,j e:.P.
Symmetry says that if the geometry of a choice problem S does not distinguish
between the agents, then the solution should not do so either. A slightly stronger
variant of this axiom, that we shall make use of later on, is:
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Anonymity (AN): For all S C r;P, for all 1c r, F[1(S)J =1[F(S)].
Anonymity states that permuting the names of the agents should not change the
solution outcome. Let A be the family of functions X from RP to itself, such that
for some a CR~+, Xt (x) = atxt for all i cp and all % CRP .
(3) Scale Invariance (S.INV): ForallScr;P, for all XcA, F[X(S)] =X[F(S)J.
S.INV requires that a rescaling of the utility representation of one or more agents
by a positive linear transformation should rescale the solution outcome in the same
way. It can be seen as a reflection of the fact that von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions are only unique up to positive affine transformations. The reason
why the transformations X contain no constant term, is that we have already used
up this degree of freedom by fixing the disagreement point d at the origin.
(4) Ind.epend.ence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IrA): For all S', S'C r;P, if
S'cS and F(S)cS', then F(S') = F(S).
In other words, if S' is obtained from S by narrowing down the set of feasible
alternatives while keeping the solution outcome to S a feasible alternative in S',
then the solution outcomes to the two choice problems should be the same.
Nash showed that there exists one and only one solution that satisfies PO,
SY, S.INV, and IrA. It is the solution that for all S picks the unique outcome that
maximizes the product of the agents' utility levels on S. Strictly speaking, Nash
stated his result only for the two-person bargaining problem, presumably because
in a situation with more than two agents, there might be room for coalitions, a
feature which is not captured by the model.
Nash's model has been elaborated by Harsanyi (1959, 1963, 1977), who
showed how the problem of solving n -person, bargaining problems could be
reduced to the more familiar one of solving two-person problems. He argued that in
any n-person bargaining problem, a particular payoff vector " ... will represent
the equilibrium outcome of bargaining among the n players only if no pair of
players i and j has any incentive to redistribute their payoffs between them, as
long as the other players' payoffs are kept constant" (Harsanyi, 1977, p 196).
This condition, which we will refer to as bilateral stability, was shown to imply
that if, among a group of n agents, all two-person bargaining problems were solved
by the two-person Nash solution, then all n-person bargaining problems had to be
solved by the n-person Nash solution.
Before we give a formal statement of Harsanyi's condition, which differs from
the ones already introduced by involving a varying number of agents, it will be
convenient to modify the basic model by following Thomson (1983a), who deals with
this case in a more explicit fashion.
Let there be a fixed, countably infinite set 1 of agents that may potentially
become involved in some collective choice problem, and let P be the set of finite
subsets of I. 1 may be taken to be the set of natural integers. Elements of Pare
denoted by P, po ,Q, etc. For all PcP, let r;P be the set of all choice problems for
the set P of agents. We redefine a solution to be a function F:
F: u R~ -> U R P
PEP PEP +
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such that for all P '=- P and all S ,=-Yf, F(S) is an element of S. For all P ,=-P, the
restriction of F to ~P is called the P-component of F.
Given Q,=-P, a choice problem T,=-~Q, a point x in T, and a subset P of Q, we
define the set tp(T) to be the intersection of T with a copy of the hyperplane RP
through x (see Figure 6.1). Given x in RQ, we denote by xp the projection of x
on RP . We may now state the condition of
Bilateral Stability (B.STAB): For all Q.P~P with P cQ and IPI =2, for all
T '=- ~Q and all S c 'if, if x =F(T) and S = tp(T), then F(S) = xp.
It is illustrated in Figure 6.1 for IQ I = 3 and IP I =2.
Q={l,2,3}
P={l,2}
T
Figure 6.1 The axiom of bilateral stability.
Harsanyi motivates this condition by pointing out that a rational agent i will
not accept a tentative agreement x for the bargaining problem T if he has reason
to believe that he could successfully force some other agent j to make a conces-
sion in his favor. Suppose that the agents are all familiar with Nash's solution to
the two-person bargaining problem, and that it is common knowledge among the
agents that two-person problems are solved by that solution. Consider then agent
1, who is looking at the bargaining problem S involving only agent 2 and himself,
by keeping the utility level of agent 3 fixed at x 3 .
If the Nash outcome to this two-person bargaining problem is (y l' yz) where
Yl >x 1 ' then agent 1 will not accept Xl but will demand Yl' arguing that agent 2
should lower his claim accordingly, by referring to their common knowledge of
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two-person bargaining theory. Whether agent 2 accepts or not does not really
matter: if agent 1 rejects :z:, then:z: cannot be the solution outcome to the three-
person bargaining problem.
Seen positively, this means that a utility vector :z: can be the solution out-
come to the IQ I-person choice problem T only if it agrees with the solution out-
comes to all two-person subproblems S obtained from T by keeping the utility lev-
els to all but two of the agents constant at the original outcome.
Because there seems to be no a priori reason why a dissatisfied agent
should limit himself to challenging only one other agent at a time for concessions,
it seems natural to consider the following generalization of B.STAB, which we call
Multilateral Stability (M.STAB): For all Q, PEP with Pc Q, for all T E: ~Q
and all SEC ~p, if :z: =F(T) and S =t;(T), then F(S) =:Z:p.
In other words, the solution should be stable, not only with respect to two-person
subproblems, but also with respect to subproblems involving any subset of the ori-
ginal group. As a principle of fair division, the axiom can be interpreted as a con-
sistency requirement on the notion of fairness, saying that an allocation should
not be declared a fair compromise for a given set of agents if it is unfair for some
subset of those agents. As pointed out by Balinski and Young (1982), this seems to
be a very natural condition to impose on the notion of fairness. Independently of
HBrsanyi's work, they have used an axiom in this spirit, called uniformity, in
their development of a theory of apportionment, e.g., for allocating seats in a par-
liament among political parties in agreement with the proportion of votes obtained
by each party.
We close this section by introducing one more axiom and some additional nota-
tion that will be useful later on. The axiom is one of continuity, which states that
similar choice problems should have similar solution outcomes:
Continuity (CONT): For all PE:P, for all S E: ~p, if !SlIl is a sequence from
~p, converging in the Hausdorff topology to S,' then !F(S II) l converges to
F(S).
The following additional notation will be used. Given P in P, ep is the vector
in ~ with all of its coordinates equal to 1. If A is a subset of R~, we denote by
cch !A l the convex and comprehensive hull of A, defined to be the smallest set
containing A which satisfies Ai, A3 and A4. Given S in ~p, we let PO(S) denote
the set of Pareto-optimal points in S, i.e.,
PO(S) ""!x E:S i jy E:S, y~:z: l .
Similarly,
WPO(S) ~!:z: E: I jy E:S, Y >:r: ~
is the set of weakly Pareto-optimal points in S. For example, if S is a rectangle in
R~ with one corner at the origin, all interior points on the top edge of S will be
weakly Pareto-optimal but not Pareto-optimal.
3 The Results
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In this section, we give an outline of some recent results involving the stabil-
ity axiom. In Section 3.1 we present a new characterization of the Nash solution,
Section 3.2 is concerned with the Leximin solution, and in Section 3.3 we discuss a
family of collectively rational and "decentralizable" solutions. Proofs will not be
given here, but may be found in Lensberg (1982a,b, and 1983), respectively.
3.1 Stability and the Nash solution
We begin by stating the following two theorems, due to Nash (1950) and Har-
sanyi (1959):
Theorem 1 (Nash): A solution F satisfies PO. sy'S.JNV, and JIA if and only if fOT
all PE P and all S E 'fr.
F(S) =N(S) =argmax { TI xi I XES} .
i EP ,
Theorem 2 (Harsanyi): If a solution F satisfies CONT and B.STAB, and if F coin-
cides with the Nash solution N fOT two-person problems. then F =N.
Theorem 2 demonstrates how B.STAB can be applied to reduce the problem of
solving n-person problems to one of solving two-person problems. In particular, if
it is known ex ante that two-person problems are solved by the Nash solution, one
is left with no degrees of freedom as regards the choice of a suitable n -person
solution.
What then if nothing is known at the outset about the nature of the two-
person solution? What kind of analytical power does the stability axiom have in
this more general situation? It turns out that it can be used to give the following
alternative characterization of the Nash solution:
Theorem 3: A solution F satisfies PO, AN, S.lNV and M.STAB if and only if it is
the Nash solution.
If we compare this result with Nash's own characterization, we see that
except for a strengthening of SY to AN, the only difference is that IIA has been
replaced by M.STAB. This is interesting, since the axiom of IIA has been somewhat
controversial within the bargaining tradition (cf. Luce and Raiffa, 1957), and
because of that, some authors (e.g. Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Roth, 1977; Thom-
son, 1981) have replaced it with other axioms, and have arrived at different solu-
tions. Here, however, we replace IIA by a version of Harsanyi's stability condition
and still arrive at the Nash solution. Thus, it seems that the Nash solution does
not rest so heavily on the axiom of IIA as is often thought.
As regards the connection to Harsanyi's theorem. we observe that, except
for dropping the hypothesis that two-person problems are solved by the Nash
solution, Theorem 3 uses the stronger version of the stability axiom, while CONT is
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not needed. Alternatively, we could weaken M.STAB to B.STAB, impose CaNT and
obtain the following variant to Theorem 3:
Theorem 4: A solution F satisfies PO, AN. S.JNV, CONT. and B.STAB if and only if
it is the Nash solution.
Going back to Theorem 3, it turns out that this is nol the strongest result
that one can prove. Specifically, the axiom of Pareto-optimality may be consider-
ably weakened and still permit a characterization of the Nash solution. Suppose
we weaken PO to require only that all one-person choice problems should be solved
optimally:
Individual optimality (IO): For all PcP with IPI =1, for all sErF,
F(S) =maxl:r I :resl·
Because IO and M.STAB together imply Pareto-optimality, we obtain:
Theorem 5: A solution F satisfies 10. AN. S.JNV and M.SfAB if and only if it is
the Nash solution.
Let us also compare this result with Theorem 1. Nash's axioms seem to fall
into two categories that are qualitatively quite different. The first category con-
sists of SY and S.INV, which state that the solution outcome should not depend on
information that is not contained in the model (Nash, 1953; Roth, 1979). In partic-
ular, S.INV is a reflection of the fact that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions are only unique up to positive affine transformations. In the second
category are PO and IrA. both of which demand some form of collective rationality
of the agents. Theorem 5 employs slightly modified versions of Nash's axioms in
the first category. and replaces those in the second category by IO and M.STAB,
both of which express a kind of individual (rather than collective) rationality
when interpreted in a bargaining context.
The kind of collective rationality expressed by IrA can be seen more clearly
by rephrasing it to say that if some alternative was declared to be "best" among a
set of feasible alternatives, then it must also be "best" among any subsel of those
alternatives. This means in particular (Roth, 1979) that if the set of possible
alternatives is expanded. then the solution either selects one of the new alterna-
tives available, or it selects the solution outcome to the original problem. On the
other hand, IrA does not have anything to say as to how the solution outcome
should change if it changes as a result of an expansion in the set of feasible alter-
natives. For example, one might feel that if the set of alternatives is expanded in
a direction which is particularly favorable to some agent, then that agent should
gain, or at least should not be worse off. as a result of such a change in the prob-
lem.
Several authors have proposed and used axioms that express such a condi-
tion of monotonicity (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Kalai 1977a; Thomson and
Myerson, 1980). In the next section we study the consequences of imposing such
an axiom in conjunction with M.STAB.
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3.2 S'tability and the Leximin solution
We begin by stating Kalai's (1977a) version of the monotonicity axiom:
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Individual Monotonicity (l.MON): Yor all Q~P, for all S, S' E'- ~Q, if S CS'
and S nRP =S" nRP where P =Q - i for some i ~ Q, then F i (S') ?oFi (S).
The motivation for this axiom is clear: The maximal set of utility vectors attain-
able in 51 by the members of P =Q - i is .'i n R P , and this set is not affected by
the expansion from S' to S'. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, where Q =!1,2!. On
the oLher hand, for each vector of utility for the set P, the maximal utility attain-
able by agent i increases, or at least does not decrease. It is in this sense that
Lhc expansion can be seen to be in agent i's favor, and it is natural then to
require that this agent should not lose.
"--------. x,
I'"igure 6.2 The axiom of individual monotonicity.
What do we get if we add individual monotonicity (I.MON) to the list of axioms
in Theorem 37 The answer is "nothing", because the Nash solution does not satisfy
I.MON, as shown in Figure 6.3. Thus, if we want the solution to satisfy I.MON, then
some other axiom in Theorem 3 must go. The question is which one. If we look at
F'igure 5.3 again, we see that the reason why the Nash solution does not satisfy
I.MON is that the level curves of the Nash product n xi permit too much trade-
tEP
off between the utility levels of agents 1 and 2. As it turns out (see Section 3.3)
the axiom of Nash responsible for the particular shape of those level curves is
scale invarianee.
The question then is whether there are any solutions that satisfy PO, AN,
T.MON and M.STAB. One possible candidate is the Egalitarian solution E, which
for each choice problem S picks the unique weakly Pareto-optimal point having
equal coordinates (see Myerson, 1981; Thomson, 1983b). This solution does not
admit any trade-off between the utilities of different agents, and so it would not
violate IMON in the example given in Figure 6.3. However, it satisfies neither PO
nor M.STAB as is clear from Figure 6.4, where Q "" !1,2,3~, P '" !2,3! and
T ""cch!(1,2,3)!.
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We have E(T):::eQ~z and t~Cl')=cch!(2,3)l=;=S, so that E(S):::2ep.
Because e Q is not a Pareto-optimal point of T, E does not satisfy PO, and because
2ep T-Zp =ep, E does not satisfy M.STAB.
8/5
1!--__~~
4/5
1
----------;-
S I
I
,
,
,
'-- --L_--L ~_ ___. x,
4/3 2
Figure 6.3 The Nash solution does not satisfy I.MON
3 L-__.J
l'-----....... x,
Ji'igure 6.4 The Egalitarian solution satisfies neither PO nor M.STAB, but the Leximin
solution does.
The Egalitarian solution is closely related to the Rawlsian maximin criterion
(Rawls, 1971) which selects a feasible alternative maximizing the utility of the
worst-off individual. In general. there may be more than one such alternative. as
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shown in Figure 6.4. Sen (1970) has suggested the following lexicographic exten-
sion of the Rawlsian maximin criterion which eliminates this indeterminacy. First,
maximize the utility of the worst-off individual, then do the same for the next to
worst-off individual, and so on, until all possibilities for increasing the utility of
individuals has been exhausted. The solution obtained in this way is called the
Leximin solution and is denoted L. It is illustrated in Figure 6.4, which also
shows that L satisfies both PO and M.STAB in the given example. In fact, we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 6: A solution satisfies PO, AN, I.MON, and M.STAB if and only if F =L.
the Leximin solution.
Observe that the list of axioms used in Theorem 6 differs from the one used
to characterize the Nash solution in Theorem 3 only in that S.INV has been
replaced by I.MON. (Imai, 1983, has given a characterization of the Leximin solu-
tion that parallels Theorem 1 in a similar way.) Now, S.INV can be interpreted as a
condition which rules out interpersonal comparisons between agents whose
preferences are represented by (cardinal) von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions. Theorems 3 and 6 show that S.INV and LMON are in a sense polar oppo-
sites when used in conjunction with the three other axioms. The Leximin solution
exploits to a maximum degree the possibilities for interpersonal comparability of
relative utility levels that become available when S.INV is dropped, by admitting
no trade-off between the utility levels of different agents.
One problem with the Leximin solution is that it is not continuous. This fact
can be seen by considering any sequence lTllj of choice problems converging to
the problem T depicted in Figure 6.4, such that each Til is strictly convex (in R~).
Then L(T II) =E(T II ) for all Til in the sequence, which means that lL(TII)j converges
to E(T). Because E(T) =(1,1,1) while L (T) =(1,2,3), this is a violation of CONT.
Thus, under the Leximin solution, it is not always the case that similar choice
problems have similar solution outcomes. This might cause someone who was sup-
posed to use it, say in a cost-benefit analysis, to worry about the quality of his
data. Although there may be other problems to worry about in connection with
implementing a collective decision rule, it will nevertheless be of interest to inves-
tigate the consequences of imposing continuity as an axiom in the model. This will
be done in the next section.
3.3 Stability and Collective Rationality
Although the Nash solution and the Leximin solution are different in many
respects, they have one thing in common: both are consistent with the maximiza-
tion of some ordering on the space of alternatives; that is, a binary relation
which is transitive, reflexive and complete. In the terminology of Richter (1971),
such solutions are said to be (collectively) rational.
The Nash solution is collectively rational: for eCich PEP and each
5 E If, N (5) =lx E 5 I :r: 2:If y for all y E 5 l, where the ordering ?If is defined on
R~ by
if and only if n Xi ~ n Yi
i EP - i EP
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As regards the Leximin solution, Imai (1983) has shown that for all P and
S, L(S) = fx ES I x ~f>y for all yES j. where for each P, ~f> is the (symmetric)
lexicographic extension of the ordering ~fi of R~ defined by
x ~fiy if and only if min xi ~ min Yi
t EP - t EP
The property of being collectively rational is enjoyed by many other solu-
tions as well. To fix ideas, one may think of the orderings ~Jf and ~f, as
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions (Bergson, 1938; Samuelson, 1947). It
is then clear that from any Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function one obtains
a social choice function (a solution) provided the maxima always exist and are
unique on the relevant domain of choice problems.
A condition that is often imposed on social orderings is separability or
independence of unconcerned individuals as it is also sometimes called. This
condition (due to Fleming, 1952) says that if the utility levels for a subset of the
agents of society is the same for some pair of alternatives, then the social order-
ing of those alternatives should not depend on the utility levels of those agents.
This means that if ~ Q is a social ordering of the utility space R2 for a group Q of
agents, then for every P c Q, the ordering ~P obtained from ~Q by restricting
~Q to any hyperplane parallel to R P must be the same for all such hyperplanes.
If the ordering ~Q is continuous, it can be shown (Debreu, 1960) that it has an
additively separable numerical representation. In other words, there is a
real-valued function f Q on R2 such that fQ(x)?,fQ(y) if and only if x ~QY'
where f Q is of the form
f Q(x) = L: f i (xi)
tEQ
The condition of separability is satisfied by any of the commonly used
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, such as classical utilitarianism,
the Rawlsian maximin criterion and its lexicographic extension, as well as the
Nash social welfare junction (see d'Aspremont and Gevers, 1977; Deschamps and
Gevers, 197B; Kaneko and Nakamura, 197B).
Intuitively, the stability axiom is a natural counterpart to separability in the
sense that it imposes on a solution much the same requirement that separability
imposes on a social ordering. What is more interesting, and perhaps less obvious,
is that it imposes on the solution a fair amount of collective rationality as well, as
the next theorem shows.
Let F be the family of all sequences Ui li E I of strictly increasing, extended
real-valued functions, where each f i is defined on R Ii l, such that for all PEP,
the function
f P "" L: f
tEP i
is strictly quasi-concave, i.e., the set of x such that fP (x) ?, fP (y) is strictly
convex in R~for each fixed y.
Theorem 7: A solution F satiSfies PO, CONT and B.STAB if and only if there
exists a sequence of junctions Ui li E I from F such that for all P <e:P and all
SEL:P,F(S)=argmax! L:fi(xi)lxESl·
tEP
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It is interesting to see this result in relation to the problem mentioned earlier of
attaining consistency in a system of decentralized public decision making, where
each decentralized unit is trying to achieve a fair allocation among its own clients.
When interpreted in this context, the stability axiom requires that if an allocation
is to be considered globally fair for the whole society, then each decentralized
unit should also regard the allocation as fair when considering only its own clients.
This is clearly a necessary condition for decentralized public decision making to
be consistent with some global notion of fairness: if it were not satisfied, then the
globally fair allocation could never be obtained, because there would always be
some local unit that would want to move away from it.
Theorem 7 shows that bilateral stability, when imposed in conjunction with PO
and CaNT, has some very precise implications concerning the nature of the deci-
sion rules that will have to be followed by the decentralized units. Firstly, the
global (and local) notions of fairness must correspond to some Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function and the decision rules must be collectively rational.
Secondly, the global social welfare function must be additively separable, which
means that it can be split up and distributed among the decentralized units in
such a way that each unit can make its decisions based on information about its
own clients only. Clearly, there is in general no guarantee that this type of
decentralized decision making will actually lead the society towards the globally
fair allocation, but the point is that if the globally fair allocation exists at all
(which it does, according to Theorem 7), then the decision rules will have to be of
this form.
It can be shown that the axioms used in Theorem 7 are independent, in the
sense that removing anyone of them will permit solutions that are not collectively
rational. Conversely, because ,the theorem characterizes a whole family of solu-
tions, it is a useful framework for analyzing the implications of adding more axioms
to the list in Theorem 7.
Adding symmetry (SY) to the list of axioms implies that all the functions Ii
must be identical. Thus, all the information needed to solve any choice problem is
contained in a single function of a real variable.
Next, we consider a weaker version of scale invariance, namely homogeneity
(HOM), which says that if two choice problems are identical, except for a scale
change, then their solution outcomes should also be identical, except for the same
scale change.
Adding homogeneity to the list of axioms in Theorem 7 implies that the func-
tions 2: Ii must be homothetic for all PEP. This means (Eichhorn, 1978,
t€p
Theorem 2.2.1) that, except for arbitrary constant terms, there exists p > -1 and
a sequence !ex i !i E I of positive real numbers such that Ii (xi) = - (ex i I p)Xi - P for
all i EJ if P 1'0, and Ii (xi) = exilog Xi for all i EJ if P =0. Thus 2: Ii is aCES
t€p
type function for all ]->E P. If symmetry is also imposed, then Ii' and hence exi ,
must be the same for all i. As P -0, we then obtain the Nash social welfare func-
tion, as p -~ -1 we obtain classical utilitarianism, and as p - = we get the Rawl-
sian maximin criterion (see Roberts, 1980, for related results in the Arrow tradi-
tion of social choice theory).
Alternatively, dropping symmetry and strengthening homogeneity to scale
invariance implies that p = 0. yielding a whole family of nonsymmetTic Nash
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solutions. This family of solutions has been studied by Harsanyi and Selten (1972),
Kalai (1977b), and Roth (1979).
It should be noted that the solutions U and E, derived from utilitarianism and
the Rawlsian maximin criterion, respectively, do not themselves qualify as solu-
tions, since the underlying social welfare functions do not always yield unique
solution outcomes on the domain considered here. One may then consider single-
valued selections, at the cost of relaxing either PO or CONT. For example, keeping
PO and dropping CONT will admit the Leximin solution studied in the previous sec-
tion.
4 Conclusion
We have attempted in this chapter to view the problem of allocating costs and
benefits among a group of individuals as one of bargaining or fair division. A gen-
eralization, due to Thomson (1983a), of Nash's (1950) model of the bargaining prob-
lem has been used to explore the consequences of an axiom, due to Harsanyi
(1959), which can be seen as a requirement that the solution to the allocation
problem should be decentralizable in a certain sense.
Although this way of looking at the problem is fairly abstract, it does give
some insight that may be useful when trying to solve real allocation problems. Our
main result is that a certain amount of collective rationality in the decision-making
process is a necessary prerequisite for an allocation procedure to be decentraliz-
able. Thus, when faced with a practical problem, the theory tells us to look for a
social welfare function in order to rank the given physical alternatives. In order
to take care of the decentralization aspect, the social welfare function should be
additively separable in individual utility levels. For practical purposes, this
means that the composite function f i (Xi 0), where xi is agent i's unobservable
utility function and f i is the i th component of the social welfare function, can be
looked upon as a standard of living index for agent i, depending on the physical
benefits or costs allocated to i.
This indicates that the problem of solving real allocation problems in a
decentralized setting is one of establishing a procedure for project evaluation in
the public sector. In both cases, the basic problem consists in specifying an
appropriate set of standard of living indices for (groups of) individuals to be used
as a criterion for selecting among the physical alternatives available in any given
choice situation. Moreover, in a given choice situation, a description of the prob-
lem consists in specifying the effect of each physical alternative on the standard
of living index for each individual or group of individuals. Thus, our results sug-
gest that if one is interested in normative aspects of the allocation problem in a
decentralized setting, then the problem can be attacked by means of the familiar
tools of cost-benefit analysis.
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PERCENED r:CONOMIC JUSTICE:
THE EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
Edward E. Zajac
1 Introduction
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Why do public utility regulators, and the public generally, find it so hard to
accept and apply the principles of economic efficiency - principles that are so
obvious to trained economists? Is it simply that the public is woefully economi-
cally illiterate? Or is it the economists who are out of step, insisting th,at every-
one march to their drummer, when in fact they arc deaf to a more fundamental
beat that drives society?
I first became involved in public utility regulation in 1965 when I was
assigned from Bell Laboratories to an ATT task force. The task force's job was to
prepare a strategy for Federal Communications Commission Docket 16258,
launched as a comprehensive investigation of Bell System rate levels and rate
structures and how they should be set so as to serve the public interest. In
response to this and subsequent dockets (e.g., Dockets 18128 and 20003) the Bell
System undertook studies to apply the most skilled neoclassical economic analysis
to determine pricing policies in the best public interest, and these studies in turn
spawned a large literature by non-Bell economists. All of this research profoundly
deepened economists' understanding of public utility pricing's relation to
economic efficiency (for an overview of this research see Sharkey, 1982, and Bau-
mol et al., 1982). However, it did not cause the FCC to scrap its fairness-based
"distributed costs" pricing in favor of an economic efficiency based pricing pol-
icy.
My continual immersion in public utility re[!ulation since then has gradually
led me away from "t.he public is economically illiterate" ar.d more toward the
"economists are deaf" view. In my experience, economists are often deaf to pleas
for economic justice because of their reliance on the "economic efficiency-income
distribution" paradigm: for a given income distribution the economist's job is to
recommend policy actions that. will move the economy toward Pareto optimality
through a Pareto improvement, while it. is someone else's job to determine what the
income distribution ought to be. In theorizing, this paradigm is very useful for
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sorting out positive and normative issues. But in the practical world. there are
generally no Pareto improving actions; every policy change generates some losers.
My observation is that economists generally ignore this fact and suggest "approxi-
mate Pareto improving" moves. perhaps ones where the winners greatly outnumber
losers, or where winners could potentially compensate losers many times over. or
where a large dead-weight loss could be eliminated.1 Such "approximate Pareto
improving" moves are of course a form of utilitarianism, with its ethical danger of
harming the innocent in order to benefit the many. Even with a single loser. an
approximate Pareto improvement may be, ethically. miles removed from a strict
Pareto improvement.2
As long as policy makers ignored economists. their espousal of "approximate
Pareto improving moves" in whatever guise was not an issue. However. recently
professional economists have become members of and even headed regulatory
bodies. They routinely train lawyers and graduates of schools of public adminis-
tration to base policy on the facilitation of economic efficiency. Although I have
observed that the FCC has shied away from embracing economic efficiency for
pricing, we have seen the massive movement to deregulate airlines, trucking,
financial institutions, and telephone utilities - a tribute in large measure to the
leadership and persuasiveness of professional economists. The ethical grounding
of economic analysis has thus become a serious business.
How is this serious business to be approached? To demand only strict Pareto
improvements is to demand policy paralysis, since such improvements generally do
not exist. Further, working too hard to avoid losers risks incurring the wrath of
potential winners, who may feel that the receipt of justly deserved gains is being
unjustly thwarted. But to implement approximate Pareto improving moves on the
naive assumption that this will help achieve Pareto optimality is to risk imposing
ethical fascism. At issue are ancient ethical questions such as individual versus
societal welfare (should an individual's rights and freedom be violated to advance
the social good?); the ends versus means dilemma, reflected currently in the ten-
sion between Rawls' end state theory of justice and Nozick's procedural justice
theory (if we agree that a particular Pareto optimal end state is just, how do we
get there justly?)
In my view, the starting point for approaching these issues is clear. At bot-
tom. economic policy is driven by considerations of economic justice. That being
the case, the further development of both positive and normative economic theory
requires a deeper understanding of economic justice, especially of how it is per-
ceived.
For example, the currently popular "economic" or "political" theories of
regulation are models of self-interest groups interacting with legislators or regula-
tors. But what causes the groups to form? One observes that the groups typically
legitimate their actions by claims of correcting or preventing economic injustices.
In my experience, economists usually dismiss such justice arguments as smoke-
screens for the furthering of self-interest and insist on approaching group forma-
tion or almost any other issue in terms of rational actors balancing benefits and
costs at the margin. But if the justice arguments are such transparent frauds,
why are they advanced in the first place and why are they given serious attention
by the regulatory process? If a theory of "sincere justice" is to be rejected, then
one must explain the success of "insincere justice" arguments, and one should be
able to construct a theory of "insincere justice argumentation."
Perceived. Economic Ju.stice: Th.e Exa.mpLe 0/PubLic UtiLity Regu.La.tion 121
On the normative side, economic analysis is an indispensable calculus for
dealing with economic justice. Its great virtue is its ability to calculate benefits
and costs that are diffused throughout the population, as well as those that are
concentrated in narrow self-interest groups. But the practical application of this
calculus can be stymied by economists ignoring, or worse, being unintentionally
high-handed about, justice issues. As a case in point, consider Katherine Sasse-
ville, former chairwoman of the Minnesota Public Service Commission, discussing
economists' proposals to deregulate telecommunications
'" they [economists] are also idealists, hopelessly out of touch with reality.
Like the flower children of the 1960s they live in a perfect world of harmony
and joy where all conditions are at Pareto optimality, and perfect competi-
tion perfectly allocates all the resources of society, providing a free-market
panacea for all the woes of man. Blinded by their belief in the theoretical
world of competition. they have made the leap of faith to assume that what
works in theory will work in the real world. Convinced that efficient alloca-
tion is fair and just allocation, they ignore the absence of any empirical evi-
dence that, in the real world, unregUlated competition can assure the fair
distribution of an essential social good or service ...Theoretical economists
who dream perfervid dreams of perfect competition in communications ser-
vices should leave Washington for a few months and travel about the small
towns of America. listening to the people describe their goals, the public's
idea of social goals for communications service. I have heard sworn tes-
timony from people who watched their house or barn burn down because of
unreliable telephone service. I also heard a woman testify that a baby is
alive today because the telephone system at Sl. Mary's Village, Alaska, had
been installed the week before the child became ill. and it was possible to
summon the bush pilot and fly the child to a hospital (Sasseville, 1981. pp
111-114).
2 The Argument in Brier
This paper does not attempt to tell economists how to inject ethics into their
analyses. Its aim is much more modest - to make a start on constructing a positive
theory of how economic justice is perceived in public utility regulation. The paper
argues that there are usually several economic justice principles that regulatory
policymakers must take into account. These principles in effect form an unwrit-
ten constitution of economic justice,3 or at least are elements of such a constitu-
tion. The unwritten constitution is tantamount to a descriptive theory of how the
public perceives economic justice in public utility regulation. Part of this unwrit-
ten constitution is a direct outgrowth of the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. Other parts have their roots in the law
on limited liability and bankruptcy. I summarize these principles into six "propo-
sitions" that form at least a part of the unwritten constitution.
Briefly, my thesis is that the noneconomist public, uneducated in the impor-
tance of Pareto optimality and gains through exchange, tends to see life as a
struggle for a just share of an economic pie of fixed size. One member of society's
getting a share of the pie is viewed as denial of that share to other members. The
public recognizes life to be unfair, but still, in the struggle for a share of the
economic pie, no one should receive less than a minimum amount (Proposition 1).
Proposition 2 says that if circumstances make it feasible to distribute what are
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deemed to be equal shares. then such a distribution should occur. Proposition 3
states that if one has fairly acquired a share of the pie. it should not be confis-
cated; moreover, the share should not be lost because of circumstances beyond
one's control (Proposition 4).
Proposition 5 deals with the perceived injustice of economic inefficiency.
Individuals will balk at market impediments when the impediments cause them to
lose potential gains through exchange. However. at the collective level. substan-
tial evidence is required to engender the perception that some rearrangement of
resources can result in a larger pie. Because the public has little conception of
what constitutes Pareto improvement, the injustice of economic inefficiency is
perceived not as a denial of gains through exchange, but as the work of a small
group thwarting potential large-scale benefits for society. This is especially the
case if those who thwart are seen as merely resisting the loss of some unfair
advantage they already enjoy.
The last Proposition relates to the public's desire for due process mechan-
isms to prevent the unjust exercise of a utility's monopoly power.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First. we briefly review the role of
economic justice in English and American economic history, then review and cri-
tique the scant literature on descriptive or positive theories of economic justice.
This is followed by a discussion of the economic justice effects which form a con-
stitutional framework for public utility policymakers. 4
3 Historical Perspective
One starting point might be to try to apply to public utility regulation the old
and well developed literature on the positive and normative ethical foundations of
the law (see Murphy and Coleman, 1984, for an introduction to this literature).
However, although much of the philosophical legal literature has direct relevance
to our subject, it cannot be used once and for all to resolve all economic justice
issues. for public utility regulation has special characteristics. By and large,
regulatory bodies were created to short-cut existing legal processes in order to
expedite the furthering of the common good. For example. the rules of evidence
do not usually apply in regulatory hearings; rather, regulatory bodies' procedures
are governed by administrative law. The bodies are generally created by enabling
legislation that is revised seldom and only in response to large changes. (The FCC
is still operating under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, in spite of the
upheavals in the telecommunications industry.)
Laws are generally not passed to tell regulators how to rule on specific sub-
stantive issues (for an exception, see the New York State "Utility Bill of Rights"
in the sequel Section 5.2.1). As long as the bodies operate within the administra-
tive law and the enabling legislation. they have considerable freedom to set policy
on such matters as rate structures and levels, costing methodology used to arrive
at rates, and the research and development expenditures that are justifiably sup-
ported by rate payers. This in effect allows them to aet as legislators. In adjudi-
cating disputes that come before them. regulators also perform a judicial function
(the former title of "hearing examiner" is gradually being replaced by "adminis-
trative law judge"), and their actions are subject to judicial review. Finally, regu-
latory bodies are usually a part of the executive branch of government. Thus.
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they perform a mixture of legislative, judicial, and executive functions.
Moreover. regulatory bodies generally do not resolve two-party disputes in
the relative privacy of a law office or courtroom. Rather, they operate in the
public fishbowl of coverage by the media, which often perceives regulatory bodies
to be resolving disputes between "the public" and public utility corporations.
Unlike the market. which offers no relief to those who object to a price rise, regu-
lation provides a place for the citizen to complain if he or she feels a proposed
water, gas, telephone, or electric power rate hike is too high. If the citizen forms
a group with similarly situated citizens, say "senior citizens". or other residents
in the citizen's community, or other small businessmen, and the group hires a
lawyer and petitions for status as an intervenor, the citizen's complaint will prob-
ably be given serious attention. If the complaint appeals to the press as an exam-
ple of David fighting the public utility Goliath in the name of justice. the citizen
might succeed beyond expectation. On the other hand, utility executives must be
very vigilant. A seemingly innocuous proposal for a policy change in rate level or
structure for example, may galvanize citizens into actions that will capture the
fancy of the press and make the utility appear to the public like an oppressive
monster trying to take unfair advantage of helpless persons.
Hence. public utility regulators may have to be particularly responsive to the
public's notions of economic justice. Like legislators and unlike judges, regulators
need not be and often are not lawyers, and thus may not be conditioned to base
their actions on a legal conceptual framework. Thus, the notions of economic jus-
tice that emerge in the regulatory process are liable to be intuitive rather than
the finely honed result of argument and counter-argument by scholarly minds over
several centuries.
A thesis that suggests itself is that the closer an institution is to immediate
public accountability, the less it will be informed by a coherent economic logic and
the more by primitive notions of morality and justice. This is in fact Posner's
(1972) assertion about the common and statute laws:
Our survey of the major common law fields suggests that the common law exhi-
bits a deep unity that is economic in character...The common law method is to
allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting activities in
such a way as to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same thing,
minimize the joint cost of the activities. (p 98)
... If much of the common law seems informed by an implicit economic logic,
the same cannot be said for statute law. Unsystematic as our survey of sta-
tute law has been in this book, it does suggest that statutes exhibit a less
pervasive concern with efficiency and a much greater concern with wealth
distribution. (p 327)
If anything, one might expect public utility regulation to be even more concerned
with wealth distribution than is statute law.
The highly public nature of public utility regulation may give the framework
or context of economic decisions an unusually significant role. As will be stressed
in the remainder of this chapter. little empirical research has been done on
"framing" or "contextual" effects on the public's perception of what is economic
justice. However. history, experiment (what there is of it), and my own observa-
tion of public utility regulation suggest that contextual effects may be very impor-
tant. We begin by considering the historical evidence.
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3.1 The Im.portance of Context on Perceptions ofEconom.ic Justice:
Historical Evidence
Modern economics training in the United States focuses so much on the
market organization of an economy that it is easy to forget that other alternatives
are possible. But the free market economy as a legitimate institution is a rela-
tively modern concept, as stressed by Polanyi. According to Pearson's Comment
on Polanyi (1977, p xxix):
Polanyi was '" at pains to point out that the market-ordered institutional
complex does not identify the economy in all societies. Whether we look to
the evidence from anthropology or history, it is clear that the competitive
market-money-price complex, operating in its legal context of private pro-
perty and free contract and its 'economizing' cultural context, has either
been absent or has played a subordinate role through most of man's history .
... The give and take relations between persons in regard to material things
in these societies are typically embedded in a broad network of social and
political commitments that do not allow the individual to maximize his
'economic' advantage in these relationships.
Polanyi's arguments are elaborated in his book The Livelihood of Man (1977). For
example, he remarks (p 11):
As regards man, we were made to accept the view that his motives can be
described as either 'material' or 'ideal' and that the incentives on which
everyday life is organized necessarily spring from the material motives... In
fact, human beings will labor for a large variety of reasons so long as they
form part of a definite social group. Monks traded for religious reasons, and
monasteries became the largest trading establishments in Europe. The kula
trade of the Trobriand Islanders, one of the most intricate barter arrange-
ments known to man, is mainly an esthetic pursuit. Feudal economy depended
largely on custom and tradition. With the KwakiuU. the chief aim of industry
seems to be to satisfy a point of honor. Under mercantile despotism, industry
was often planned so as to serve power and glory.
Historically, in the English tradition. one of the "broad social and political
commitments" mentioned by Polanyi has been a moral or ethical commitment, a her-
itage of the medieval Christian view of how an economy should operate "justly". As
is well known, medieval Christian Europe held to the doctrine of the "just price".
Phillips quotes Glaeser on the importance of this doctrine and its historical role in
regulation (Phillips, 1969, p 52).
Regulation of private industry has been attempted by government from earli-
est times. All attempts at such regulation owed much to a very ancient ideal
of social justice, which, as applied to economic life by the early Church
Fathers, became their very famous doctrine of justum pretium, i.e .. they
opposed this idea to the contemporaneous doctrine of verum pretium, i.e ..
'natural price,' which the Roman law had derived from Stoic philosophy. As
contrasted with the doctrine of natural price, which justified any price
reached by agreement in effecting exchanges between willing buyers and wil-
ling sellers, the 'just price' doctrine drew attention to the coercion which
may reside in economic circumstances, such as a food famine where a buyer
is made willing by his economic necessities. Hence, in order to draw the sting
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of coercion, the early Church Fathers, following Sl. Augustine, considered
only that trading to be legitimate in which the trade paid a 'just price' to the
producer, and in selling, added only so much to the price as was customarily
sufficient for his economic support. There was to be no unjust enrichment. 5
"Just prices" in the grain markets prevailed as the official doctrine in Eng-
land all through the 18th century, even though the doctrine progressively came to
be disregarded. However, it always hovered in the background, to be appealed to
especially in times of scarcity. But most interestingly, it captured a popular ethi-
cal view. E.P. Thompson calls this ethical outlook, the "paternalistic model"
(Thompson, 1971, p 83) and describes its working in the grain markets as follows:
The paternalist model existed in an eroded body of Statute law. as well as
common law and custom. It was the model which, very often, informed the
actions of Government in times of emergency until the 1770s; and to which
many local magistrates continued to appeal. In this model, marketing should
be, so far as possible, direct, from the farmer to the consumer. The farmers
should bring their corn in bulk to the local pitching market; they should not
sell it while standing in the field, nor should they withhold it in the hope of
rising prices. The markets should be controlled; no sales should be made
before stated times, when a bell would ring; the poor should have the oppor-
tunity to buy grain, flour, or meal first, in small parcels, with duly-
supervised weights and measures. At a certain hour, when their needs were
satisfied, a second bell would ring, and larger dealers (duly licensed) might
make their purchases. Dealers were hedged around with many restrictions,
inscribed upon the musty parchments of the laws against forestalling, regrat-
ing and engrossing, codified in the reign of Edward VI. They must not buy
(and farmers must not sell) by sample. They must not buy standing crops, nor
mighlthey purchase to sell again (within three months) in the same mark~t at
a profit, or in neighboring markets, and so on. Indeed, for most of the
eighteenth century the middleman remained legally suspect, and his opera-
tions were, in theory, severely restricted.
The 18th century was a time of great improvements in agriculture in England
and in most years agricultural markets operated without incident and without
great regard for the "eroded body of statute law" cited by Thompson. However, to
quote Thompson again (p 79):
Those years which brought English agriculture to a new pitch of excellence
were punctuated by the riots - or as contemporaries often described them.
the 'insurrections' or 'risings of the poor' -of 1709, 1740, 1756-7, 1766-7,
1773, 1782, and, above all, 1795 and 1800-1. This buoyant capitalist industry
(agriculture) floated upon an irascible market which might at any time dis-
solve into marauding bands, who scoured the countryside with bludgeons, or
rose in the market-place to 'set the price' of provisions at the popular level.
Thompson describes dramatically the fury of the mobs, in times of great scarcity,
directed at the middlemen who "forestalled" the path of grain to the market but
bought cheaply in bulk to sell dearly in small lots ("engrossing") or otherwise
"unnecessarily" elevated the grain's final price ("regrating"). He also emphasizes
that the mobs' actions were driven by a strong ethical purpose - to have the
grain markets function according to the paternalistic model (p 111):
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the movement of the crowd from the market-place outwards to the mills and
thence ... to farms, where stocks were inspected and the farmers ordered to
send grain to market at the price dictated by the crowd - all this is commonly
found.
Thus, the work of the mob was to "set the price" fairly even while confiscating the
grain, when the mob could just as easily take the grain without payment.
Thompson argues that the paternalistic model gave way at the end of the
18th century to the "new political economy" (p 89):
Few intellectual victories have been more overwhelming than that which the
proponents of the new political economy won in the matter of the regulation
of the internal corn trade. The model of the new political economy may, with
convenience, be taken as that of Adam Smith.
Interestingly, Thompson points out that neither the paternalistic model nor the
model of the new political economy were clearly verified empirically (p 91):
Whereas the first appeals to a moral norm - what ought to be men's recipro-
cal duties - the second appears to say: 'this is the way things work, or would
work if the State did not interfere'. And yet if one considers these sections
of The WeaUh of Nations they impress less as an essay in empirical enquiry
than as a superb, self-validating essay in logic ... When we consider the
actual organization of the eighteenth-century corn trade, empirical verifica-
tion of neither model is to hand.
What about the effects of Adam Smith's great moral triumph on the economic
development of the United States? What is American history as regards the moral-
ity of market versus nonmarket controls? A fascinating account of the interplay of
the use of market and nonmarket controls is given by J.R.T. Hughes in The
Governmental Habit (1977). He does not imbed his account in a framework of
contextual effects on popular perceptions of economic justice. Nevertheless his
account implies such effects. Briefly, the colonies took over into their laws the
extensive controls over economic life that existed in contemporary English law.
To quote Hughes (p 36):
Two medieval concepts, the prohibition of usury and the doctrine of a just
price, were imbedded in the colonial laws.. " Georgia, in mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, passed a law that contained the actual medieval words, enjoining mer-
chants against "forestalling, engrossing and unjust exactions".
In summary, the colonial period set the stage (p 49):
Thus we see that during the colonial era virtually every aspect of economic
life was subject to nonmarket controls. Some of this tradition would not sur-
vive. some would become even more powerful, while some would ascend to the
level of federal control. The colonial background was like an institutional
gene pool. Most of the colonial institutions and practices live on today in
some form, and there is very little in the way of nonmarket control of the
economy that does not have a colonial or English forerunner. American his-
tory did not begin in 1776.
Since the establishment of the republic, Hughes sees a pattern much like that
described by Thompson for England before Adam Smith, but with the acceptance
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of the market and without a strict moral sanction against it. As in 17th and 18th
century England. in times of abundance, the market is allowed free rein. but (p 8):
'" When the market creates shortages of goods and services in response to
the expressed desires of consumers, the consequences are resented and the
call goes out for the government to intervene. And it has, over time. case by
case, with the results we now face.
As a specific example, consider Hughes' description of the treatment of land from
colonial times to the continental expansion (pp 59~O):
... we discern the general pattern. The colonial regime. with its township dis-
tribution, headright grants, quit rents and socage tenures. and long leases
with feudal incidents (in New York), can be viewed as pursuing a policy of
keeping land relatively scarce. while still encouraging its settlement ...
Freed from these constraints. the new republic at first mixed tradition with
the market and then relied increasingly upon the market. A plentiful land
supply rendered a complex social apparatus of distribution superfluous, for
straight sales were satisfactory to government and to buyers alike, But when
the line of settlement reached beyond the lOOth meridian into territories of
low rainfall, good land became scarce again, and settlers demanded, and got
in the Homestead Act, government rather than free-market land distribution.
Following lhe continental expansion, roughly in the period following the panic of
1873 and before the First World War. there was a continual and increased turning
to federal rather than local nonmarket controls (p 95):
... Control gained the upper hand at the federal level over the new laissez
faire because powerful groups rejected the decision of the free market
regarding the ownership and,distribution of economic power.
The powerful groups were many: farmers demanding protection against the
economic devastation of crop failures. unions seeking ways of ameliorating worker
risk in the "free wage bargain ". businessmen trying to shield themselves from the
effects of financial panics, and the general public wanting protection from the
perceived abuses of monopoly power.
Subsequently. according to Hughes. America has gone beyond specific groups
turning to the federal government for relief. By the end of the Second World War.
it had come to expect the federal government to apply nonmarket controls to pro-
vide economic stability (p 118):
Federal responsibility for the maintenance of a satisfactory level of
economic life was a radical break with tradition. Some hoped for it in the
thirties, but it was not until 1946 that a majority of Congress went along.
Hughes' work appeared in 1977, immediately before the great deregulatory
movement in airlines. agriculture. financial markets. transportation. and tele-
phones. It is not clear whether or nol he would now make a categorical statement
like (p 97):
... One only rarely sees in American history a demand to return to the free
market once an apparatus of nonmarket control has been established.
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But, as I argue below, if one imbeds Hughes theory in a framework of per-
ceived economic morality, the deregulation movement is not necessarily a contrad-
iction. All of what Hughes describes from a sweeping overall view of American
economic history accords with what can be observed in public utility regulation.
One of the principles that has emerged there, and it seems also in the economy
generally, is the perceived injustice of special interest groups thwarting the
conferring of widespread, diffused benefits. As we discuss in some detail in the
sequel when we consider Proposition 5, it is in this form that economic efficiency
appeals to public notions of fairness and justice.
At any rate, whether from 17th and 18th century England or from 19th and
20th century America, the historical evidence seems to indicate that in times of
economic stress, economic justice looms large in governmental policy. Policies that
are accepted unquestioningly in times of plenty are challenged as unfair, and
either forgotten governmental mechanisms are resurrected or new ones are
created to "correct" what are perceived to be economic injustices. Once in place,
these mechanisms provide a framework for routinely examining the justice of
economic actions that go unchallenged in a market setting.
4 Recent Literature on Descriptive Theories or Economic Justice
4.1 Prescriptive Theory as Descriptive Theory
In a sense, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive theories of
economic justice is artificial. To have predictive value, a descriptive theory must
assume stable human behavior over time, which implies that human beings act
according to some set of ethical principles - Le., they act according to a
prescriptive theory. Likewise, a prescriptive theory must be empirically based
on some descriptive model of innate human behavior. So prescriptive or normative
theories of economic justice, which go back to antiquity, obviously have descrip-
tive empirical content. Unfortunately, prescriptive or normative notions of
economic justice are often so broad and so intent on grinding a particular axe that
they are not precise in stating their descriptive or positive bases. For example,
Okun (1975, p 119) espouses the slogan "the market needs a place, and the market
needs to be kept in its place." He champions a truncated income distribution as
the primary economic justice goal - the lower boundary of family income should be
at one-half the mean. Thus, he accepts equality, but also a measure of economic
efficiency. On the other hand, Hayek (1944) finds repugnant all proposals for
government interference in the name of economic justice and predicts that,
unchecked, they will inexorably lead to totalitarianism. So, Hayek wants the
economy to accord to the "new political economy", considered completely legiti-
mate after Adam Smith, and to notions of individual liberty contained in the Bill of
Rights. Needless to say, the Okun -Hayek tension is mirrored in the contrast
between two recent books, The Zero-Sum Society (1980) by Lester Thurow and
Free to Choose by Milton and Rose Friedman (1979), as well as by countless politi-
cal debates between the "left" and "right".
In the philosophical literature, the recent works of Rawls (1971) and Nozick
(1974) have received considerable attention from economists. Rawls suggests max-
imizing the lot of the worst-off members of society as an "end state" ethical goal,
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while Nozick rejects "end state" goals in favor of justice as a process. He argues
that "a distribution is just if it arises from another Uust) distribution by legiti-
mate means". A literature is now emerging at the intersection of philosophy and
economics (see Murphy and Coleman, 1984; Buchanan, 1985), which however is gen-
erally normative and has not turned its attention to the specific area of public
utility regulation.
4.2 Equity Theory in Social Psychology
To my knowledge, the most intense empirical work on how economic justice is
actually perceived has been done by social psychologists. Unfortunately, their
work has been almost exclusively confined to two-person interactions and they
have done little on the interaction of one person with a group or with the state.
Nevertheless, according to Walster et al. (1979) over 400 empirical studies have
been done on what social psychologists call "equity theory," and this literature
offers some interesting insights. Walster et al. summarize what in their words is
the "heart of equity theory" by four propositions. These are:
Proposition I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where out-
comes equal rewards minus costs).
Proposition IlA: Groups can maximize collective reward by evolving accepted
systems for equitably apportioning resources among members. Thus, groups
will evolve such systems of equity, and will attempt to induce members to
accept and adhere to these systems.
Proposition lIB: Groups will generally reward members who treat others
equitably, and generally punish (increase the costs for) members who treat
others inequitably.
Proposition Ill: When individuals find themselves participating in inequitable
relationships, they will become distressed. The more inequitable the rela-
tionship, the more distress individuals will feel.
Proposition IV: Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable relation-
ship will attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. The greater
the inequity that exists, the more distress they will feel, and the harder they
will try to restore equity.
Walster et al. further formulate the basis of what is considered an equi table rela-
tionship by a "definitional formula". The formula essentially says that the ratio of
rewards must be equal to the ratio of contributions if two parties are to view an
interaction as just. The definitional formula is traced to Aristotle in his
Nichomachean Ethics.
The Aristotelian notion, ratio of rewards equal to ratio of contributions, is
fraught with difficulties for an economist, even in simple two-party interactions.
These difficulties are also apparent to social psychologists, as succinctly
described by Homans (1976, p 232):
Thus distributive justice always entails a comparison by the parties of the
contributions each makes and the reward each receives, but what they com-
pare is not the subjective value and cost of the rewards and contributions -
for there can be no comparison of subjective values - but rather the outward
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and visible amounts of the rewards and contributions. Thus workers in a fac-
tory compare their earnings but not how much these earnings 'mean' to each
of them.
Note that if all parties are to accept a distribution as just, they must
agree on three different points. First, they must agree on the rule of distri-
butive justice itself: that rewards ought to be proportional to contributions.
Second, they must agree on what kinds of rewards and contributions are to
be legitimately taken into account in applying the rule. Third, they must
agree in their assessment of the amounts of these contributions each makes
and the amounts of these rewards each receives. Experience seems to indi-
cate that people are much more likely to reach agreement on the rule itself
than on the other two issues. They agree on the rule but not on its concrete
applications.
4.3 Experiments by Ga.me Theorists a.nd Economists
Game theorists and economists have done a small number (relative to "equity
theory") of experiments involving subjects agreeing on how to divide resources or
money. Of particular interest are the experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer (1985);
these explicitly address the effect of context on how subjects perceive what is
fair. Their initial experiments gave startling (to them, and to economists gen-
erally) results involving bargains struck between
... two subjects who had opposing payoff functions and who had full informa-
tion of one another's payoffs. By a flip of a coin one subject could choose a
non-cooperative outcome, unilaterally: the winner of the coin toss could sim-
ply choose an outcome which gave him $12 and left the other subject nothing,
regardless of whether or not the other subject agreed. However, if the two
subjects cooperated they could obtain $14 from the experimenter. which
could be split between the subjects in any mutually agreed on manner.
Cooperative game theory predicts that the subjects will cooperate and divide
the rewards $13-$1 (the Nash bargail'jing solution: an even division of the $2
gain from trade). Under no circumstances should the winner of the flip settle
for less than $12, according to game theory. In our experiments all of the
subject pairs chose the joint profit-maximizing outcome, which the theory
predicts, but they then divided the rewards $7,$7. In effect, each winner of a
coin flip agreed to take $5 less than the $12 that he could have obtained
without the other subject's cooperation. 6
Although these results seem at first glance to be irrational to someone
steeped in economics or game theory, Hoffman and Spitzer offer an explanation in
terms of rational behavior with a moral basis:
In the results reported above, we hypothesize that subjects behave in accord
with a theory of distributive justice which says that flipping a coin is not a
just way of allocating unequal property entitlements. Subjects perceived no
morally justified difference between themselvcs, even though one "legally"
owned a substantial property entitlement and the other did not. Because they
were "morally equal", an equal split seemed to be the only fair allocation.
To test this theory, Hoffman and Spitzer varied the moral context in two
ways: Winners did not win the flip of a coin but rather won a game of nim, and
winners were instructed that they had "earned the right" to control the amount of
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money they and the loser were to receive (rather than having been "designated"
to control). This treatment allowed Hoffman and Spitzer to test three theories of
perceived distributional justice:
... observing how subjects' payoff distributions change. we can infer which
theories of distributive justice subjects seemingly hold. ... Specifically. we
consider the self-regarding, economic man paradigm from utilitarian theory,
an extreme egalitarian theory of equal sharing, and the Lockean theory of
earned desert.
Here. by "Lockean theory of earned desert". is meant a normative theory similar
to the Aristotelian notion of "rewards proportional to contributions" of equity
theory. Hoffman and Spitzer define it as follows:
The Lockean theory posits that an individual deserves, as a matter of natural
law. a property entitlement in resources that have been accumulated or
developed through the individual's expenditure of effort. The individual
deserves the entitlement because he "mixed his labor" with the resource.
With the addition of the "moral authority" and "earning" variables, the
results came out strongly in favor of the Lockean theory:
... The results suggest that subjects behaved in accord with neither the self-
regarding utilitarian theory nor the egalitarian theory of distributive jus-
tice, but rather in accord with the Lockean theory of earned desert. These
experimental results show strongly that different methods of assigning pro-
perty entitlements lead to significant differences in the frequency of self-
regarding us. equal payoff divisions. Subjects appeared to treat their enti-
tlements as rights to unequal payoff divisions when the experimental institu-
tions led those subjects to believe that they had "earned" those entitlements.
Similar results are reported in Selten (1978) who reviews a number of experi-
ments testing "individual rationality". He concludes that many of the results may
be summarized by a general equity principle, namely, if the subjects perceive
themselves to have contributed to the achievement of outcomes that yield
resources or rewards. the Aristotelian "rewards proportional to contributions"
formula will be followed; where contributions cannot be distinguished. rewards will
be divided equally.
The results from "equity theory" of social psychology and from the experi-
ments of game theorists and economists are suggestive of a strong "framing" or
contextual effect on what the public perceives as economically fair. In normal
times. driving a "gas guzzler" automobile evokes no public reaction. But in times
of a gasoline crisis. such an activity may suddenly be considered very unfair. to be
stopped immediately by the authorities. Thompson's observation of a different
ethical norm existing during an era of officially "just prices" from an era of a
freely acting market economy supports a contextual effect, as does Hughes' thesis
that severe economic setbacks usually result in pleas for governmental interven-
tion. This would predict that what is perceived to be economically just behavior in
a regulatory context might differ markedly from economically just behavior in a
market context. especially since regulation has a structure in place for the hear-
ing of economic grievances. Unfortunately. to my knowledge, no specific experi-
ments to test this hypothesis have been performed.
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4.4 Economic Theories of Regulation
Several "economic" or "political" theories of regulation have recently been
proposed, which Levine (1981) calls "revisionist" theories. These theories try to
revise the older "public interest" theory - that regulation does and should exist
to remedy market failures - in favor of a theory that regulation exists for the
benefit of rational agents acting to further self-interest. All of the revisionist
theories are necessarily based on some behavioral model of economic agents, and
thus directly or indirectly on some theory of how individuals deal with economic
justice. By and large, the underlying behavioral assumptions in these models are
crude and are presented as being self-evident and self-validating, not requiring
detailed explication or empirical support.
Some of the principal economic or political regulatory models are the implicit
contract model of Goldberg (1976), the facilitator model of Fiorina and Noll (1978),
the political model of Wilson (1980), the economic theory of regulation of Stigler
(1971) and of Peltzman (1976), and the strategic game models of McDonald (1975)
and of Owen and Braeutigam (1978). (For a review and critique of the economic
theories of regulation, see Posner, 1974). I will not attempt to discuss all of these
theories, but will comment on Stigler-Peltzman (SP) and Owen-Braeutigam (OB) to
illustrate my general dissatisfaction with them as a class.
In brief, Stigler starts with the observation that the state has a unique
power, namely, the power to coerce or police. Self-interest groups in society will,
according to Stigler, try to commandeer this unique power to further their own
ends. For example, members of a profession will demand licensing laws that erect
high barriers for those who would enter the profession - thereby giving existing
members monopoly power. The grab for the state's police or coercive power
creates the demand side of a market for regulation. On the other hand, society
gives legislators or regulators the right to exercise the government's police
powers. But legislators or regulators have their own self-interest goals: power,
glory, re-election, high-paying jobs when ,their term ends, etc. They disburse
governmental power in return for things, such as votes, which will further these
goals, thereby creating the supply side of a market for regulation. In the Peltz-
man elaboration of Stigler's basic model, the essential commodity being transacted
in the political market is a transfer of wealth. The regulator seeks to maximize
the net votes or a majority in his favor, by benefiting a group through taxing
those not in the benefited group. The probability of the regulator's obtaining
support from the benefited is assumed to increase with the group's received net
benefit (benefit minus costs of campaigning. lobbying, organizing into a group.
etc.). On the other hand, the probability of opposition by the nonbenefited is
assumed to increase with the tax they suffer and to decrease with the per capita
expenditures used on education to quell their opposition. Peltzman puts these
ingredients together into a mathematical model that can be solved for equilibria
and examined for insight into the relevant importance of the various factors.
Owen and Braeutigam take as their starting point the bold and seemingly
weakly supported assertion that the administrative process has two main effects:
it confers beneficial property rights in the status quo and has the government act
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as insurer against economic uncertainty. For example, Davis' (1958) standard text
on administrative law states (p 7):
The pervasiveness of the effects of the administrative process on the aver-
age person can quickly be appreciated by running over a few samples of what
the administrative process protects against: excessive prices of electricity,
gas, telephone, and other utility services; ... uncompensated injuries related
to employment; cessation of income during temporary unemployment; sub-
minimum wages; poverty in old age; ... loss of bank deposits.
A true believer in the OB theory might charge, for example, that, in the name of
protecting the consumer, the administrative process will bias utility and transpor-
tation rates against increases, that is, the process will confer property rights in
the status quo on those whom the status quo benefits. Likewise, in the name of
"protection against chaotic conditions in broadcasting" the process will give those
who like classical music a property right in the status quo of its broadcast: a clas-
sical music radio station will be required to go through elaborate procedures to
changc to country rock music. Likewisc, a believer in OB might conclude that
"protection" against "uncompensated injuries related to employment", "cessation
of income during temporary unemployment", "poverty and old age", and "loss of
bank deposits" are examples of the government acting as an insurer when private
insurance could possibly be superior.
In the OB theory legislators and regulators are assumed to be seeking the
favor of the "median voter", much as in the SP theory. Regulatces, however, are
assumed to be capitalizing on the attempt of the administrative process to treat
them fairly and equitably. In particular, regulatees have a powerful tool - the
delay of regulatory action by demanding the due process of regulation to run its
course. The net result, according to OB, is the opportunity for regulatees to
"game" the system, acting strategically in the light of regulatory and administra-
tive rules.
The SP and OB theories are both appealing, as are revisionist theories of
regulation already mentioned. But they all lack a firm behavioral foundation,
which must be grounded in notions of economic justice that are considered legiti-
mate. As already mentioned, none of the theories attempt to explain how "self-
interest groups" form in the first place. Likewise, even if we understand the
economic forces driving individuals to coalesce into self-interest groups, how do
we explain when legislators can afford to trade the government's policy powers
for votes without incurring the wrath of the non benefited voters? What is the
boundary between logrolling, porkbarreling, and other perjoratively described
legislative acts and legislators' allowing members of a profession to get away with
the usurpation of monopoly power?
In the OB theory, there is a different deficiency: In explaining the driving
forces of regulation by appeals to elemental notions of economic justice OB have
not cast their net widely enough. The feeling that one has a property right in the
status quo is indeed a powerful force. Likewise, "the government should be my
insurer" is also a strongly held ethical belief. But, as I argue below, these are not
the only two effects at work.
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5 Six Propositions or Perceived Economic Injustice
5.1 Introduction
In this section we describe the six principal economic justice effects that
seem to circumscribe policymakers in public utility regulation. At the outset,
three remarks are in order.
First, it may be more useful for policy analysis to focus on economic injustice
rather than on justice. This point is cogently made by E.N. Cahn in The Sense of
Injustice (1949). Cahn first discusses attempts to ground justice in "natural
laws" motivated by arguments like the following (p 4): "There are natural laws to
govern the relation of stars and planets on their journeys through the heavenly
spheres, and, by like token, there must be natural laws to eovern the relations of
human beings in their social and political orders." Cahn then describes Hobbes'
argument that natural laws are arbitrary, and goes on to observe that attempts to
axiomatize natural laws have proved sterile, and. further, that basing justice on
experience or particular instances leads to infinite regress ["how are we to know
that the instances selected are themselves wholly 'just'?" (p 13)J. Cahn goes on to
say (p 13):
Why do we speak of the 'sense of injustice' rather than the 'sense of justice'?
Because 'justice' has been so beclouded by natural-law writings that it almost
inevitably brings to mind some ideal relation or static condition or set of pre-
ceptual standards, while we are concerned, on the contrary, with what is
active, vital, and experiential in the reactions of human beings. Where jus-
tice is thought of in the customary manner as an ideal mode or condition, the
human response will be merely contemplative, and contemplation bakes no
loaves. But the response to a real or imagined instance of injustice is some-
thing quite different; it is alive with movement and warmth in the human
organism. For this reason, the name 'sense of injustice' seems much to be
preferred.
Cahn summarizes his own candidates for perceived economic injustice as follows
(p 22):
The sense of injustice may be described as a general phenomenon operative
in the law. Arnone its facets are the demands for equality, desert, human dig-
nity, conscientious adjudication, confinement of government to its proper
functions, and fulfillment of common expectations. These are facets, not
categories. They tend to overlap one another and do not together exhaust
the sense of injustice.
The point raised by Cahn is not trivial. If we think in terms of a mathemati-
cal formulation, the quest for an economically just state suggests axioms that
evoke a social preference function to be optimized under feasibility constraints
that reflect resource limitations, such as Yaari's (1981) mathematization of Rawls,
or axiomatic approaches to "just" cost allocation that lead to the Shapley value
(see Chapters 1 and 3).
On the other hand, the quest for a lack of economic injustice suggests in-
equality constraints on possible resource allocations and perhaps a region in the
space of resource allocations that is considered free of economic injustice, a view
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reminiscent of the core and related solution concepts in cooperative game theory
(see, for example, Zajac, 1978; also Chapters 1, and 8).
Second, as in the case of the US Constitution's articles and amendments, we
can expect conflicts between the six economic injustice Propositions set forth
below. The freedom of the press guaranteed by the US Constitution's First
Amendment suggests that a reporter's sources should be protected; while the
right of the accused to confront his accusers suggests that the sources should be
divulged. Every Supreme Court term is devoted to resolving conflicts over which
of two or more possible Constitutional guarantees should prevail. Likewise, as will
become apparent from the six Propositions, in certain instances, more than one
concept of economic justice may be applicable and different groups may be
winners or losers depending on which concept society thinks is paramount. The
resolution of the resulting conflict may be difficult and controversial, requiring
lengthy legislative, judicial, or regulatory proceedings.7
In other terms, policymakers in the public utility regulation collectively act,
in effect, as "ethical pluralists" as described by Gordon (1980, p 46):
The basic problem of ethics arises from the fact that criteria of goodness
may conflict with one another. The ethical pluralist accepts this and does not
attempt to eliminate such conflicts by methods such as utopian reconstruc-
tion, reduction, or lexicographical ordering. The main tasks of pluralist eth-
ics are to clarify ethical criteria, identify conflicts of values, and improve
our ways of mediating them.
Third, my conjecture is that many, perhaps all, of the Propositions can be
formulated as models of rational economic agents acting to achieve self-interest
rather than as moral maxims. For example, why do queues form at a bus stop? The
moral answer might be that it is only fair that those who arrive at the stop first
get the first chance to board a crowded bus. A rational-actor-model explanation
might be that order is a public good; those who ride buses have learned the bene-
fits of this public good and hence form queues in their individual self-interest.
For parsimony and to make the discussion accessible to noneconomists, I have not
attempted to construct such rational-actor models for any of the Propositions. A
deeper issue is whether or not a theory of positive economic justice can be con-
structed with no reference to morality. In the philosophical legal literature, such
an extreme view of "legal positivism" has a long history but is now generally
rejected (see Murphy and Coleman, 1984, Chapter 1). An open question is whether
reasonable explanatory and predictive power would be provided by a similar
extreme "economic justice positivism" in terms of rational actors seeking Pareto
superior moves.
5.2 The Six Propositions
5.2.1 Economic rights
In the Reagan administration, it is currently fashionable to talk of "safety
nets". This is a recent manifestation of the notion that every individual somehow
has a right, or an entitlement to a minimum level of economic "necessities" such as
food, shelter, clothing, a job, health care, education - and in the United States,
utilities. The very fact that a conservative administration feels it must espouse an
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economic rights concept such as a safety net is significant, for such espousal has
not always been felt necessary and, for that matter, still has ils critics.
Indeed, the movement toward economic rights has been so strong in the
United States and Western Europe as to generate support for economic rights to
be given constitutional status. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this has
been the attempt to get adopted a United Nations Convenant on economic rights B
Recently in New York Stale, the notion of economic rights has been extended
to cover utility services. In 1981. the New York State Legislature and lhe gover-
nor approved a "Utility Bill of Rights".9 The New York Times (July 4, 1981)
reported:
With the bill's sponsors asserting that gas and electric service 'are not a lux-
ury, but a necessity', the Senate tonight approved a measure defining the
rights of consumers in their dealings with utility companies ... Under the
biii, consumers who are approved for utility service must receive that ser-
vice within five days - instead of the current 10 - and cannot be required to
pay security deposits. Companies must provide service to welfare recipients,
even if they cannot pay, and the State Department of Social Services must
cover up to four months of arrears and guarantee the payment for future
services to such recipients. The payments would be guaranteed for no more
than two years. The so-called 'Utility Biii of Rights' requires utility com-
panies to follow specific procedures when they want to cut off gas and elec-
tricity. The companies are also prohibited from turning off heat during cold
weather without first contacting an adult resident of the household at least
72 hours before shutoff. A utility cannot terminate service if a doctor has
certified that a person in the household is experiencing a medical emer-
gency. The bill permits customers who are behind in biii payments to pay the
debt on a deferred schedule keyed to their ability to pay. The legislation
also limits a utility's use of estimated bills. The Companies are also required
to inform the customers annually, in writing, of their rights.
Economists might be taken aback by New York State's "Utility Bill of Rights".
For example, Leland Johnson (1981), in commenting on the author's paper, "Is
Telephone Service an Economic Right" (1901) states, "Taken literally lhis (an
economic right) suggests the jolting notion that allocation of resources in meeting
basic needs (however they are defined) should proceed independently of market
signals." Johnson further warns:
We can agree that, in some sense, people should have an economic right to
telephone service. But the concept of economic right is extraordinarily
fuzzy and must be examined most carefully beforc making policy recommenda-
tions in specific situations. If we grant that a particular service should be
provided as an economic right, do we mean that the service should be pro-
vided free of charge to all comers, or that the user should pay enough to
cover at least some portion of that cost? Or, once we have agreed upon some
price that is 'proper' for service to which a user has an economic right, does
this mean that any increase in that price is to be prohibited in the future,
despite inflation, changing market structure, or changing social needs? ... J,
for one, am disturbed by any notion of economic rights that casts in concrete
a structure within which the user pays nothing, or a specified amount for a
specific service, regardless of changing circumstances.
Johnson's warnings are right on target. But his view, and the views of the majority
of economists, are not governing. As I said in my paper:
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Whether one believes telephone service should be an economic right is beside
the point. Individuals do not make the decision; rather, society acting
through the democratic process decides it. In my view, a disinterested,
objective observer of the American scene would conclude that a basic level
of telephone service is regarded as an economic right.
The evidence leads me to the first and perhaps most important perceived
economic injustice proposition:
Proposition 1: It is now accepted that every individual has basic economic
rights to adequate food, shelter, heat, clothing, health care, education, and,
in the United States, to basic utility services. Deprivation of basic economic
righ ts is considered unjust.
5.2.2 Equality of gain and pain
We live in a society of widely disparate incomes and individual wealth. These
disparities and others in possessions, status, health, etc., are accepted as indivi-
duals go about their daily business. But envy, I.e., coveting what the other fellow
has, is a deeply felt emotion. When circumstances precipitate feelings of envy,
the reactions are liable to be swift and violent, with strong feelings expressed
over the outrage of unequal treatment.
Musgrave's The Theory of Public Finance (1959, Chapter 5) traces econom-
ists' attempts, starting in the middle of the sixteenth century with an essay by
Guicciardini. to formulate workable schemes for minimizing envy and treating indi-
viduals equally. The efforts of subsequent social philosophers culminated in a
classic essay by John Stuart Mill arguing in favor of "equal sacrifice" as the
proper basis of taxation. After pointing out the difficulty of making the concept
of "equal sacrifice" precise (should it be equal, absolute, proportionaL or marginal
sacrifice?), Musgrave states his position with regard to interpersonal utility com-
parisons as follows (pp 10B-109):
This entire discussion rests on the assumption that interpersonal utility com-
parisons can be made in a meaningful fashion. This assumption is basic to a
subjective view of the ability-to-pay doctrine. Yet it is an assumption gen-
erally rejected by the "new" welfare economics. If such rejection is valid.
the entire concept of equal sacrifice becomes so much nonsense and must be
discarded -lock, stock, and barrel ... I hesitate to go this far. While we can-
not assume that the utility schedules of individuals are known, the new wel-
fare economics may have gone too far in its categorical rejection of
interpersonal utility comparisons. Such comparisons are made continuously,
and in this sense have operational meaning ... For purposes of policy forma-
tion in a democracy - or, for that matter, in a nondiscriminating dictatorship
- the best solution may well be to follow Robbins' formula and to proceed as
if individuals were alike. Thereby, the concept of SUbjective utility is
translated into one of social income utility ... If we proceed along these lines.
the principle of ability to pay ceases to be the subjective matter that J .S.
Mill had thought it to be. It becomes a question of social value, and the prob-
lem is how the values can be determined. In a democracy they must be traced
to the preferences of individuals, and a political mechanism must be designed
by which this can be accomplished.
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Thus, Musgrave rests his faith on the possibility of a utilitarian approach, based
on a "political mechanism" that. allows the policy maker to infer "social value" from
individual preferences. Musgrave's language immediat.ely brings Arrow and the
problem of collective choice to mind. Since Musgrave was writing in 1959, only
eight years after Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), the diffi-
culties of collective choice were not as well appreciated as t.hey are today, and did
not seem to be overwhelming obstacles to Musgrave:
Arrow's particular set of conditions for social ordering are based on norms
that are met where majority voting leads to an unambiguous result. This is an
interesting case because majority voting is widely used; but it is only one
possible case, without claim to general validity ... It remains to be seen
whether the results obtained under a system of qualified majority, plurality,
or point voting might not be superior.
I think t.he modern view among economists is that. the interpersonal-
comparison-of-utilities problem cannot so easily be dismissed. Rather, thc
economist must approach questions like equal t.ax treatment. with great humility.
Thus, in motivating their theoretical work on effects of taxes, based on a Berg-
sonian welfare function, Atkinson and Stiglitz in their recent Lectures on Public
Economics (1980, pp 422-423) state:
In deciding on the direction of such research, one must bear firmly in mind
the purpose of this kind of literature. The aim is not to provide a definite
numerical answer to the question, 'how progressive should the income tax
be?' ... The purpose is rather to explore the implications of different beliefs
about how the world works or about how governments should behave...
Still another possible theoretical approach to the issue of equality is to
observe that. inequality is a fact of life that is tolerated and t.o argue that t.he
search for equality is at heart a search for lack of envy. This then suggest.s the
literat.ure on "envy-free", technically called "equitable", resource allocations,
where envy has Foley's definition: "I prefer your bundle of goods to mine." This
literature is st.ill in t.he making (see Varian, 1975, for an introduction) and, as yet,
has little t.o offer in the way of practical policy prescriptions.
As far as t.he public is concerned, my guess is that it finds economist.s' wor-
ries about avoiding interpersonal utility comparisons, the difficulties of establish-
ing universal measurements of gain and pain, and the subtle but surprisingly disas-
trous implication of the vot.er's paradox in collective choice all to be the most.
arcane academic hairsplitting. This is especially the case where an apparently
valid measuring rod appears at hand - for example, gains and losses measured in
dollars or in time. The social psychology equity theory literat.ure seems to teach
t.his, and regulation is in fact replete with applications of the principle of equal
treatment. The regulation of natural monopoly is based on the equal treatment
notion that investors in a natural monopoly should get a return equal to t.hat. of
other invest.ors who bear comparable risk. Those who would price discriminate in
public utility pricing bear the burden of proof that price differentials are based
on cost differentials: appeals to economic efficiency as a basis of price discrimina-
tion are difficult to sustain.
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This brings us to:
Proposition 2: Equal treatment of individuals is seen as a just basis for pol-
icy, especially when common measurements. such as dollars or time. of indivi-
dual gain or sacrifice are at hand. Unequal treatment of individuals is con-
sidered unjust.
5.2.8 Right in the status quo
In 1978, my wife and I together with another couple made a one week tourist
trip to Cuba. On arrival in Cuba, we were escorted to two buses, each of
which had a guide who was to accompany us for the entire week of an
intensely planned trip. The buses were filled in order as we came out of cus-
toms; those coming out first filled the first bus and the overflow the second
bus. The four of us happened to be in the first bus, which also happened to
have a very vivacious and interesting young lady as the guide. As a girl, she
had lived for several years in Miami and spoke fluent English. Although she
worked hard at propagandizing us, she readily answered all questions and
offered even more information and interesting sidelights than was requested.
The young lady guide in the second bus can only be described as a dolt. She
spoke English very haltingly, was not receptive to questions, and offered as
little information as she could get away with. The disparity between the
guides was apparent within the first day, but no one attempted to change
buses until the third day. On that morning, my wife and I and our friends were
the last to get on the first bus. We discovered that all of the seats were
taken. Four persons from the second bus had filled them. What to do?
Tempers quickly came to a boil, not only ours but those of friends we had
already made on the first bus. The guide finally announced, "r know who you
people are. This bus is not leaving until you go back to your bus." Two peo-
ple finally sheepishly departed to their (the second) bus. Silence! The guide
then implored two single people to go to the second bus as a special favor to
her. They did, and the trip resumed. The two interlopers were of course
recognized and completely ostracized for the rest of the trip, not only by the
occupants of our bus but by the occupants of theirs as well.
Students seat themselves at random the first day of class, and continue to
occupy the same seats; after a few class meetings, each student feels he owns his
or her seat. Queues are normally formed voluntarily in front of ticket windows,
bank tellers, to enter a bus, or generally when many are served by a few. A place
in the queue is felt to be owned by its occupier, a fact that sometimes led to
bloodshed in the 1974 and 1979 gasoline crises in the United States.
The sense of ownership in the status quo is a commonplace phenomenon and
its justness may be felt so strongly as to outweigh feelings that equality should
prevaiL as the above anecdote illustrates. I have already remarked that this
phenomenon is a behavioral cornerstone of Owen and Braeutigam's theory of regu-
lation as a game. It is also an element in Goldberg's contract theory of regulation,
where the regulator is viewed as the customers' agent with the job of negotiating
an implicit contract with the regulated firm that supplies them; part of the impli-
cit contract is that a certain quality of service will continue to be provided at
rates that are determined by the regulatory process.
Aside from Owen and Braeutigam and from Goldberg, the principal researcher
who has explicitly focused on this phenomenon seems to be W.J. Samuels (Samuels,
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1974; Samuels and Mercuro, 1976). Several recent events strikingly illustrate the
phenomenon:
(1) Long-standing rent control establishes a notion that status-quo rents
should be raised only to cover "fairly" incurred costs, e.g., due to inflation, and
not merely to respond to market forces. Attempts at the official raising of rents
are resisted by tenants, sometimes violently. For example, in 1981 the New York
City Rent Guidelines Board voted increases for lease renewals for the 900 000
apartments it controls. The increases were 10%, 13%, and 16% for one, two, and
three year leases respectively. The New York Times article (of June 16, 19(1)
remarked that the board's meeting was "raucous", resulting in twelve demonstra-
tors being arrested. It went on to observe:
The persistent din of yesterday's meeting seemed to surprise even longtime
observers of the normally noisy board meetings. The tenants, who set up a
picket line outside the building before t.he meeting convened, marched into
the auditorium chanting and clapping and refused to stop. At one point, the
meeting was adjourned for 40 minutes because the demonstrators drowned out
the deliberations ... More than 25 police officers were on hand at the peak of
the demonstrations.
Subsequently, on June 29, 1981, the Times reported that New York legislature
leaders had decided to extend for another two years the seven-year-old Emer-
gency Tenant Protection Act which had established the board.
(2) As west.ern US cities develop, successive rings of new developments gen-
erate successively increasing water costs. Residents and businesses often feel it
is only fair that they should continue to pay the rates that prevailed before more
recent development on the grounds that the new developments caused the higher
water costs. The classic economic efficiency counterargument is put forth by J.T.
Wenders (1981):
Both old and new cust.omers are equally responsible for the capacity and
operating costs of the LVVWD (Las Vegas Valley Water District). An old cus-
tomer, by occupying facilities which could otherwise be transferred to new
customers and save the LVVWD the cost of building new facilities at current
cost., is just. as responsible for the growth in the size of the LVVWD delivery
system as is the new customer ... It is clear that the LVVWD has chronically
mis-priced water. By failing to recognize that summer, peak-period usage is
much more costly to provide than is winter, off-peak usage, the District has
severely underpriced summer water usage. This has caused the uneconomic
stimulation of summer water usage in Las Vegas, resulting in an uneconomic
overexpansion of the LVVWD delivery system. Thus, the LVVWD rate struc-
ture has encouraged more inve:>tment in water delivery facilities than would
be needed had the District adopted a rate structure which more accurately
tracked costs.
The issue is even more forcefully joined in a 1976 Public Utilities Fortnightly
article by A.E. Kahn and C.A. Zielinski, both former chairmen of the New York
Public Service Commission, as quoted in Wendcrs (1981):
We may expect therefore to be confronted constantly with proposals for vin-
taged rates - lower rates for existing subscr'ibers and higher rates for new.
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Since most commissions have probably been presented with similar reasoning
in the case of electricity - namely, that it is the new electric customers, or
those whose demands are growing, who are responsible for our having to
incur the higher current costs, and that rates approximating incremental
costs should therefore be applied discriminatorily to them - it seems to us
very important to get the basic principles straight. So far as generating and
transmission costs, at least, are concerned, new customers coming on the line
are no more responsible causally for the incurrence of higher current costs
than old customers staying on the line. In purely economic terms, it is just as
important for the latter as for the former to confront a price that reflects
the additional cost to society of their taking more, or the amount that society
would save if they took less. And while we recognize the intuitive attraction
of protecting old customers from the burden of inflation, we cannot under-
stand the case even on moral grounds for protecting wealthy consumers
whose level of consumption, already extremely high, is not growing, at the
expense of poor consumers whose consumption is growing, possibly because
they are just getting married, or just having children. Vintaging of this kind
is flatly, and in our judgment inexcusably, discriminatory.
Thus, the feeling of a property right in the status quo, if the status quo is
preferred to a proposed change, can be intense, as illustrated by the rent control
and old-versus-new water-users examples. If a Rockefeller can acquire a property
right in economic wealth by the accident of birth, why shouldn't I have a property
right to a seat on the first Cuban bus by the accident of having gotten through
customs before others did, or why shouldn't the early settlers of Tucson, Arizona
have a property right to cheap water by the accident of having moved to Tucson
sooner than others? This idea may be summarized as
Proposition 3: The beneficial retention of a status quo is considered a right
whose removal is considered unjust.
This Proposition on the right to a beneficial status quo is perhaps the most
interesting of the six and the most fruitful for further study. It is intimately
related to the notion, extensively discussed in the literature, of property or own-
ership as a bundle of rights (see Gordon, 1980, pp 84 -89 for an introduction). One
of the forces obviously behind this Proposition is the public's appreciation that
stability or order is a public good of enormous importance to society. This is dis-
cussed at length in Rawls (1971). Usher (1981) formulates a game theory approach
to stability, arguing that the game-theoretic instability of majority rule means
that legislatures in a democratic society will avoid explicitly dealing with income
or wealth redistribution per se, the implication being that society recognizes that
stability is too important to be put in jeopardy. Since wealth is a bundle of claims
to property rights, the argument extends to an argument about the stability
rights to the status quo. Much more can be said in this vein but would lengthen an
already long chapter.
5.2.4 Society as an insurer
It is impossible to protect oneself against all contingencies. No matter what
level of disaster or misfortune we provide for, something worse is possible. So, it
is common in almost all societies to provide shelter and food when natural disas-
ters such as earthquakes, floods, or volcanic eruptions destroy homes, or medical
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care when an unexpected grave illness strikes. Likewise, institutions that in
economic disasters shift the responsibility for economic burdens from the indi vi-
dual to someone else are common. The idea that such a shift is only fair is, of
course, behind the notion of economic rights. But it is also behind the notion of
society protecting the individual against the fickleness of the marketplace.
Again, it is easy to assume that modern institutional arrangements have always
existed and to forget that they have evolved over time, with a concomitant evolu-
tion in ethical norms. Significantly, perhaps the two most important modern forms
of transference of economic responsibility - the limited liability corporation and
bankruptcy - are of relatively recent origin.
In a society with a strong ethical belief that each individual should be
responsible for his or her debts, the idea that several persons should be allowed
to limit the responsibility for their collective debts may seem like a moral outrage,
a scheme to encourage persons to act irresponsibly. This is in fact Adam Smith's
view in The Wealth of Nations (1776, p 264, vol 2):
This total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum,
encourages many people to become adventurers in joint stock companies, who
would upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery ...
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners
in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own... Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of
the affairs of such a company. It is upon this account that joint stock com-
panies for foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition
against private adventurers. They have, accordingly, very seldom succeeded
without an exclusive privilege; and frequently have not succeeded with one.
Without an exclusive privilege they have commonly mismanaged the trade.
With an exclusive privilege they have both mismanaged and confined it.
Smith follows the above passages with a recitation of some of the spectacular
mismanagements and failures involving the Royal African, Hudson's Bay, South Sea,
and East India Companies, and with Abbe Morellet's list of fifty-five failed joint
stock companies. He sums up (p 280, vol 2):
To exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which
take place with regard to all their neighbors, merely because they might be
capable of thriving if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be
reasonable. To render such an establishment perfectly reasonable, with the
circumstance of being reducible to strict rule and method, two other cir-
cumstances ought to concur. First, it ought to appear with the clearest evi-
dence. that the undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the
greater part of common trades; and secondly, that it requires a greater capi-
tal than can easily be collected into a private copartnery.
Smith concludes that only in banking, insurance, canals, and water works are his
conditions fulfilled and only in these industries should joint stock companies be
allowed.
Smith's ethical outlook was evidently shared by others. Although limited lia-
bility, joint stock companies were first chartered in England in 1662 (see HilI,
1967, p 186), E.S. Mason (1968) points out that they had a checkered history, with
reactions to curb them setting in after spectacular failures. For example, the
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collapse of the South Sea bubble was followed by the Bubble Act of 1720, which
was "An Act to Restrain the Extravagant and Unwarrantable Practice of Raising
Money by Voluntary Subscriptions for Carrying on Projects Dangerous to the
Trade and Subjects of the Kingdom." The act prohibited (quoted in Mason):
The acting or presuming to act as a corporate Body or Bodies, the raising or
pretending to raise transferable Stock or Stocks, the transferring or pre-
tending to transfer or assign any Share or Shares in Such Stock or Stocks
without Legal Authority either by Act of Parliament or by any charter from
the Crown to warrant such acting as a Body Corporate ...
Mason then goes on to remark that, in England, only in 1855 was limited liability
granted as a matter of course to companies wishing to incorporate.
Debtor's prisons were still common in Dickens' day, and bankruptcy has a
similar, parallel history to corporate limited liability, with the escaping of debts
being legitimated only recently. According to Clark (1939):
The original purpose of bankruptcy laws was to secure full realization of
assets and just distribution among creditors ... Not until 1705 was provision
made for the release of the debtor from the undischarged balance of his
debts, and not until 1826 in England (1841 in the United States)10 could the
debtor voluntarily go into bankruptcy and so avail himself of this privilege of
discharge.
Thus, we seem to have evolved, with many ethical oscillations, to policies of
ever greater protection of individuals and groups of individuals from the exigen-
cies of the market. In recent times, we have seen the "bail-outs" of Lockheed and
Chrysler, and the fierce debates about the extent of protection that should be
extended to the steel and auto industries against the onslaught of foreign com-
petition. It is perhaps not surprising that individuals in society should, as a
matter of course, expect to be granted the same kind of governmental protection
as is given to the large corporation or even to the profligate neighbor who has
declared personal bankruptcy. Thus, the economist may view such things as fair
trade laws as a cynical grab for monopoly power on the part of small businessmen,
but small businessmen may view them as justifiable insurance against "destructive
competition" by large businesses. Owen and Braeutigam state this viewpoint well
(23-24):
Market forces, particularly those associated with innovative activity, neces-
sarily pose a threat to human beings with less than instantaneous adaptive
capabilities. It is not merely that investments in physical capital with few
alternative uses may be threatened, but also investments in human capital:
specialized skills, knowledge of an industry or firm, and the like. Political
activities designed to protect these investments from sudden unexpected
reductions in value may be indistinguishable from actions designed to achieve
an increased return on investment through monopoly. But to the extent legis-
lators see the proposals for regulation as being principally an attempt to
obtain the benefits of due process, with its slow deliberation, in order to pro-
tect human investment, they may reasonably be sympathetic. This point of
view, when coupled with the symbolic political usefulness of the notion that
regulation is to protect the consumer from monopoly prices or unsafe practi-
tioners and products, may be quite persuasive. In a sense, then, regulation is
not much different from unemployment insurance and agriCUltural price
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supports, both of which are intended to protect human as well as financial
interests from the shocks and blows of market forces.
Thus, we see federal policies to "stabilize the market" in agriculture, and uniform
prices across airlines (until their recent deregulation). This discussion may be
summarized by:
Proposition 4: Society is expected to insure individuals against economic
loss because of economic changes. Failure to insure is considered unfair.
5.2.5 Economic efficiency
The desire to trade or transact to mutual advantage seems to be a fundamen-
tal human trait. Suppressing this desire by government authority is apt to meet
with as much success as attempts to suppress love, sex, or original sin. This is
brought out by Barbara Tuchman in A Distant Mirror. After describing the
medieval doctrine of the "just price" she goes on to explain that it was to a large
extent honored in the breach (Tuchman, 1978, p 37 -38):
... banker. merchant, and businessman lived in daily commission of sin and
daily contradiction of the moral code centering upon the' just price'. ... To
ensure that no one gained an advantage over anyone else, commercial law
prohibited innovation in tools or techniques, underselling below a fixed
price, working late by artificial light, employing extra apprentices or wife
and under-age children, and advertising of wares or praising them to the
detriment of others. As restraint of initiative, this was the direct opposite of
capitalist enterprise. It was the denial of economic man, and consequently
even more routinely violated than the denial of sensual man ... Merchants
regularly paid fines for breaking every law that concerned their business,
and went on as before...
The point is also made by opponents of command or planned economics, who argue
that attempts to control prices, to ration, and otherwise to monitor the flow of
resources by a central authority inexorably lead to black markets or to other
forms of noncompliance with rules and regulations. We had a black market in the
United States during World War II and we now havc the claim that a large under-
ground economy has arisen in direct response to excessive regulation. In 18th
century England, even though the statute books were fun of laws governing the
setting of just prices, the laws were ignored except in times of famine.
In the US, we have seen the movement in recent years toward deregulation.
The airlines present a striking example of deregulation in the name of facilitating
economic efficiency. Levine (1981) recounts its history in arguing that it resulted
primarily from Congress's desire to serve the public interest and to correct per-
ceived economic injustice. According to Levine (p 191):
In 1938, it appeared to the general public and the Congress that uncontrolled
markets did not work very well for the public over the long run. Although
markets produced low prices during the Depression years, many producers
went out of business. The airline business was relatively new, Congress had
little experience with it, and there was no reason not to apply general skepti-
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cism about markets to airlines ... it seemed to Congress that mistakenly
optimistic entrepreneurs were seeking profitable operations where none
were possible, draining away resources needed for further extension of the
airline system in fruitless and profitless competitive struggles for existing
business ... It was therefore not difficult for the airline industry to persuade
Congress and the public that the fledgling airline industry would go the way
of many other Depression-era firms and that the full potential of aviation
could not be developed in a free-market environment. This would be both
inefficient and unfair.
Panzar (1980) expresses a similar opwlon that an economist viewing the
demand and supply characteristics of the fledgling airline industry in the mid-
thirties would have concluded that regulation was the policy that best served the
public interest. However, later experiments like the California and Texas unregu-
lated air service cast doubt on how well the system worked. As Levine goes on to
remark (p 193):
Over time, scholarly assessments of the performance of the regulated indus-
try suggested that airlines operated better without regulation. Congres-
sional leaders thought it politically beneficial, and perhaps even consistent
with their legislative duty, to make changes which might benefit the public.
Finally, in spite of having a system that worked well in many respects, and in spite
of strong opposition, deregulation was accomplished (pp 193 -194):
Certainly the industry opposed deregulation, as did many members of
Congress and the public ...
But the telling fact for our purposes is that this initially doubtful congres-
sional faction (including Senator Cannon, the powerful chairman of both the
Aviation Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee) ultimately helped
control the legislative process in favor of deregulation, which by then was
perceived to be in the public interest. And it did so in the face of diehard
opposition by factions (including the industry) whose positions were under-
mined by the ultimate transparency of the degree to which their positions
were motivated by purely private, rather than 'public-interest' considera-
tions of gain and loss ...
This scenario may seem painfully quaint to most readers. It is certainly not
self-evidently correct. But it is consistent with the rhetoric of the legisla-
tive and administrative history, with the facts of airline deregulation, and
with the existence of a broader movement to deregulate other industries as
well.
Offsetting the current deregulatory movement are the many years of motion
toward more regulation rather than less that are described by Hughes (1977).
Evidently the examples of waste and inefficiency because of the impeded action of
markets must be numerous and flagrant in order to evoke popular sentiment for
unfettering market action. Hence, we postulate:
Proposition 5: The existence of numerous and significant economic ineffi-
ciencies is considered unjust, especially if their existence is seen as confer-
ring benefits on special interest groups who oppose their removal.
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5.2.6 Resentment of abuse of monopoly power
Since 1877, the United States Supreme Court has struggled with the problem
of defining the boundaries of regulation. To a large extent, the struggle has been
a conflict between individual and corporate rights to control property and the
police powers of individual states. The battles have centered on the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution ("No person ... shall be deprived of ... property without
due process of law"), the Tenth ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people"), and the Fourteenth ("No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United Sates; nor shall any State deprive any person of ." property without due
process of law ... ").
A typical history of a dispute that has found its way to the Court has been
the following: The citizens of a state become sufficiently outraged over some per-
ceived abuse of economic power to cause the state legislature to pass a law curb-
ing the power; those curbed sue on the grounds that their constitutional rights
have been abridged.
To summarize this history briefly, I follow Phillips (1969, Chapter 3) (see also
Hughes, 1977). The first, landmark decision was Munn 1J. Illinois in 1877. At the
time, virtually all of midwestern grain flowed through Chicago. the "gateway of
commerce". Nine firms owned all of Chicago's grain elevators and met periodically
to fix storage rates. In 1871, the Illinois legislature passed a law fixing the rates
the firms could charge. Munn and Scott, owners of one of the firms, ignored the
law and were sued for failing to comply. Upholding Illinois, Chief Justice Waite
argued for the majority in a famous passage:
... we find that when private property is "affected with a public interest, it
ceases to be juris private only." This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale
more than two hundred years ago ... and has been accepted without objection
as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property does
become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of
public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect, grants to the public an interest in that usc, and must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created ...
Justice Bradley, in a later case, summarized the Court's findings more succinctly;
The inquiry ... was as to the extent of the police power in cases where the
public interest is affected; and we held that when an employment or business
becomes ... a practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort,
and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from the community, it is sub-
ject to regulation by the legislative power.
Munn 1JS. Illinois was followed by two cases that expanded the states' power to
regulate grain and how it was loaded and stored from ships (Budd 1JS. New York,
1892) and to the fixing of storage rates within an entire state (North Dakota) not
necessarily at a "gateway of commerce" (Brass 1JS. stoeser, 1(94). The grain cases
were followed by a case that permitted Kansas to regulate the fire insurance busi-
ness (German Alliance Insurance Company 1JS. Lewis, 1914). Then the trend to
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granting the states broad powers to regulate was halted in a series of decisions in
the twenties. In Wolff Packing Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations
(1923) Kansas was not allowed to fix prices and wages, as it wanted to in a variety
of industries; in New State Ice vs. Liebmann (1925), Oklahoma was prevented from
regulating the ice business; in Tyson and Brother vs. Banton (1927) New York
was not allowed to fix prices of theater tickets; Tennessee was not allowed to fix
the price of gasoline in Williams vs. standard Oil Company (1929); and New Jer-
sey was not allowed to fix employment agency fees in Ribnik vs. McBride (1928).
These cases were not generally unanimous. However, the decisions eventually
evolved to the conferring of broad powers to the states, with the last landmark
case being Nebbia vs. New York (1933). Here, the Court allowed New York to regu-
late the milk industry and to fix milk prices. Justice Roberts wrote:
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of business affected with
a public interest, and the function of courts in the application of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether cir-
cumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of
governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory ... So
far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the leg-
islature, to override it.
Thus we see the confirmation of Justice Waite's view in Munn vs. Illinois that
when "one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect, grants to the public ~n interest in that use, and must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good." Public utility executives are aware of
the strength of this feeling on the part of the public. The constant affirmation by
them of their dedication to serve the public is not idle rhetoric, but grounded in
years of experience of incurring the public's wrath if service quality falls below
the public's expectations or if prices appear exorbitant or exploitative.
Casual empirical observations suggest that, generally speaking, the fewer the
close substitutes for a regulated firm's products and services that are available,
the more intense is the feeling on the part of the public that it has an interest in
the use of the firm's property. Dissatisfaction with service or price at a shoe
store is easily remedied; one simply trades at another shoe store down the street.
But there is generally no alternative telephone, electricity, or water company
down the street. Further, as already remarked, basic utilities are now generally
considered necessities that should be provided by society as an economic right.
If a complaint against a utility providing a "necessity" is not satisfactorily
resolved, one can be left with a profound feeling of frustration, with no place to
turn, like a prisoner despairing of freedom.
It is thus perhaps not surprising that the history of regulation of public util-
ities is replete with disputes between the state's police powers and personal (or
corporate) freedom to deploy property, not only on such matters as service qual-
ity and rates, but on matters affecting the basic management of the utility, with
regulators asserting an almost ownership say in the utility's activities. In an edi-
torial, L.E. Smart (1982), editor of the Public Utilities Fortnightly, discusses
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movements in state legislatures or by initiative and referendum to exert more con-
trol over utilities. He cites a proposal in Maine as an extreme:
The proposal in Maine goes furthest, it would seem, in trying to weaken
investor-owned electric utilities and perhaps eventually supplant them with
public power. It would decree that the new Maine Energy Commission (which
would replace the public utility commission, board of railroad commissioners,
state water storage commission, and office of energy resources) would have
responsibility and authority to create a state energy budget, a semiannual
energy demand study, a plan for meeting the demand ascertained by the
study, an energy conservation plan, and an energy development fund to raise
the money to finance projects in the state energy budget. Certainly, if all
these features of the proposed law revision became enacted, it is hard to see
what initiatives, if any, would be left for electric utilities. They would be in
place simply to carry out the will of the all-powerful state energy commis-
sion. The motivating force behind these proposals would seem to be not so
much the desire to improve regulation as to enlarge the role of the public
sector as against that of the private sector.
This brings us to our last proposition of perceived economic injustice:
Proposition 6: The fewer the substitutes for a regulated firm's output, and
the more the output is considered an economic right, the more the public
expects to exert control over the firm. Denial of control is considered
unjust.
5.2.7 Summary
In an earlier era of "political economy," economists did not confine them-
selves to narrow questions of economic efficiency. Unfortunately, political econ-
omy led to doctrine rather than science because of its intermingling of value-
laden, normative judgments of "what ought to be" with objective, value-neutral
analyses of "what is" (Schumpeter, 1954, p 1141). Great theoretical advances
came with the abandonment of doctrinaire "political economy" in favor of the
"positive-normative" and "economic efficiency-income distribution" dichotomies.
But with the greater ascendancy of economists and their students into responsible
policy-making positions, and the greater influence generally of neoclassical
economics on public policy, the ethical issues that these dichotomies avoided must
once again be confronted. In particular, economists must realize that a policy
that attempts to approximate Pareto improving moves is not ethically harmless; in
fact, it can have profound ethical consequences. On the other hand, the great
ability of economic analysis to analyze diffused as well as concentrated benefits
and costs makes it an indispensable tool for the calculus of economic justice. It is
suggested that the place to begin to mobilize this tool is to understand how the
public actually perceives economic justice.
This chapter attempts to develop such an understanding in the case of public
utility regulation. It points out that public utility regulation is a very public
activity, that often has extensive media coverage. This in turn gives importance
to "framing" or "contextual" effects in what the public perceives to be fair and
just. There is a great need for investigations of such effects. The evidence from
history, casual observation, and the few experiments that have been performed all
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point to different perceptions of economic justice in a market setting from the
perceptions in a regulated setting.
Acknowledgments
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a symposium at Airlie
House, Warrenton, Virginia, "A Regulatory Medley - From Economic Analysis to
Economic Justice", sponsored by Washington and Lee University in cooperation
with the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Companies, August 18 -21, 1981.
This paper represents an ambitious excursion into a number of fields, espe-
cially philosophy and law, which are outside of my specialty of public utility
economics. To prevent the most obvious blunders of ignorance, omission and com-
mission, to say nothing of logic, I have gone to great lengths to solicit comments
from a large number of persons. So many in fact that it is difficult to remember all
of them. In the very initial drafts, my colleagues at Bell Laboratories, especially
Roy Radner, Peter Linhart, and Frank Sinden were especially helpful and
encouraging. In addition, from the Bell System, J. Falk, G.R. Faulhaber, T. Hodge,
S.P. PerIes, and M. Wish offered comments on early drafts, while A.E. Buchanan,
John Carver, Alfred E. Kahn, K.P. Hamister, W.J. Samuels, John Wenders and Jack
Wiseman did the same from outside the system. I would like to thank all of these.
In addition, I would like to thank the attendees of various seminars that I have
given for the comments they have made on the material in this paper. Needless to
say, none of these are to be blamed for errors in the paper or for its point of
view. For these, only I am responsible.
Notes
1 For years I lectured Bell executives on dead-weight losses and how their elimina-
tion could potentially improve the lot of many without hurting anyone. Somehow I
avoided dealing with the ethical problems involved in actually eliminating dead-
weight losses. It was only when I tried in my monograph Fairness or Efficiency to
explain the practical relevance of the theoretically economically efficient (Ram-
sey) prices for a regulated firm that the extent of the ethical problems of approxi-
mate Pareto improving moves sank in. To my economists colleagues at Bell Labs
and elsewhere I posed the simple question "Why should a policy maker move toward
Ramsey prices when the move will clearly generate unhappy losers, sometimes pol-
itically very powerful losers?" I could get no fully satisfactory answer. Finally, in
writing the monograph, I retreated to pointing out that while the move to Ramsey
prices would generate losers, not making the move meant that potential winners
would be denied gains and in a sense would also be losers. I concluded that it was
essentially up to the regulators to pick the winners and losers (see Section 5).
2 Space docs not permit a discussion of the defense of utilitarianism and variants of
it that try to overcome the "harm of innocents" objection (see Murphy and Cole-
man, 1984, Chapter 2, for an introduction). For example, Harsanyi's (1976) long-
standing defense of utilitarianism as an ethical riorm is well known in the economics
literature. For an extensivo ethical critique of utilitarianism, see Rawls (1971);
Rawls' critique is discussed by Arrow (1973).
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3 Throughout the chapter, I use "constitution" in the sense of Buchanan and Tullock
(1962), that is, a set of rules or procedures by which a group or a society can
make decisions as a collective.
4 The present chapter is similar in spirit to Scott Gordon's Welfare, Justice. and
Freedom (1980). His taxonomy of property, fair exchange, desert, equality, equal-
ity of opportunity, and freedom is very similar to my six "Propositions". The
chapter gives concrete examples from the arena of public utility regulation to
illustrate these and other factors at work, and can thus be viewed as a case study
of some of Gordon's theses.
5 For a more extensive discussion of the doctrine of the just price and its rclation to
modern regulation, see Manus (1975).
6 In the second set of experiments to test their theory Hoffman and Spitzer (1985)
replicated the initial "coin flip/no moral authority" experiments described at the
beginning of this section. except for some changes in wording of the instructions to
the participants. The wording changes resulted in 61% rather 100% of the pairs
opting for an even $7, $7 division, but the overall statistical results were largely
unaffected by the instructional effect (see Footnote 35 of Hoffman and Spitzer).
7 The problem of how laws or legal processes are or ought to be divided into disjoint,
nonoverlapping sets has also occupied legal philosophers in both positive and nor-
mative theorizing. Space limitations do not allow us to review the extensive litera-
ture that has resulted (see Murphy and Coleman, 1984). Very brieflY. most
theories conclude that overlap exists and is inevitable and must be resolved by
judges applying their own standards.
8 Such a Covenant was proposed to implement the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. which was adopted by unanimous vote (but with abstentions) in 1948. The
United States' adoption of the Universal Declaration and its nonadoption of the
subsequent Covenant is an interesting story that illustrates the difficulties of dcl-
ineating the boundaries of perceived economic injustice. (The subsequent discus-
sion of the UN Declaration and the proposed Covenant is based on Green, 1956.)
The introduction of economic rights into the United Nations was evidently unantici-
pated. After the horrors of World War II, the United Kingdom and the United
States felt it important for the United Nations to take a stand on human rights,
having in mind civil or political rights, like freedom of speech, assembly, or press,
that can only be removed by due process of law. However, the communist bloc
responded to the English-speaking initiative by arguing that the concept of human
rights should encompass basic economic rights as well as civil rights. The result
was the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 30 articles, 23 of which pertain to civil
rights, five to economic rights, and two to administrative matters.
A critical distinction between the two forms of rights is that, by and large, civil
rights require few economic resources to guarantee, whereas the guaranteeing of
economic rights requires considerable resources. This distinction has evoked dif-
ferent emotions among economists. For example, Okun (1975) is not particularly
bothered by the fact that economic rights require resources (p 16):
It is much less expensive, in every sense, to fulfill the right to free
speech than a 'right' to free food. But society does provide some costly
or resource-using rights, like public education. And one way proponents
of equality seek to narrow the differences in standards of living among
Americans is to lengthen the list of resource-using rights.
Hayek (1976), on the other hand, is outraged by the whole idea. He argues (p 102),
"Nobody has a right to a particular state of affairs unless it is the duty of someone
to secure it", and continues (p 103):
There have recently been added new positive 'social and economic'
human rights ... These are claims to particular benefits to which every
human being as such is presumed to be entitled without any indication as
to who is to be under the obligation to provide those benefits ... It is, of
course, meaningless to describe them as claims on 'society' because
'society' cannot think. act, value, or 'treat' anybody in a particular
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way. If such claims are to be met, ... the cosmos of the market would
have to be replaced by a taxis whose members would have to do what
they are instructed to do ... From this it follows that the old civil rights
and the new social and economic rights cannot be achieved at the same
time but are in fact incompatible; the new rights could not be enforced
by law without at the same time destroying that liberal order at which
the old civil rights aim.
Hayek reserves his particular outrage for the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (p 105): "Even the slightest amount of ordinary common sense ought to have
told the authors of the document that what they decreed as universal rights were
for the present and for any foreseeable future utterly impossible of achievement,
and that solemnly to proclaim them as rights was to play an irresponsible game with
the concept of 'right' which could result only in destroying the respect for it."
Hayek's worst fears were never completely realized for, to my knowledge, the
Draft Covenant to implement the UN Declaration on Human Rights has never been
adopted by the US, much less by the entire United Nations. Article 2, Paragraph 1
of the Draft Covenant stated (Green, 1956, p 190): "Each State Party hereto under-
takes to take steps, individually and through international cooperation, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in this Covenant by legislative as well as by
other means." In the Senate debates of 1952 and 1953, the economic rights to be
implemented by clauses such as this were referred to as "socialist rights" (Green
1956, p 61) and US support for the Covenant was withdrawn.
9 The bill (Senate Bill 5578B) was signed into law by Governor Carey on August 6,
1981 and is now Chapter 713 of New York State Laws of 1981.
10 More specifically, Countryman (1970) recounts that in the United States the first
congressional bankruptcy statute was enacted in 1800, to be repealed in 1803 as
being more favorable to the merchant class than to farmers. This was followed by
a statute passed in 184,1 (referred to by Clark), but repealed in i843 "as a manifes-
tation of the then common view that debtor relief was immoral" (Countryman, p
121). Then came a statute in 1867, repealed in 1878 as being too beneficial to deb-
tors. Finally,
The last statute was enacted in 1898 in belated response to demands for
debtor relief originating in the panic of 1893, and has apparently
become a permanent institution. It has been frequently amended and
was extensively revised in 1938; there has been no agitation for its
repeal.
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CHAPTER 8
ECONOMIC AND GAME-THEORETIC ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH COST ALLOCATION IN A
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
William W. Sharkey
1. Introduction
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In recent years, scientific interest in the theory and practic~ of allocating
joint and common costs has been extensive and has led to a substantial literature
on the subject. A significant part of this literature has been motivated by the
problems faced by public enterprises, regulatory agencies, and private firms in
setting prices or making other economic decisions in which a specific methodology
of cost allocation is required. The telecommunications industry has been and con-
tinues to be both a prominent source of problems for theorists and a testing
ground for practical methodologies.
In this chapter I describe some of the economic and technological charac-
teristics of the telecommunications industry and some of the attempts to apply
game-theoretic concepts to issues involving pricing and allocation of costs in the
industry. The most important conclusion reached in the following analysis is that
cost allocation in the telecommunications industry cannot be considered without
regard for the fundamental interaction of telecommunications with the remainder
of the economy. Telecommunications services are consumed as final outputs by
households, but in addition are used as inputs in most other productive sectors of
the economy. Some sectors of the industry have the characteristic of a natural
monopoly with few close substitutes. Other sectors of the industry are currently
or prospectively highly competitive because of the erosion of natural boundaries
between telecommunications and information processing.
These technological and economic characteristics of the telecommunications
industry must be taken into account in any attempt to allocate telecommunications
costs. In Section 2, I briefly consider the more important technological and
economic characteristics of the industry. Then, in Section 3, I describe some of
the progress that has been made in applying game-theoretic concepts to issues of
cost allocation.
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2 Economic and Technological Characteristics or the Industry
2.1 Telecommunications Technology and the Need to Allocate Costs
The single most important characteristic of the telecommunications industry
for the discussion herein is that it is a multiple-output industry.l Indeed, there
are many different ways in which one may describe the outputs of the industry
and, generally speaking, with each particular disaggregation of total industry out-
put, there are important issues involving cost allocation. Basic telephone service
involves the production of three distinct outputs: access to the network, local
usage, and toll usage. Of course, access to the network is a prerequisite for
obtaining either local usage or toll usage, but the costs of providing access are
totally independent of actual usage.
The distinction between toll and local usage is essentially arbitrary and is
based more on social and geographical boundaries than on technology. All end
users are connected to a central office, containing a local switch, by means of
copper wire, optical fiber, or other technology. The cost of providing and main-
taining this local loop comprises the nontraffic-sensitive cost of access. Local
usage consists of electronic messages that are transmitted to the end office
switch and then back to another subscriber in the same central office or to a dif-
ferent central office in the same local service. Toll usage consists of messages
that follow a similar sequence of paths, except that a typical toll call travels
through a more complex hierarchy of switching offices before reaching its final
destination.
Perhaps the most fundamental issue of cost allocation is to assign the fixed
costs of providing access to customers or services so as to satisfy standards of
equity and of economic efficiency. Currently in the US, charges for access to the
network are bundled together with a flat fee for a minimum amount of local usage.
In European countries, access is priced separately and local usage is often priced
on the basis of number of calls, duration, and time of day. In both North American
and European systems, it is generally true that the revenues from local service
and access together are less than the total costs of providing these services
(Mitchell, 1979). The difference is made up from a surplus of revenues over costs
for toll traffic.2
Going beyond the basic subsidy from toll usage to access and local usage, one
can find innumerable instances of cost allocation based upon alternative disaggre-
gations of output. For example, even if access is unsubsidized by other services,
it would be necessary to allocate the fixed costs of access among business and
residential subscribers, urban and rural subscribers, and so on. In the case of
toll service, a problem arises because the same transmission and switching equip-
ment is used to provide dedicated private line service, ordinary toll service, and
various bundled services, such as Wide-Area Telephone Service (WATS) in the
United States. While these services are technologically similar, they are provided
in substantially different markets to largely distinct sets of subscribers. There-
fore, in order to determine prices, il is necessary for the supplier of these ser-
vices to have an explicit cost allocation methodology.
As a final observation on the disaggregation of output, it should be noled that
telecommunications services, both toll and local, consist ultimately of the point to
point transmission of messages between fixed geographic locations. In order to
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design an efficient network, given the economies of scale that are possible to
achieve in transmission, it is desirable to concentrate traffic in a relatively small
number of high-capacity routes. However, since telephone traffic is also proba-
biListic, and varies periodically over hours of the day and days of the week, it is
most efficient to follow a practice known as alternative routing.3 This means that
as a typical toll call enters the lowest level in the hierarchy of switching
machines, it is assigned a direct route to its final destination, which is generally
the shortest geographic path through the network. If the direct path is being
used to full capacity, an alternative route is selected which is geographically
longer, but which utilizes higher-capacity transmission media and which therefore
has a lower probability of being blocked. If the first alternative route is blocked,
a second alternative is chosen, and so on, until a final routing is reached at the
highest level of the switching hierarchy.
As a result of alternative routing and other techniques in network design, it
is difficult to directly assign the costs of individual pieces of equipment to
specific outputs in the network. Consequently, higher levels of aggregation are
required in order to allocate the total costs of toll usage. In both the United
States and Europe, prices are set on the basis of average cost per unit of dis-
tance. While this method of allocation is simple to administer, it has given rise to a
substantial subsidy in toll revenue from the high-density, low-cost routes to the
low-density, high-cost routes.
2.2 Competition in Telecommunications Markets
I have argued above that the technology of telecommunications gives rise to a
large number of situations in which joint and common costs must be allocated
among different outputs or alasses of service in order to set prices. In this sec-
tion, I argue that in setting prices, it is also necessary to account for the dif-
ferent degrees of potential and actual competition in telecommunications markets.
Since the opening of telecommunications markets to competitive entry is consider-
ably more extensive in the US than elsewhere, this section refers more specifi-
cally to telecommunications in the US.
The growth of the telecommunications industry in the US has followed a
rather uneven course. 4 After the invention of the telephone by Alexander Gra-
ham Bell in 1876, the Bell Telephone Company held a monopoly in the industry due
to its original patents. After the basic patents expired in 1893, there was com-
petitive entry in the markets for local telephone services as independent com-
panies established themselves in communities not yet served by Bell and occasion-
ally in direct competition with already established Bell companies. During this
period the Bell companies, under a newly formed parent company known as the
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (AT&T), began to interconnect the local
service companies with long-distance lines. In the early years of the twentieth
century, both AT&T and the independent companies grew rapidly. The period was
also a time of rate wars, litigation over patents, and occasional mergers between
Bell and independent companies. In 1913 the dominant firm in the industry, AT&T,
agreed to refrain from further merger activity and to interconnect its long-
distance network with the remaining independent companies. In 1934, the Com-
munications Act was passed establishing the Federal Communications Commission
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(FCC) with regulatory authority over the industry. AT&T owned approximately 80%
of the telephones in the country and most of the long-distance network, while
approximately 1500 independent companies provided local service in the
remainder of the country.
For the next thirty years, the entire telecommunications industry could be
characterized as a regulated monopoly. However, in the early 1960s, several deci-
sions were made by the FCC and by the courts, which set in motion a chain of
events that will almost certainly end the era of regulated monopoly in all sectors
of the industry.5
In 1959, the FCC decided to allow entry into the market for private lines ser-
vices by private firms who wished to construct their own communications net-
works. In 1969, the FCC agreed to allow a "specialized common carrier" known as
Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI) to construct a microwave link between Chi-
cago and St. Louis. In 1977, a federal court ruled that MCI could not be prevented
from offering a service similar to ordinary toll service, thereby overturning an
earlier FCC ruling denying such authorization. Five years later, in 1982, AT&T
agreed to a consent decree with the US Department of Justice, thus ending a
long-running antitrust case against the company. In the decree, which was effec-
tive from 1984, AT&T agreed to divest itself of its 22 wholly owned local operating
companies. In return, AT&T was given permission to enter new, unregulated mar-
kets such as data processing, and it was understood by both parties to the decree
that AT&T's toll service markets would ultimately become deregulated as well.
It is almost certainly true that the ultimate consequences of the actions
taken by the FCC, the courts, and the executive branch were not correctly fore-
seen at the time they were made. Furthermore, the consequences were unfore-
seen largely because of a misunderstanding of, or a lack of appreciation of, the
difficulty of allocating costs for a regulated firm serving markets with differing
degrees of competition. As noted in the previous section, Bell System rates for
both private line and toll services were traditionally set on the basis of system-
wide average cost per unit of distance. Thus, a private line or toll call between
two rural locations was charged the same amount as a line or call between two
urban locations separated by the same distance. Due to the pronounced
economies of scale in transmission, it was therefore possible for a rival company to
enter selected high-density markets and provide service that cost less than aver-
age Bell System rates. While many firms perceived the opportunity, however, only
a few had the persistence and political astuteness to win the prolonged regulatory
battles.
Once a few competing firms gained a foothold in the industry, however, the
situation changed dramatically. Under totally regulated monopoly, cost allocation
decisions were made on the basis of administrative convenience, simple rules of
thumb, and loose interpretations of regulatory mandates. Under regulated com-
petition - that is, when AT&T served both monopoly markets and markets open to
competitive entry - the survival of new entrants was often at stake in the choice
of a cost allocation procedure. For example, when entry was first allowed in
private line markets, AT&T's response was to lower its own private line rates to
reduce incentive for the construction of private networks. Suppliers of equip-
ment for the private networks complained that AT&T was using its monopoly ser-
vices - that is, toll service - to subsidize its newly competitive services. Evi-
dence of the alleged subsidization was based upon a particular method of fully
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distributed cost allocation, which showed the rate of return from toll service to be
hieher than the rate of return from private line service. AT&T responded that its
prices for private line service were greater than incremental costs and therefore
that the private line service was not subsidized in an economically meaningful
sense. While most economists supported the latter position, it was never fully
accepted by the FCC, in part because data to measure the true incremental cost
could come only from AT &T itself.
Ultimately. the test for cross-subsidization was conducted in the political
arena. When the market share of new entrants was insignificant, the FCC was
reluctant to accept cost allocation rules that would favor AT&T at the expense of
its rivals. However, cost allocation rules that were able to protect incumbent
rivals also had the effect of encouraging new entry. Soon it became clear that the
FCC would either have to expand its authority to, in effect, dictate market shares
and levels of entry in all markets or, alternatively, to initiate the process of total
deregulation of all markets.
The potential for competition in local service markets is only now beginning
to be perceived.'7 As in the case of toll and private line markets. competition can
only occur in markets in which price is greater than cost. As noted in the previ-
ous section, in both the US and European systems, prices for access and local ser-
vice are generally less than incremental cost, and the difference has traditionally
be subsidized from the revenues of toll services. Furthermore, since prices for
toll service are usage-sensitive, it is the very large toll users who have contri-
buted disproportionately to the subsidy.8 Consequently, it is the large toll users
that constitute the most attractive market for entry by firms who provide alterna-
tive access to end users, so that they can avoid subsidizing the access of other
subscribers. As in the case of entry into private line services, the ftrst instances
of entry occurred when large business users constructed private networks in
order to bypass completely the public network. New technologies, such as cellu-
lar mobile radio, optical fibers, and satellites, as well as traditional microwave
technology, may also be used to replace copper wires in the local loop (Bell Sys-
tems Operating Companies and AT&T, 1982). The attractiveness of these alterna-
tive technologies depends on the pricing policies of existing local service tele-
phone companies. Their prices in turn depend on the method they use to allocate
costs, includin[? the fixed costs of access.
3 Game-Theoretic Analysis or Cost Allocation in Telecommunications
3.1 cost-Based Tests jor Cross-Subsidization
It was arl?ued in the previous sections that while allocations of joint and com-
mon costs are essential in setting prices for telecommunications services, it is also
necessary to account for the economic characteristics of telecommunications
markets. In this section, I illustrate some of the ways in which game-theoretic
analysis could be potentially useful in telecommunications pricing and cost alloca-
tion.
I believe that the most important overall contribution that game-theoretic
analysis has made and will continue to make is the definition of a rigorous frame-
work in which issues of both fairness and efficiency can be addressed. Both
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issues are very much apparent in the literature on cross-subsidization.9 The ques-
tion of cross-subsidization arises primarily when a regulated or public sector firm
must allocate joint or common costs among two or more product lines that are sold
in distinct markets. In the simplest case. one can imagine two discrete outputs
that can be produced at a total cost of
C(1,2) =Co + C 1 + C 2
where Co is a common cost while C1 and C 2 are directly attributable costs of out-
puts one and two, respectively. Clearly, if T 1 and T 2 represent the revenues col-
lected from customers in markets one and two, then one may say the revenues or
prices are subsidy-free if Tl ;;., C1 and T2;;" C 2, so that each output covers at least
its directly attributable cost. If. in addition. total revenues must cover the total
costs so that Tl + T2 =C(1,2). then there are no uniquely determined subsidy-
free revenues. The economic approach suggests allowing demand conditions in
markets one and two to determine a unique allocation. lO However. if only the cost
function is used as a basis for allocation, little more can be said.
One contribution of game theory to the theory of cross-subsidization has
been to extend the simple analysis above to more complex situations involving
three or more outputs (Faulhaber, 1975). For example, if there are n discrete
outputs and N =11..... n l denotes the set of all outputs. then a revenue vector
r =(T 1, .... Tn) is subsidY-fTee if
n
L:Tt =C(N)
1
~ Tt ~ C(N) - C(N\S) for all SeN
tES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Condition (1) is merely the break-even constraint. Condition (2) represents an
"incremental cost test" for subsidization. since it requires that revenues from
each collection S must be at least as great as the incremental cost of producing
that collection. Clearly. given (1). condition (2) can be rewritten as
~ T t ~ C(S)tES -
which suggests a "stand alone test" for subsidization. Namely. the revenue vector
r is subsidy-free if each collection S pays no more than would be required if it
were to stand alone.
Either one of the above equivalent tests for cross-subsidization seems to
embody a reasonable concept of equity. However, it is important to note that
when there is competition in one or more of the markets, the tests must also be
passed in order to guarantee the most basic requirement for economic efficiency.
As an example, let us assume that the firm or public enterprise is a natural mono-
poly. in the sense that the cost function C is strictly subadditive. That is.
C(S) + C(T) > C(SuT) whenever SnT = if;
Suppose that a particular coalition N\ S is subsidizing the complementary coali-
tion S. Then it follows that
~ Tt < C(N) - C(N\S) < C(S)
t ES
(4)
where the first inequality follows from the incremental cost definition of subsidi-
zation and the second follows from the definition of subadditivity.ll Equivalently.
one may write
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(5)
(6)
C(N) - C(S) < C(N\S) < }.; Ti
N'S
If there is a competitive supplier of outputs N\S who can provide them at a cost
G (N\ S) such that
C(N) - C(S) < G (N\S) < L; T iN'S
then the customers of outputs N\S will surely defect. But then equation (4)
shows that the customers remaining in markets S must pay not only their incre-
mental costs but also their total stand alone costs. Furthermore, the total costs
of production are larger since
G(N\S) + C(S) > C(N) - C(S) + C(S) = C(N) (7)
(B)
Thus, subsidization when there is also competition can harm both the subsidized
customers and aggregate economic efficiency.
Conditions (1) and (2) define the incremental cost test for cross-subsidization
and are equivalent to the conditions defining the core of a game, in which the
characteristic function is the incremental cost of production. However, subaddi-
tivity of the total or stand alone cost does not imply superadditivity of the incre-
mental cost. An alternative game that is superadditive is defined by the charac-
teristic function v(S) = -C(S). In either case, it is well known that cores need
not exist unless more restrictive conditions are placed on the cost function.
Thus, another contribution of game theory to the literature on cross-subsidization
is the proposition that subsidy-free prices may not exist.
The definition of cross-subsidization that is based only on the cost function
has a number of important limitations. As already noted there are, in general,
many subsidy-free allocations and there is no apparent method of choosing one
subsidy-free allocation rather than another. More importantly, the cost-based
definition of subsidization docs not make use of any available additional informa-
tion concerning competitive conditions in the various markets or the willingness of
customers to pay. From the discussion of competition in telecommunications mar-
kets, it should be clear that this is a serious omission. When there are alternative
sources of supply, or other constraints based on consumer demand, it clearly fol-
lows that not all subsidy-free cost allocations are viable.
Suppose that, in the example discussed above, the revenue vector T is
adjusted so that the group N\S no longer subsidizes S and that no other subsidi-
zation constraints are violated. Nevertheless, it may still happen that there is an
alternative source with costs G(N\S) < C(N\S) such that
C(N) - C(S) < G (N\S) < L; Ti S C(N\S)
N'S -
As before, the customers of N\S have the incentive to defect. If they do, then
the remaining customers of S bear the cost and aggregate efficiency is lowered, as
again illustrated by inequalities (7).
3.2 Ana.lysis of Benefit Ga.mes
To extend the game-theoretic analysis to include information on consumers'
willingness to pay, one may proceed as follows. Suppose that b = (b 1 , .... bn ) is
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(10)
the vector representing the maximum willingness to pay of consumers of each pro-
duct. 12 Then if C(S) represents the cost of producing the collection S of outputs,
it is possible to define the following characteristic function for a benefit game,13
v(S) = max { ~ b t - C(R)} . (9)ReS t ER
The function v represents the maximum surplus obtainable by the coalition S
of markets. It is easy to see that v is monotonic, Le., that v (S) ~ v (T) whenever
S 2T; that v is superadditive if C is subadditive; and that v (S) ~ 0 for all S,
since C(¢) = O. Furthermore. it follows that
v(N) = ~bt -C(N)
N
if and only if
~ bt ~ C(N) - C(N\S) for all SeNt ES -
In other words, it is optimal to produce the entire product set N if and only if the
combined willingness to pay of every coalition S is at least as great as the incre-
mental cost of producing S.
It was shown in the previous section that one definition of subsidy-free
prices or revenues could be made with reference to the core of an appropriate
cost game. Similarly, when there are demand constraints, subsidy-free prices or
revenues can be determined by examining the core of the benefit game. Let
Y = (Yl • ...• Yn) be a vector representing the consumer surplus in each market.
Then, assuming that conditions (10) are true, it is a straightforward exercise to
show that there exists a vector y in the core of the benefit game if and only if
there exists a subsidy-free revenue vector T for which no market is charged more
than its willingness to pay. That is, the core of the benefit game is nonempty if
and only if there exists a vector T such that
~Tt' = C(N)
N
~Tt ~ C(N) - C(N\S) for SeN
N
(11)
(12)
(13)
Clearly. the subsidy-free prices in a benefit game are a subset of the
subsidy-free prices in the cost game, because of the additional constraints (13).
Furthermore, it is possible that the core of the benefit game is empty even though
the core of the cost game is nonempty. However, for some technologies, it is pos-
sible to guarantee that the core of the benefit game is nonempty for every set of
benefit vectors b that satisfy the optimality conditions (10).
Let C· (S) = C (N) - C (N \ S) be the incremental cost function. It has been
demonstrated (Sharkey, 1981, 1982b) that if the incremental cost function C· is
convex, that is, if
C· (S) + C· (T) ~ C· (SuT) + C· (SnT) (14)
for all coalitions Sand T, then for any willingness to pay vector satisfying (10)
there is a revenue vector that satisfies (11)-(13). Equivalent to (14) is the condi-
tion that the total cost function be "concave" so that
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Condition (15) describes a property known as "cost complementarity", which has
proven to bc useful in the study of multiple-product cost functions. It should be
emphasized that cost complementarity is sufficient but not necessary for the
existence of a subsidy-free revenue vector satisfying (11)-(14). The following sec-
tion will describe a different class of nonconcave cost functions for which the
core of the benefit game is always nonempty.
3.3 Cost Allocation in a Spanning Tree Game
There is a type of cost allocation game known as a minimum cost, spanning
tree game that has particular relevance for technologies involving construction of
a network.14 Minimum cost, spanning tree games may be relevant in allocating the
cost of access to local communications networks. In this game, one takes as given
the set of nodes N u !O j and the matrix lCij l representing the cost of constructing
an arc linking nodes i, j EN u lO j. Node lO j is a distinguished node representing
the common supplier of network services and N represents the set of potential
subscribers to the network service. For any coalition S eN one then defines the
cost function C (S) representing the sum of costs of the arcs in a minimum cost
spanning tree which connects the nodes S u lO j. It is well known that minimum
cost, spanning tree games always have cores (Granot and Huberman, 1981). In
fact, the revenue vector that assigns to each subscriber the cost of the associ-
ated link in a minimum cost spanning tree is itself in the core. Since there exist
efficient algorithms for calculating minimum cost spanning trees, it would appear
that finding a subsidy-free revenue vector in a spanning tree game is a straight-
forward task. However, when the subscribers' willingness to pay is also known no
simple algorithm exists for finding revenues in the core of the benefit game. While
a spanning tree game with willingness to pay constraints does have a nonempty
core, it is necessary to solve explicitly the 2n + n inequality constraints given in
(11)-(14) in order to determine a subsidy-free revenue vector (Sharkey, 1985).
When the spanning tree game is generalized in various ways, subsidy-free
revenues may no longer exist. For example, if there is more than one potential
location for the source node or if new nodes may be created in order to construct
a minimum cost tree, then the core of the cost game need not exist (Bird, 1976;
Megiddo, 1970a). Moreover, if there are positive incremental costs when two or
more users share a link, as there are in telecommunication networks, the core may
also be empty (Sharkey, 1985). Thus, while the minimum cost, spanning tree game
has an interesting mathematical structure that may ultimately prove useful in
resolving the cost allocation question, such games appear now to have virtually all
of the complexity of general cost allocation games.
4 Concluding Comments
In this chapter, I have attempted to survey the technological and economic
characteristics of the telecommunications industry and to indicate how some of
the methods of cooperative game theory might be used in formulating rules for
cost allocation. While the technology of telecommunications is such that cost allo-
cation questions frequently arise, one must consider the economic characteristics
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of telecommunications markets before making a final choice of a method of alloca-
tion. While game-theoretic concepts have frequently been applied to questions of
pure eost allocation, where economic constraints do not intrude, I believe that
game theory has also been shown to be a useful aid in understanding some of the
economic issues.
There is, of course, much addilional work that could bc done. Highly struc-
tured games, such as the minimum cost, spanning tree game have not been exten-
sively studied. Important economic issues, such as the basic externality inherent
in communications services, have not been incorporated in most game-theoretic
discussions. Finally, there is much to be done in the area of finding useful compu-
tational results. What has been achieved, however, is the specification of a simple,
yet relevant model of the cost allocation process that can be used to guide
current policy and to encourage further research.
Noles
1. See Sharkey (1982a, Chapter 9) for further discussion.
2. The subsidy from toll service to local service and access has been justified tradi-
tionally by the perceived need to promote universal service - that is, to maximize
the number of households having a telephone. Additional arguments for subsidized
access may be based upon the externalities inherent in a communications service.
See Sharkey (1982a, Chapter 9) and the references cited therein for further dis-
cussion.
3. The practice of alternative routing is described more fully in Hell Laboratories
(1977).
4. See Brock (1981) for a more detailed account of this period.
5. See Johnson (1982) for additional discussion of recent competitive inroads into the
industry.
6. The method, known as FDC-l, is described more fully in Johnson (1982).
7. See Bell System Operating Companies and AT&T (1982) for a discussion of bypass
technology and the potential for competition in local service markets.
8. In Bell System Operating Companies and AT&T (1982), it is reported (p 92) that "1m
of the residence customers account for approximately one-half of all residence
interstate MTS messages; lOt of the business locations account for approximately
three-fourths of all business interstate MTS revenues; and lOt of the interstate
WATS locations account for approximately 60% of all interstate WATS revenues".
9. See Faulhaber (1975) and references cited therein for further discussion of
cross-subsidization.
10. This approach, known as Ramsey pricing, is explained in Baumol and Bradford
(1970), Boiteux (1971), and Ramsey (1927).
11. See Sharkey (1982a) for further discussion and analysis of subadditivity.
12. The demand vector b might also be interpreted as a vector of competitive prices
from outside suppliers. Note also that under the willingness to pay interpretation,
it is assumed that demands are independent across markets.
13. Benefit games are discussed further in Littlechild (1975) and Sharkey (1982c).
14. Cost allocation on a spanning tree was first discussed by Claus and Kleitman (1973).
Game-theoretic analysis is contained in Bird (1976), Granot and Huberman (1981),
and Megiddo (1978a,b).
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1 Introduction
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This chapter surveys some of the potential applications of cost allocation
methods and principles to the field of telecommunications. We present a simple
methodology for estimating marginal costs of different outputs and, using this as a
reference system of prices, we study the revenue trade-offs that exist between
users and between different outputs under current pricing policy in the French
telecommunications network. This amounts to a pragmatic estimation of the extent
of cross-subsidization between different classes of users and outputs. We discuss
the implication of these results for French pricing policy for telephone services
in terms of equity and economic efficiency.
Cost allocation principles and techniques have many potential applications in
the field of telecommunications (for surveys more oriented toward the North
American context, see Chapters 7 and 8). One of these is how to allocate telephone
costs between basic access to the network, lines operations, local usage, and
long-distance usage. Such allocations are needed to establish reference costs for
carrying out economic studies and designing pricing policies.
Similarly, it may be necessary or desirable to share costs between different
categories of usage in the network. Peak users cost more to the telephone indus-
try than off-peak ones, access is more costly to provide in rural than in urban
areas, toll calls cost more than local ones but less than tariffs tend to show, etc.
Comparing actual rates to a theoretically fair and/or efficient pricing system
allows us to draw a map of cross-subsidizations, Le., revenue trade-offs that occur
between types of customers and between classes of usage.
Third, there is the issue of how to share the common costs of a trunk tele-
phone network between different regional operating units, in order to build a
decentralized accounting system in which long lines and local operations are
treated as separate cost centers.
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Another problem is how to allocate the common costs of transmission and
switching capacity between several different telecommunications services using
the same network, such as voice and data transmissions. This issue is important in
France, where narrow-bandwidth non voice traffic (facsimile and videotext) is
accommodated in part by the basic telephone network. Economic rationality in
pricing might suggest charging per information-bit transmitted regardless of the
nature of messages, whereas commercial purposes might encourage a differentia-
tion of prices according to services. Moreover, if these new services were to be
run in the future by operators outside the monopoly, it would become a major con-
cern for PTT to set cost-based rates for the network facilities supplied to opera-
tors and to price in a consistent way the intermediate demand (operators) and the
final demand (users).
Finally, cost-sharing rears its head in the use of transcontinen tal telecom-
munications equipment. Each national company collects all of the revenue from
users' outgoing traffic and pays to the intermediate or final destination countries
(or to international organizations for satellite and underseas circuits) a fee based
on the cost of equipment utilized. Conversely, each company receives a fee per
minute of incoming or transit traffic run through its network. These fees, which
constitute an internal pricing system between telephone companies, are deter-
mined through a negotiation process that should allow for allocation principles.
In this chapter, we concentrate on the first two applications: building refer-
ence costs and assessing the revenue trade-offs inherent in the tariffs. We then
discuss the French telephone pricing system and explain the main orientations of
the policy planned by the Direction Generale des Telecommunications toward
"efficient" pricing and "fair" control of trade-offs.
2 Nonnative Pricing Schemes
In theory, a telecommunication::; monopoly such as the French PTT should
price at marginal costs in order to maximize the overall social surplus, Le., the
sum of the industry's profits and consumer surplus (see Abraham and Thomas,
1966). But if. for instance, owing to increasing returns to scale, marginal pricing
does not allow total costs to be recovered, the budget balance can be restored
through taxes. In this trade-off, consumers yield to the industry part of their
surplus and the overall social surplus remains constant and maximal. However,
such a tax system is certainly more theoretical than realistic and some care is
needed so that they are shared among consumers in a Pareto-optimal way. More-
over, it might be undesirable insofar as it creates poor incentives for a cost-
minimizing policy for the industry. Economic theory then recommends setting
"second-best" prices that maximize consumer surplus, subject to profit con-
straints or to budget balances, the so-called Ramsey prices (see Ramsey, 1927;
Baumol and Bradford, 1970; Boiteux, 1971). Despite their second-best status, Ram-
sey prices possess a number of properties that are liable to disqualify them as a
reference system. First, reference prices should be a representation of industry
costs, and therefore should rely only upon production parameters. Ramsey prices
do not satisfy this condition since they also depend on demand
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elasticities. Assuming zero cross-elasticities of demand, they depart from margi-
nal costs in inverse proportion to elasticities. For instance, the color of tele-
phone sets could influence Ramsey prices if demand is color-sensitive, even
though production costs are indifferent to this factor. Second, Ramsey prices
reveal a disputable notion of equity, based on a willingness-to-pay principle: in-
elastic segments of demand are marked up more than elastic ones, which would
lead (in the example of telephone usage) to overcharging intermediate demand
(businesses) because it is less elastic than final demand (households). This may
seem unfair, since the former needs the telephone service as an input to produc-
tion and thus represents a more captive market than the latter.
Third, it has been shown that for a natural monopoly with economies of scale,
which is reputed to be the case for at least a portion of the telecommunications
industry (for an estimation of economies of scale and economies of scope in
telecommunications, see Christensen et al., 1983; Kiss et al., 19B3), Ramsey prices
are not neces~<lr'ily subsidy-free. In other words, some outputs may generate less
revenue than their incremental cost (the extra cost of supplying these outputs
under provision of the others) and some may generate more revenue than their
stand-alone cost (the cost of supplying these outputs without providing the oth-
ers). In this case the latter subsidize the former (a discussion of this point is
given in Rheaume, 1983, and a model yielding welfare-optimal, subsidy-free prices
is developed.). This opens Ramsey prices to criticism as a norm. From a policy
standpoint there is another serious problem with Ramsey prices - or indeed any
prices that allow cross-subsidization. If barriers to entry are not too strong - as
in the North American context - such prices may encourage inefficient competi-
tion in the market for subsidizing services and discourage it in the market for
subsidized ones where it could be sociably desirable (see Chapter 8).
There are price systems other than Ramsey that are cost sharing and do not
exhibit the above-mentioned defects. For instance, prices that maximize surplus
subject to being subsidy-free and satisfying a profit constraint; or
Aumann-Shapley prices which, under suitable conditions on the cost function, are
subsidy-free, coincide with marginal costs in the case of constant returns to scale,
and generalize in a natural way the notion of average cost for a one-output indus-
try (see Chapters 1 and 3). The diversity of possible pricing systems is in fact
merely an indicator of the range of suboptimality, each separate system pointing
to a different concept of equity, or monopoly sustainability, or second-best effi-
ciency, etc.
Faced with these issues and with the numerous possible answers, we con-
sidered both the availability of data, which does not permit very elaborate estima-
tion techniques, and the purpose of this study. Rather than assessing the
discrepancies between actual pricing and some desirable and/or attainable goal,
the aim was to build an "ideal" ("first best") reference system with which we could
compare all feasible pricing systems consistent with budget-balancing constraints.
Among these are actual pricing, Ramsey pricing, and other "suboptimal" cost-
sharing systems. From this standpoint, the evaluation of marginal costs appeared
to be the first and the most useful step in the process of gaining better knowledge
of production conditions in French telecommunications.
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3 Estimating Marginal Costs as a Reference Base
In computing marginal costs one has to account for the multi-output charac-
ter of telecommunications. including access to the network, lines operations. local
traffic, long-distance (toll) traffic, and international traffic. These are in fact
joint outputs; traffic cannot be provided without access, nor toll and interna-
tional traffic without local traffic. Moreover, some equipment is shared by at least
two functions. For instance, in local exchanges some transit switching equipment
run both local and toll traffic; buildings, energy and logistics serve all activities.
Although the cost function is not separable according to outputs, the pricing
function is, and the consumer pays separately for access through an initial con-
nection fee. for lines operations through a bimonthly rental charge, and for
traffic through a distance and time-of-day-sensitive rate based on periodic pulses.
Assessing marginal costs and comparing them with tariffs thus requires
either evaluating the total cost function from which marginal costs can be derived,
or estimating marginal costs directly by allocating elementary expenses. The first
method means evaluating a multi-output, nonseparable cost function by
econometric techniques. (The functional form of the cost function as a translog
second-order approximation is mentioned in Fuss, 1983; Chistensen et al., 1983;
Kiss, et al., 1983.) This involves a number of difficulties including specification of
the form of the cost function and a multicollinearity among the variables (such as
changes in traffic and mainstation stock), not to mention the lack of consistent
cost data over space and time due to imperfections and changes in the accounting
system.
The second method consists of referring to detailed accounts and measuring
the expenditure (investment and operations) occasioned over a period of one year
by the increase in the various outputs. (A more detailed presentation of marginal
cost calculations from the French· telecommunications accounting system is given
in Curien and Pautrat, 1983.) In this approach, joint and common costs have to be
allocated, first to telephone (as opposed to other services such as telex or tele-
graph using some of the same network facilities) and then to connections, lines
operations, and traffic.
Although less attractive than the first method from a theoretical standpoint.
the second was preferred because of its stability under uncertainty and incom-
pleteness of data, its structural consistency with the accounting system and, not
least, its better understandability by management. In order to obtain results
quickly, the cost allocation process was carried out using classical empirical rules.
(Such rules are referred to as "easy joint cost allocation approaches" in Thomas,
1980). For instance, technical expenditures are shared between lines and traffic
in the same proportion as the equipment they contain. Such a choice was dictated
by the relative weakness of data, and a belief that not much would be gained from
taking account of sophisticated tools related to game-theoretic concepts (see, for
instance, Littlechild, 1970; Faulhaber, 1975). Such tools generally require more
inputs than are available from basic accounts, and their useful application assumes
that data quality fits methodological refinement, which was certainly not the case
when marginal cost calculations were first made for French telecommunications in
1976. Since then, accounts have been checked and improved through usage, and
cost data are more reliable. so that further reference to principles of allocation
theory should be possible and worthwhile in the future.
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Table 9.1 shows the marginal costs per unit of output, computed as indicated
above, for the years 1976, 1970, 1979 (in 1977 important changes in the accounting
system do not allow reliable computation of costs); investment and operations
costs are separated. The mainstation (MS) is the unit used to measure lines con-
nections or operations outputs, and the erlang (E) unit is used to measure the
traffic capacity of the network. The volume of traffic that can be handled by the
telecommunications equipment is 1 erlang-hour if the equipment is busy during a
one-hour period. The intensity of traffic, Le., the volume of traffic per time unit
is then measured in erlangs, as is the traffic capacity of a network or piece of
equipment: 1 E is the capacity that can carry 1 E of peak traffic intensity.
Table 9.1 Marginal cost estimation
(thousands of French francs, FF, current value).
Operations
-_..__~._-
Output Subscribers Coin telephone Local Trunk International
lines lines traJ'fic tra..tfic tra..tfic
(MS) (MS) (E) (E) (E)
1976 0.64 9.31 22.50
1978 0.59 3.64 8.83 16.35 176.29
1979 0.59 4.04 9.91 15.04 194.20
Annual %
increase
(constant FF)
1978/1976 -12.2 -11.0 -22.1
1979/1978 -9.8 6.3 1.8 -16.6 -0.001
Investment
----_~---~-----------~_----_.. ----_.__._-- --_.- -- --- ------_~---
Output Subscriber Coin telephone Local Trunk International
connections connections tra..tfic tra..tfic tra..tfic
(MS) (MS) (E) (E) (E)
1976 3.01 112.0 159.8
1978 3.43 16.03 144.45 186.90 397.58
1979 3.28 15.39 168.57 219.54 388.41
Annual %
increase
(constant FF)
1978/1976 -2.4 3.9 -1.1
1979/1978 -13.3 -13.0 5.8 6.5 -11.4
Several trends are noteworthy. Investment costs decreased in constant FF
except for local and trunk erlangs, due to a policy of decreasing equipment usage
rates: more equipment was installed to satisfy a given level of traffic demand, thus
lowering the probability of call rejection and improving the quality of service sup-
plied. Operating costs declined as well between 1975 and 1980 (except for coin
telephones), mainly in the trunk network. However, it should be observed that
the decrease in marginal costs does not necessarily imply increasing returns to
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scale, for this decrease was caused not only by the growth of output but also by
the reductions in equipment and labor costs. More observations than available
would be necessary to separate the two effects.
4 Analysis or Trade-orrs
The classical way to carry out cross-subsidy tests is to compare, for each set
of joint outputs, the revenues on the one hand and the incremental and stand-
alone costs on the other. (Such tests have been carried out for the Canadian
interregional telecommunications network and are described by Autin and
Leblanc, 1983). However, the evaluation of these costs is not yet available for
French telecommunications. Therefore we used a simpler approach to measuring
cross-subsidization by analyzing the trade-offs associated with variations in con-
sumers surplus. When telecommunications prices deviate from marginal reference
costs, this may be measured by the change in surplus generated between the
reference state and the actual state. If actual prices exceed marginal costs, the
overall change in surplus reflects a global subsidy from consumers to the industry.
The variations in surplus for each elementary segment of the market, when com-
pared with "fairly" allocated variations, indicate revenue trade-offs between
groups of users and between types of outputs.
More precisely, let q denote the telecommunications output vector and p the
associated price vector. Market equilibrium requires that
q =q(P) (1)
(2)
where q (P) is the Uoint) demand function. The surplus is not generally totally dif-
ferentiable, so that its definition depends on the selection of a path in price
space between the marginal cost price reference point Po and the actual price Pl'
The surplus variation in a transition from marginal to actual price is then
1'1
S = -Jq(P) dp
Po
where the integral is computed along the selected path from Po to Pl' If (as is
the case in France) marginal prices Po are far from actual prices Pl' the theoret-
ical demand q 0 =q (p 0) is unknown, so that it looks sensible and convenient to
assume perfect inelasticity in this price range. Let
(3)
which means approximating the demand function q (P) between Po and P 1 by a
step in computing the surplus integral (2). This integral no longer depends on the
price trajectory and may be written explicitly as
(4)
Denote classes of users (business, residential, ... ) by an index i and classes
of outputs (connections, lines operations, traffic, ... ) by an index j. The surplus
variation between reference and actual states may then be written
s = -}::; q ij (p ij _ P ij )
i ,j 1 1 0 (5)
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where each term in the sum is the surplus variation of market segment (i ,j):
Sij =- q i j (p i j - P 6j ) (6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
The transition from Po to P1 may conceptually be split into two steps. In the
first step all users together yield the surplus S to telecommunications, this sub-
sidy being "fairly" allocated in the sense that profitability is assumed to be the
same in each market segment. Thus reference share of surplus §ij is proportional
to the revenue generated in the reference state:
qijp ij§ij =S 1 0
ql'PO
Using expression (4) for S this becomes
S~ij _ i j [ql'Pl ij ij]- -ql ---Po -Po
ql'P O
In the second step the surplus S is reallocated in order to reach the actual
allocation Sij. and the trade-off Tij received or given by segment (i ,j) is defined
as the change in surplus obtained from reallocation, Le.,
Tij =Sij - .§ij
Substituting expressions (6) and (8) for Sij and §ij:
Tij =_qij[pij _ ql'P1 p ij )
1 1 q l'PO 0
Let Po denote the price vector proportional to the marginal price vector Po.
adjusted in order to yield the same income as the actual price vector Pl' Le.,
~ ql'Pl
Po =---Po
ql'PO
The share borne by segment (i ,j) in the first step of the "fair" allocation is
then
(12)
This may be interpreted as the surplus variation in a transition from marginal cost
pricing Po to proportional pricing Po' Similarly. the trade-off Tij in the second
step of the reallocation is
(13)
The concept of trade-offs that we introduced may therefore be looked upon as a
measure of the distance between two pricing systems satisfying the same profit
constraint: prices proportional to marginal costs, and actual prices. Since total
telecommunications revenues are the same under each of these systems. the
trade-offs must add up to zero:
~ Tij =0
i ,j
The trade-offs between users alone can then be defined as
T i . =~Tij
j
(14)
(15)
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and between facilities alone as
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(16)
f.T i . = f. T'; =0 (17)
i ;
A positive (negative) trade-off for usage (i ,j), user (i ,.), or facility (.,j) means
that this market segment is better (worse) off under actual pricing than under
proportional to marginal cost pricing; Le., this segment yields to telecommunica-
tions a smaller (larger) part of its surplus.
Table 9.2 shows the trade-offs per subscriber in 1901, calculated as men-
tioned above. (A qualitative analysis of these trade-offs may be found in Curien
and Pautrat, 1983, and a quantitative one in de la Brunetiere and Curien, 1984.)
Table 9.2 Revenue trade-offs Tij between users and between outputs (thousands of
French francs, 1981 value).
-----_._~--~------_._-----~------------_._----_.
'I'ype of user, i
Adminis- All Coin
'I'ype of House- Profes- Indus- tration and busi- tele- Total,
output, j holds sions stry services nesses phones T';
Connections 487 4B7 487 487 487 1556 498
Line
operations 120 120 120 120 120 4261 161
Local traJ'fic 122 101 605 1324 1158 976 205
Toll traJ'fic -512 -707 -8439 -3476 -4617 -4383 -864
Total, T i . 217 1 -7227 -1545 -2852 2410 0
:> Interpretation or Results
Figure 9.1 summarizes the direction of cross-subsidization between different
classes of outputs in the French telecommunications industry. Toll traffic subsi-
dizes local traffic owing to two factors. The cost of a local call depends on its
duration, whereas the tariff does not and the cost of the average call exceeds the
tariff per call; whereas, the actual cost of long-distance calls does not rise with
distance as rapidly as does the tariff, which means overcharging of long-distance
calls. This is becoming more pronounced with the spread of digital technology,
which tends to reduce the dependence of cost on distance.
Second, traffic as a whole subsidizes lines operations and connections. The
rental charge does not make up for the costs of lines and the operation of sub-
scribers' equipment, nor does the connection charge make up for the true costs of
access. Moreover. the social policy of expanding the telephone stock is widening
this gap by lowering connection charges and keeping rental charges constant in
current money. This policy will be discussed below.
Finally, although this is not shown explicitly in the table, off-peak traffic
subsidizes peak traffic, and short local calls subsidize long ones (they are priced
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the same and cost less). Conversely, long toll calls subsidize short ones, because
through the periodic pulse system the over-tariffing of toll calls is proportional to
their duration. In order to cancel all trade-offs between outputs, the rental and
connection charges should be roughly doubled, and so should the local pulse rate,
whereas the toll pulse rate should be more than halved.
TOII~_
)
Sho~ Long --
Local
~ Shon Long
(
T"ffk "\: '''':0"' ~
Off-peak h)
Lines operations
Yigure 9.1
Long distance
Proximity
As for trade-offs between classes of users, the main feature is that
businesses subsidize households (and coin telephones). More accurately, calcula-
tions show that under the present price structure, households are undercharged
by about 15 percent and coin telephones by 30 percent, industry is over charged
by 50 percent and services by 20 percent, tariffs being roughly fair for the pro-
fessions. This trade-off from business to residential customers is the result of two
parallel effects. On the one hand, these two categories account for a comparable
share of the profits made on traffic, whereas households are the main source of
new connections costs (in 1982 they accounted for 85 percent of the telephone
stock increase). On the other hand, businesses make greater use of long-distance
service, where profits are greatest.
In the future the traffic-to-access trade-off might be mitigated by the
saturation of the residential market, and the development of telematics between
businesses, which will tend to modify the relative contributions of households and
businesses to network growth. Conversely, the intra-traffic cross-subsidies may
become more important if an increase in network capacity in order to handle the
residential evening traffic makes households rather than businesses responsible
for peak demand.
Though not shown in Table 9.1, subsidies also occur from high-density areas
to low-density ones, since installation and operating costs are greater in the
latter case. However, this subsidy is partly offset by greater reliance on long-
distance calls: due to sparser populations, a smaller number of subscribers can be
called at the local rate than in urban areas.
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6 Implications for policy
NicoLas Curten
The above analysis of tariff-cost discrepancies and associated trade-offs can
serve as a basis for designing a pricing policy for telecommunications. Such a pol-
icy has to seek for the "best" balance between two contradictory criteria. On the
one hand, one wants to aim at economically efficient results - ideally through mar-
ginal pricing, more realistically through some form of second best, such as Ramsey
pricing. On the other hand, it may be desirable to encourage the growth of cer-
tain outputs (such as nonvoice services) and to control the relative development of
others. One might also wish to promote trade-offs between classes of users so as
to favor access and usage by lower-income groups. The necessary compromise
between economic pricing and trade-off control can be solved through two key
options.
First, converging toward the relative structure of marginal costs in traffic
facilities pricing, in order to guarantee a fair return on transmission and switch-
ing equipment and to steer demand towards efficient choices by reducing trade-
offs between local and long-distance or peak and off-peak traffic. In this vein,
time of day multilevel pricing and local measured service have just been intro-
duced in France. Local measured service (for an economic analysis of local service
pricing, see Mitchell, 1978, 1979, 1983; Brander and Spencer, 1983; Dansby, 1983)
will remunerate the local network at proper time and cost, will allow the lowering
of long-distance tariffs and thus reduce the effect of the distance factor on tar-
iffs, and will up-grade the quality of service by shortening peak-hour calls. It will
also encourage nonvoice uses of the network by charging in proportion to the
volume of transmitted information. Time-of-day pricing, by offering attractive
off-peak charges, could represent both a social advantage for households, as well
as an incentive to the development of telematics, and by regulating the peaks, may
improve the quality of supply without any increase in the average level of tariffs.
Second, subsidizing connections and lines operations from traffic revenues,
while inconsistent with economic efficiency, may be partly justified by the posi-
tive externality of network growth - the new subscribers extending the potential
available to those already subscribing (see Artle and Averous, 1973; Squire, 1973;
Rohlfs, 1974; Littlechild, 1979; Taylor, 1980; Curien and Vilmin, 1983). Externali-
ties associated with the growth of lines, both stock and usage, are mentioned by
these authors as key factors in modeling telephone demand. Moreover, provided
that the rate of return on investment in new connections exceeds the rate recom-
mended to public investors by the central planning authority, the trade-off
between traffic and access is a shift of revenue within the telecommunications
industry which fits the macroeconomic social choice concerning the return on
investment. Economic calculations show that the planned target of 23 million
mainstations in 1985 (95 percent of households, 85 percent of workers equipped)
can be reached by reducing connection and rental charges to about half of their
1980 values, which should preserve an acceptable rate of return on new connec-
tions (over 8 percent in real terms). An optimization of the French telephone net-
work growth under tariff control and subject to profitability constraints is dis-
cussed in Curien et a.l., 1981.
The evolution of the French telephone rate structure from its present state
according to the options presented above (especially time-of-day pricing), will
necessarily be a stepwise process in which the observation of consumer behavior
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and the measurement of price elasticities will allow a check on efficiency and show
the direction for the next steps. Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction. this
evolution will have to cope with the development of nonvoice uses of the telephone
network and with the growth of specialized networks parallel but interconnected
to the basic one (datapack, satellite, cable TV, etc.). The overall purpose is to aim
at a "consistent" pricing system that reconciles the various social and market
development goals with economic efficiency.
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CHAPTER 10
AUCTIONING LANDING RIGHTS
AT CONGESTED AIRPORTS
Michel L. Balinski and Prancis M. Sand
1 Introduction
1'79
The intent of the United States Airline Deregulation Act of 1970 was to open
the industry to the usual market forces, and, in particular, to allow air carriers to
initiate or terminate service wherever they liked. Airports, however, have a fixed
capacity. Due to congestion the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) established
quotas in 1969 on the hourly number of scheduled landings and take-flffs (called
"slots"). The 1970 law was passed before anyone became aware of the need for a
method to allocate the available slots among competing carriers that is in the
spirit of the Act.
This chapter describes a mechanism that was developed in response to the
need for finding an economically efficient allocation of slots that explicitly
accounts for the complex interdependence among the slots that airlines require
for scheduling flights. It is an auctioning procedure in which repeated bidding is
done simultaneously across the many different hours and airports that constitute
the "markets". It is also a concrete instance of an auctioning mechanism for allo-
cating public rights of access that have joint benefits (and possibly joint costs).
This approach to allocation was developed and proposed in the context of the
1980 airline situation, so the facts reported below date from then and the percep-
tions of what was realistically acceptable are reflected in the work. In fact,
scheduling committees (as described below) have continued to be the instance of
allocation through October 1984., at least, although under increasing attack and
the strain of prolonged scheduling deadlocks.
2 Background
A slot is the right to schedule either a landing or a take-off in a particular
hourly period (e.g., 8 to 9 a.m.) at a particular airport. To schedule flights the
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airlines must have slots, but slots must not be confused with actual landings or
take-offs which are, of course, afforded to planes in distress, emergencies. etc ..
and for which landing fees and other rental charges will exist.
Standard practice is for each airline to determine, in response to its per-
ceived market opportunities, a half-year fleet schedule, that is, a schedule for
each aircraft in its fleet, in set cycles through different airports. These cycles
are determined by customer demand and the need to assure periodic maintenance
of planes. For example, each of United Airline's DC-lOs had its own 37-day cycle
involving about 410 hours in flight, including San Francisco at least once for an
overnight stay to perform a major maintenance. Finding a good fleet schedule is
an extremely complex combinatorial optimization problem that demands a major
planning effort. Given a good schedule, that is, one that makes efficient use of
the fleet in meeting expected demand for flights, an airline is loath to change it.
Once determined, crew routing is fitted to the fleet schedule. The fleet schedules
decide the slots each airline seeks to acquire. In a word, fleet schedules, and the
flights that they assure, are the essential objects of importance and their values
determine the values of individual slots. There is, therefore, an extremely strong
interdependency among any prices that may become attached to slots.
Airline "scheduling committees" meet twice a year under the auspices of the
Air Transport Association. They are composed of airline industry representatives
operating under a special antitrust exemption sanctloned by the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Each committee is concerned with a single airport and seeks to obtain
agreement on an allocation of slots among the air carriers that satisfies set "quo-
tas" at high-density airports. These are: 40 at Washington National, 4B at New
York LaGuardia, 70 to 80 at New York JFK and 115 at Chicago O'Hare (depending on
the time of day). Slots are allocated for a fixed period of 6 months. Prior to each
meeting and based on their fleet schedules, the carriers submit their requests for
slots to the scheduling committee staff. These requests are tabulated and distri-
buted to members at the start of the meeting. Slots requested generally exceed
slots available. Through negotiation, the committee first seeks to reduce total
requests by all carriers to the daily quota (for example 640 at Washington National
Airport). Then they try to limit hourly reservatlon requests to hourly quotas by
having the carriers "slide" their operations from one hour to a neighboring one
(airlines thereby hope to maintain the basic integrity of their fleet schedules).
Under the guidelines set down in the CAB antitrust exemption, committee
representatives are not permitted to discuss operations with respect to particu-
lar markets, routes or other airports. Should a committee fail to reach an agree-
ment, the responsibility for a decision rests with the FAA. Although in the past
the scheduling committees have typically reached a unanimous agreement, t.he
flexibility airlines have acquired in entering new markets, due to the Deregulation
Act, has considerably lengthened the process. Previously, the road to obtaining
unanimous agreements was for all to agree to a proportional reductlon in slot
requests. Experience has shown that the new, smaller entrants are less willing
than established carriers to agree to such proportional reductions. Since the
rule for agreement is unanimity, it is not surprising that arriving at decisions in
the deregulated environment has become much harder.
3 The Problem
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The problem of the allocation of slots is fundamentally rooted in the efficient
operation of an airport. An early paper concluded, "... the existing price system
for airport services fails to allocate the existing capacity so as to maximize its
value. It fails also to guide investment in airports so as to achieve the appropriate
mix and level of output with a minimum investment of resources" (Levine, 1969).
One might wish for an airport pricing system that adequately reflects the multiple
attributes of airport capacities, such as different types of pollution, limits, rights
of access, terminal space and the like, and also reflects user characteristics such
as the type of plane, its weight, and the time of day. It is neither reasonable nor
politically viable, however, to consider a comprehensive pricing policy.
Accordingly, we view slots at a given hour and airport as a homogeneous good
representing, in effect, an option giving the holder the right to schedule an
operation at that hour and airporl for a six-month period. There are good reasons
that such rights should be vested for sufficiently long periods of time, since the
services provided by carriers require investments in support facilities, advertise-
ment and the like which cannot be altered in the short run. In addition, since the
demand for air travel, the financial positions of carriers, the general state of the
industry and the condition of the economy as a whole may change, the holders of
slot options in a deregulated environment should be allowed to trade - to buy
and/or to sell - their options. The problem thus becomes: to design competitive
and efficient mechanisms to first allot and then facilitate the trading of slots.
The various approaches to the initial allocation of slots that have been con-
sidered may be classified into administered and competitive schemes (see, for
example, Geisinger, 1980). Administered schemes include: the curre,nt scheduling
committees: first-come, first-served; proportional allotments by priority guide-
lines (depending upon such factors as historic shares of operations, potential pub-
lic service provided); 101 teries (with win probabilities a function of historic
shares, estimated future passengers, or on the basis of purchased lots); solutions
of mathematical programming problems that maximize the total "value" of all
scheduled flights; and time-differentiated landing fees.
An extensive study of the scheduling committee (Grether et al., 1979) demon-
strates the economic inefficiency of its outcomes. The committee's requirement
for unanimous decisions gives each participant, notably the least viable economi-
cally, the power of veto, so factors other than economic ones determine the out-
comes.
Maximizing the total value of the carrier's total scheduled flight is a laudable
aim, but how can such values be determined? The basic planning decisions involve
fleet schedules, not flights. Moreover, even if precise values could be imputed,
airlines would probably not be willing to divulge them.
Time-differentialed landing fees seem to be an attractive alternative (Carlin
and Park, 1970). They have been used by the British Airports Authority and were
applied, in limited form, by the Port Authority of New York beginning in 1968 to
relieve congestion by discouraging smaller aircraft. Unfortunately it is impossible
in practice to set such fees correctly: if prices are too low, excess demand
results and the problem remains; if prices are too high, excess supply results and
the airport is under utilized, contrary to the public welfare. If some prices are too
high and others too low, both conditions obtain. It should be feasible to
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incorporate sufficiently modest time-differentiated fees to avoid causing under-
utilization, and then rely on another, competitive mechanism for solving the alloca-
tion problem.
Competitive allocation schemes connote auctions and/or market mechanisms.
If auctions, what type should they be? If markets, how are trades to be effected?
There are a host of specialized auction rules, each apparently tailored to the
needs and institutional environment of the industry where they are used (Cassady,
1967). The English auction begins with low bids to buy and goes up, the last
(highest) bidder winning. The Dutch auction begins with high offers to sell and
goes down, the first bidder winning. Should bids be open (e.g., oral) or sealed?
How should many homogeneous goods (40 slots per hour at Washington National) be
auctioned as versus one specified item (e.g .. a painting)? For example, it has been
suggested by Vickrey (1972) that for the problem of a flight overbooked with
passengers, each passenger should indicate on a sealed "bid" that amount of
money he or she would be willing to accept for not flying; the passengers making
the highest bids would be given seats, the remainder would receive compensation
equal to the price on the highest rejected bid. This is a competitive sealed-bid
auction in that all bids are filled at one price. Should the auction be discrimina-
tory sealed-bid, with bids filled at the different full-bid prices? In an exchange
market, should offers to buy and offers to sell be anonymous? Should direct nego-
tiation be allowed between participants?
To define the terms of the discussion assume that each airline has a utility
function and that given a set of prices each airline buys and/or sells slots to max-
imize its utility subject to its budgetary constraints. Let us call these "optimal
individual plans". A competitive equiiibTium solution is a set of prices and a set
of corresponding optimal individual plans which are together feasible, that is, at
which demand does not exceed the available of supply slots. A competitive equili-
brium is "efficient" if there is no other solution whose utility is at least as great
for all participants and strictly greater for at least one; that is, there is no solu-
tion that dominates in the sense that each airline is at least as well off according
to its own evaluation and ~t least one is better off. The central problem is to eli-
cit a set of equilibrium prices.
The difficulty with almost all auction mechanisms is that they ignore the
interdependency problem. Acquiring one slot is of no use alone, since it takes at
least two slots to link a pair of congested airports. One way to overcome this is a
"first-choice" auction. In barest terms, it proceeds as follows: at any stage, an
ordinary auction is held (say, of the English variety) with the winner having the
right to choose any slot at any airport which is still available. The interdepen-
dency problem appears to be in part accommodated: the bidders can acquire in
sequence the slots necessary to complete flights and fleet schedules. The solution
is freely competitive, but it is not efficient. Moreover, the prices paid by bidders
for slots in the same hour at the same airport may differ widely, and so do not con-
stitute a set of nondiscriminatory equilibrium prices. In addition it is difficult to
imagine the industry agreeing to pay significantly different prices for what it con-
siders an identical good.
A direct approach, similar to that suggested by Vickrey (1972) for resolving
overbooking problems, was proposed for slot allocation by Grether et ai. Each
airline interested in acquiring slots in some particular "market", for example the
5-6 p.m. period at Washington National, makes sealed bids for each of the slots it
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desires, perhaps at different prices. The sealed bids are collected, and the 40
highest bids are awarded the 40 available slots at the price of the lowest of those
40 bids. In general, in a market with an hourly quota of q, the q highest bids win
at the price of the lowest of the q bids. If the total number of bids is lower than
q, then all are awarded at no cost (there is excess supply in the market). This
"one-time" auction is, in many ways, a reasonable approach. However, it fails to
take into account the institutional problem faced by the industry.
Assume, for the purposes of concrete discussion, that the following situation
obtains: 4 congested airports have hourly quotas which are in force for certain
hours of the day. This means there are some 40 slot-markets. Either the many
auctions operate simultaneously or they operate sequentially.
Suppose that the auctions are conducted simultaneously. Then each of the
participating airlines must place values on each of the slots it desires over the
entire network and at all times. What strategy should an airline follow? Suppose
an airline knows what slots it wishes and knows the values it attaches to flights.
How should the airline allocate the values it has on flights to the prices it bids
for slots desired to realize those fligh ts? For a fligh t needing only one slot, there
is no difficulty. But for a flight needing two slots (or more) there are many ways
in which the airline could distribute the value over the two (or more) slots. What
it should bid depends entirely upon the total demand pressure in each of the
markets. The "one-time" auction provides no information concerning this pres-
sure since the airlines are obliged to bid "in the dark". The intertemporal and
network dependencies so crucial to the industry's environment are unaccounted
for. Nothing remotely resembling an efficient economic equilibrium is likely to be
produced: the bids can only be pure guesses.
Suppose, then, that the auctions are conducted sequentially. Then, the first
auction, say 7:00-8:00 a.m. at Washington National, is carried out "in the dark";
the second, say 8:00-9:00 a.m. at Washington National, is carried out with the out-
come of the first known; ... the last, say 10:00-11:00 p.m. at Chicago O'Hare, is car-
ried out with the outcomes of all the prior auctions known. The strategy of each
participant may be increasingly clarified; but early mistakes cannot be recouped,
and the later bids, and so outcomes, must depend upon the earlier results. As is
well known to auctioneers, and to readers of the auction literature, " ... both the
allocations determined by auctions and the final vector of prices associated with
these allocations are very sensitive to the sequence in which the goods are
brought up for sale" (Schotter, 1976). Thus, beginning with Washington National
and going on to Chicago O'Hare may yield very different results than vice versa;
beginning with the morning hours and going on to the afternoon hours may give dif-
ferent prices and allocations than beginning with the afternoon periods and
proceeding to the earlier hours of the day. Economically efficient allocations can-
not be expected to result from sequential auctions either. Moreover, sequential
auctions may invite the bidders to make threats concerning future bids that can
lock them into inefficient strategies and uneconomic outcomes. Numerical exam-
ples can be constructed to show "prisoner's dilemma" phenomena in which no air-
line can adopt a more rational behavior alone because doing so would only worsen
its situation. Declared threats could be outlawed as a rule of procedure, yet the
fact of such possibilities points to an additional weakness.
In either casc - simultaneous or sequential - inefficient allocations can
result. In order to rectify this possibility and to facilitate the coordination of
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slots to meet the needs of flights. Grether et ai. (1979) proposed an aftermarket.
The potential unbalanced endowments of slots resulting from the initial "one-Lime"
auctions would be corrected in an aftermarket of the NASDAQ. "open-book" type
where carriers could sell or buy slots. These markets can, indeed. be expected to
converge to competitive equilibrium prices: but competitive prices and trades
which occur are directly dependent upon the initial endowments which the
traders bring with them. and these initial endowments are the result of the previ-
ous rounds of auctions.
The one-time auction mechanism. in which airlines bid totally unaware of the
demand pressures in one or another market. can lead to almost any outcome. The
aftermarket produces a competitive equilibrium based upon the initial slot alloca-
tion. What of the joint outcome? It will not. in general, be an efficient competitive
equilibrium. The outcomes of the auctions may so distort initial distributions that
the aftermarkets are unable to achieve competitive equilibria efficient for the
final allocation of slots. An example demonstrating how this may OCCllr is given in
the Appendix. The difficulty is that in the auction process each airline bids
prices on slots whose totals equal (or approximate) the values of the correspond-
ing flights it wishes to schedule. but, being ignorant of the remaining airline's
demands and bids. it receives only some of the necessary slots. It - and the other
airlines - enter the aftermarket to acquire needed slots and dispose of slots for
which the prices of the mates they would need to complete a flight are too high
(the total value of the flight would be surpassed). Economic self-interest results
in some trades. but not in sufficient trades to drive out certain flights that should
not belong to a competitive. efficient solution. The prices and allocations of the
initial auction inhibit the aftermarket from producing an efficient solution.
4 Repeated Auctions
Instead of a "one-time" auction consider a "repeated" auction. The idea is to
permit airlines to iteratively learn of the demand pressures that exist in each slot
market and so to enable them to develop informed and rational strategies in view
of the demands and the interdependencies; and to obtain auction allocations that
are at least close to efficient competitive equilibria. The auction is followed by an
aftermarket designed not only to permit trading in slots throughout the period of
6 months in which options are valid. but also to permit the minor marginal adjust-
ments that may be necessary to improve the initial allocation reached by the
repeated auction.
Each airline comes to the initial round of the repeated auction with its
desired schedules in hand and some appreciation for the total expenditure (the
"value") it is prepared to make to realize a flight or scheduling cycle. Each air-
line is requested to prepare sealed bids for the slots that it requires. This means
that for each hour at each congested airport - at each "trading post" - it
prepares bids for those slots it desires. These first bids are made "in the dark"
just as in the "one-time" auction. The airlines should bid any prices for slots real-
izing a flight whose totals do not surpass the value it attaches to the flight. The
individual demand curve of an airline is as given on the left of Figure 10.1. Accu-
mulating the individual demands yields the aggregate demand of the carriers at
each post. A typical aggregate demand curve is given on the right of Figure 10.1.
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Either the total demand is less than the quota of that trading post (as on the
left of Figure 10.2) or the total demand is at least as great as the quota (as on the
right of Figure 10.2). The dotted line in effect represents the supply curve, so
the trading post price should be determined by where demand and supply inter-
sect. In the case of excess supply (Figure 10.2 left) the price should be 0; in the
case of excess demand (Figure 10.2 right) the price should lie in the interval
between the price of the qth highest bid and the (q +l)th highest bid. It may be
that an aggregate demand curve is as shown in Figure 10.3, where there are
several bids at the trading-post price.
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At this point the auction administrator reveals to all airlines the aggregate
demand at each of the trading posts. Each of the airlines who made bids at or
above the trading post price p (which makes supply equal to demand) is condi-
tionally awarded those slots, and each of those having made bids lower than p is
not. In the case of Figure 10.3. where more than one bid is made at the trading
post price p but the quota is such that not all bids at that price or higher can be
awarded, then some random allocation among those bidding p is made. If this were
the final auction, then each airline winning a slot at a trading post would actually
pay the price p at that post.
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If the conditional allocations and prices are agreeable to all airlines then an
efficient. competitive equilibrium allocation has been found. Typically - and cer-
tainly after the first round of bidding - many airlines will be dissatisfied with the
conditional solution. The results of the first round are precisely equivalent to
what is produced by the "one-time" auction and so its defects are known.
This is why the administrator announces conditional allocations and trading
post prices, and the current expression of total demand at each trading post. The
first round gives each bidder information concerning the demand pressures that
exist at each trading post. On the basis of these. and of their individual needs,
each airline prepares new bids in a second round of the auction. The administra-
tor accumulates the sealed, secret individual bids, and by the same procedure.
announces new conditional allocations. trading prices and total demands. If, at
any step, no airline announces the wish to change its bid, then the process ter-
minates. Since it is unrealistic to assume that convergence so perfect will obtain,
other stopping rules may need to be invoked (see below).
The outcome of the slot exchange auction is that each airline is endowed with
the ownership of a collection of slot options. Typically, the auction procedure
would not result in a perfect equilibrium: some airlines would wish to acquire
several slots, some to dispose of several. And, as the six-month period of vested
rights elapses. the desire to acquire more slots or to dispose of more, could
develop. Therefore, a NASDAQ "open-book" aftermarket would be maintained con-
tinuously until the expiration of the six-month period. An airline would be free to
offer slots for sale at stated prices or to bid to purchase slots at stated prices at
each of the trading posts at any time. Each trading post would have a total
demand D and total supply S which could be in anyone of the four different quali-
tative forms shown in Figure 10.4. In case (d) the offers to sell are all at prices
above the offers to buy, so no exchanges would take place. Otherwise. in cases
(a). (b) and (c), q* slots are bought and sold at some trading post price p* that
lies between PD * and Ps*, Ps* ~ P* ~ PD *. In these cases all sellers who
announce a price higher than P* would sell nothing. All buyers who quoted a lower
price would buy nothing. If there was excess demand at P* case (a) with, say,
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P* =PD* =Ps* or excess supply at P* case (b) with, say, P* =Ps* =PD*
then, those who bid P would be rationed randomly.
Price (a)o Price o
(b)
o
No. of slots
o
I
w=4,---Q_*__...
No. of slots
P*
o
P*s
P* P*0 0
P* P*s s
0
No. of slots No. of slots
Price (c) Price (d)
0
S
Figure lOA
The repeated auction and aftermarket embody precisely the same economic
mechanism: the law of supply and demand determines the equilibrium solutions in
both cases. Thus, the same arguments sustain the relevance of both mechanisms.
In fact, there is little controversy over the open-book NASDAQ-type slot
exchange: this is a well practiced form of market.
Partial theoretical justifieation for repeated auctions may be based on a
paper of Dubey (1982), which considers a Walrasian exchange economy with a fin-
ite number of traders and of commodities, with traders making contingent state-
ments about the quantities they are prepared to buy or sell at different prices.
He shows, under very general conditions, that the competitive equilibria are effi-
cient and at the same time are strong Nash or noncooperative equilibria. A "Nash"
or "noncooperative" equilibrium means that no airline acting alone could improve
its position by changing its bid. A "strong" Nash equilibrium means that no cabal
of airlines acting in concert could improve their positions by changing their bids,
in the sense that at least one airline is better off and none are worse off. This
implies that t.here would be no inducement for one or several airlines to posture.
Dubey's model explicitly includes the interdependency of the commodities,
t.hat is, of the slots at different trading post.s. It does, however, make several
assumptions that. are not strictly met by the slot allocation problem. The marginal
values of commodities are assumed to be non-increasing. This may be reasonable
for slots, except. for the tempt.ation of cornering a market as more are acquired.
The commodities are assumed to be divisible. Slots are not: however, there are
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sufficient numbers of them (e.g., 40) to justify the use of the results. The model is
of an exchange economy so the initial "owners" of the slots - the airports or the
FAA - should be considered as strategic players: setting an hourly quota q is
equivalent to announcing a supply curve that offers up to q slots at price 0 but no
more at any price. However, the repeated auction mechanism does not allow the
airports to participate in the trading by announcing supply curves. The pro-
cedure itself is, of course, easily modified to include the airports as bidders. Air-
ports would announce non-decreasing supply curves (such as in Figure 10.4) and
thus adopt supply strategies, somewhat relaxing the absolutely fixed nature of
the quota limitations by introducing extra slots at higher prices. This could serve
to answer the airlines frequently voiced wish for the quotas to be increased. The
difficulty is that strategic behavior - maximizing airport revenues - could be
inimical to the public welfare, although that would depend upon many other fac-
tors.
The repeated auction is a tatonnement process: the idea is to try solutions
and have participants react by bidding higher for slots that are desired but so far
denied and to drop from bidding for slots that are too dear. There can be no
mathematical guarantee that this process will converge: examples prove that in
some cases it will not. However, experimental work of Vernon Smith (1976) and
others shows that, in many open-market bidding situations, remarkably fast con-
vergence to a competitive equilibrium is obtained. This typically happens in the
presence of very little information. "The experimental facts are that no double
auction trader needs to know anything about the valuation conditions of other
traders, or have any understanding or knowledge of market supply and demand
conditions, or have any trading experience (although experience may speed con-
vergence) ... " (Smith, 1976). Smith's laboratory experiments concern very simple
trading situations. The repeated slot auctions are considerably more complex, and
there have been to date no experiments that adequately treat the possibility of
interdependence in the goods that are traded. However, the repeated auctions
build information concerning the values others put on goods and cumulatively
reveal the total demand pressures at the various trading posts. One would expect
that prices and allocations would begin to settle down over successive outcomes
with changes occurring only at the margins. However, the indivisible nature of
slots could well cause the prices of certain ones to be chased up to the point that
many bidders would drop out together, only to bid up other prices. Such a cyclic
phenomenon. due to the indivisibility of the commodity, could warrant the intro-
duction of "threshold" prices or "entrance fees". Other candidates for rules to
induce convergence are to stop auctioning when prices change by little, or when
allocations change by little, or when only a few of the bidders wish to change their
bids. In any case the threat of no further auctions after several rounds should
always be present to prevent posturing or other disruptive behavior. It could also
be useful to charge bidders for the privilege of changing their bids.
While a carefully designed experiment using auctions to obtain an initial slot
allocation remains to be performed, the procedure has been tested for managea-
bility and convenience in an institutional setting (Balinski and Sand, 1980;
Bechhofer, 1980). The test was conducted for the FAA over the course of one
week with airline representatives as players, using an airline management game
(Elias, 1979), which provided a quasi-realistic environment for the participants.
Slot values were established in terms of the short-term profitability of airline
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operations with a fixed fleet of aircraft and simulated markets defined in terms of
seat-mile capacity, schedule convenience and frequency, and a generalized
passenger demand function. Five "airline teams" competed for market shares in
the game.
The results were far from conclusive for several reasons. First, the game was
complicated and required a significant effort to learn. Within the time con-
straints, it was not possible to fully distinguish between learning effects and the
convergence of the auction procedure. Second, there were no controls in the
experimental design. Third, the two repeated auctions were terminated after
three rounds of bidding in each, in spite of the obvious need for further rounds,
as seen from the volatile price movements. However, the experiment did show that
airlines could use the repeated auction procedure to obtain a reasonable initial
slot allocation. Most of the slots which the "airlines" required for flight schedul-
ing were in fact obtained, and at prices which diminished but did not destroy pro-
fits. In both auctions there was a remarkable degree of convergence in alloca-
tions: the third rounds produced almost the same allocations as the second
rounds, despite considerable price variability. Moreover, the second auction -
which concerned the same simulated problem - showed significantly better con-
vergence than the first. Learning clearly made for considerable improvement.
Some of this may be due to the fact that the participants could easily guess that
the third round would be the last, and so would wish to assure their "current"
positions. It is fair to conclude that the experiment contributed to showing the
practical interest of repeated auctions but at the same time confirmed the need
for further trials and study.
5 Criticisms
The criticisms leveled at repeated auctions by industry representatives and
others seem to fall into four major headings: what to do with the proceeds. how to
implement the auctions in practice, how to obtain convergence, and how equitable
they are to small as opposed to large airlines.
The predominant worry had to do with the monies generated. As one
observer of the experiment remarked, "Several representatives of the airports
attended the experiments, and their presence compounded the scheduler's fears.
The airport men watched eagerly as total revenues from slots climbed higher and
higher" (Bechhofer, 1980). This is a question inherent in any pricing system, not
to auctions alone, which raises economic and political issues as to who controls the
funds and for what purpose. While this issue is beyond the scope of our study, it
may well be that any pricing system for the allocation of slots will founder on this
point.
The fear that small carriers may not be treated equitably is founded on the
idea that the large carriers' financial might could lock them out of any slots. This
seems to be something of a red herring since it is an issue in any market whatso-
ever. Moreover, the behavior of scheduling committees seems to indicate that the
large airlines have bowed to the few demands for slots made by the small to avoid
trouble.
Time was the next major worry. Preparing bids in successive rounds in
response to information gleaned in previous rounds was difficult even in the
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simplified experimental setting. Computerized communications to facilitate the
physical realization of auctions would help, but one would have to count on learn-
ing and experience to eventually allow bidders to respond relatively quickly.
Further testing would clearly be necessary.
The time needed to converge to a "near" equilibrium solution is a practical as
well as a theoretical issue. The practical evidence in many other domains
encourages a faith in convergence despite the existence of theoretical examples
that shows it does not necessarily obtain. Further testing of different stopping
rules and devices that promote convergence is needed.
Appendix. Example or an inefficient outcome with "one-time" auction and
aftermarket.
There are five airlines (A, B, C. D and E) and one congested airport. The
quota of the airport is 4 slots. Each airline wishes to route flights through the
airport at particular times of the day, first landing then taking off. Each airline
knows the "value" of each flight, which represents the total dollar amount it is
willing to pay to acquire the necessary slots. The data of the problem are as fol-
lows. The notation X indicates the slots needed to realize the flights in question.
--------------_.----_._-----
Time (a.m.)
.- ------------------------ --_.-
Airline Flight Value 9-10 10-11 11-12
------------------~-
A Ai 305 X X
A2 305 X X
B B1 320 XX
B2 305 X X
B3 295 X X
C C1 302 XX
C2 320 XX
C3 300 X X
D Di 300 X X
D2 305 X X
E E1 324 XX
----
C2, for example, is to land and take-off in the 10-11 a.m. period; D2 to land in the
same period and take off in the 11-12 a.m. period.
Suppose that the (simultaneous) "one-time" bidding is as shown in the next
table.
Then, the price in the first period (9-10 a.m.) is $157, in the second period
$145, and in the third period is $162. The winners of slots are starred (*). Thus,
A wins one slot in the first period, and one in the third; B wins two in the first and
two in the second; C wins two in the second and one in the third; D wins one in the
first and one in the third; and E wins one in the third period. The initial endow-
ments are unbalanced. Most flights cannot be realized.
Consider A. It paid $1~7 for one slot at 9a.m. for Ai, and so is prepared to
pay at most $305-$157 =$148 for a slot at 10 am. B paid $145 for a slot at 10 a.m.
Auctioning La.nd.ing Rights a.t Congested. Airports 191
'I'ime (a.m.)
Airline Flight Value 9-10 10-11- 11--12
A A1 305 $170* $135
A2 305 $140 $165*
B B1 320 $160* ,$160*
B2 305 $150 $155*
B3 295 $145* $150
C Cl 302 $151,$151
C2 320 $160* ,$160*
C3 300 $136 $164*
D D1 300 $157* $143
D2 305 $135 $170*
E E1 324 $162* ,$162
needs a slot at 11 a.m. to accommodate its flight 83, but notes the price, $162, is
too high since $162 + $145 =$307, which is more than its value. So, 8 is willing to
sell one of its second-period slots for at least $145. B, therefore, sells one of
these slots to A at some price between $145 and $148, say $146.50. Similarly, B is
willing to offer up to $160 for a first-period slot and D to sell a first-period slot
for at least $157. So B purchases such a slot from D for, say, $158.50. Similarly E
purchases a third-period slot from A at $162.
At this point, A has acquired the slots for Ai; 8 has acquired the slots for Bl
and fl2; C has acquired the slots for C2; and E has acquired the slots for El. C and
D each hold one 11-12 a.m. slot. No airline is willing to make any departures from
its present holdings: the solution is a Nash equilibrium.
However, the solution is inefficient. C and D cannot use t)1eir slots since
they do not possess the c<;Jrresponding slots necessary to complete the flights.
The markets for first- and second-period are saturated, but the third period has
only 2 fligh ts, not the quota of 4, The total "value" of the 5 realized fligh ts in
$1574. The total paid at the auctions is $1832.
Therc does exist an efficient, competitive equilibrium determined by the fol-
lowing prices: $151 in the 9 a.m. market; $155 in the 10 a.m. market; and $150 in
the 11 a.m. market. At these prices, A obtains the slots for A2: B obtains the slots
for Bl; C obtains the slots for Cl and C2; D obtains the slots for D2; and E obtains
the slots for El. No other flight is economically viable. The quota of each period
is saturated. The total value of the 6 realized flights is $1874. The total sum paid
at the prices named is $1024.
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CHAPTER 11
COST Al.LOCATION IN MULTIPURPOSE
RF:Sf1:RVOJR DEVELOPME:NT:
THE: JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
Nona Okada
1 Introduction
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It was not until 1953 that an official cost allocation procedure was esta-
blished for multipurpose reservoir development in Japan. In that year the Energy
Power Development Promotion Act was passed and the so-called alternative justifi-
able expenditure (AJE) method was officially adopted as the procedure for allocat-
ing costs. An increasing number of multipurpose reservoir developments, involving
principally three sectors - power, river management (chiefly flood control) and
irrigation - demanded a new law specific to this type of water resources develop-
ment. In 1957 the Specified Multipurpose Reservoir Development Act was enacted,
which authorized the Ministry of Construction exclusively to plan, implement and
maintain particular types of multipurpose reservoir developments. "Dam utiliza-
tion rights" were established under which users were regarded as "tenants" of a
dam and were entitled to "utilize" the dam instead of "owning" the facility. The
1957 Act carried forward the AJE method as the official cost allocation procedure.
In the early 1960s a remarkable upsurge in the economy caused domestic and
industr'ial water demands to pick up sharply. This economic growth was accom-
panied by accelerated urbanization, which was gradually encroaching on flood-
plains and exposing residents to flood damage. All of this meant an ever-growing
demand for multipurpose reservoir developments, including flood control,
hydroelectric power, and increased industrial and municipal water supplies.
In practice the AJE method was found not to be appropriate in many of these
cases. Typically the AJE method tended to favor the power sector, in that its jus-
tifiable cost (I.e., the alternative cost of supply) was assumed to be low (meaning
that it was allocated a relatively small share of the joint costs), whereas its inclu-
sion in the development often caused total costs to increase sharply, which then
had to be borne in part by the other water-using sectors. This treatment was
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considered unfair by the others, and led to its abandonment in favor of the so-
called separable costs remaining benefits (SCRB) method, which we describe in
detail below. This method is still in use in Japan for most multipurpose reservoir
developments, and has proved to be fairly viable - despite various inconsistencies
and the ad hoc definitions it employs (for a detailed critique of the SCRB method
see Young et al., 1982).
Our purpose is to show, through a detailed example, how the SCRB method is
actually applied in Japan. We conclude with a discussion of some of the methodo-
logical complications encountered in allocating the costs of a multipurpose reser-
voir.
2 Case study: The Sameura Dam Development
The Sameura Dam is on the Yoshino River, one of the major rivers in Japan,
which originates in the western part of the Shikoku mountain range and runs from
East to West through Shikoku Island. It then flows eastward as far as the border
between Kochi and Tokushima prefectures, then turns northward to meet the
mountain range, and runs eastward again before it flows into the sea at Tokushima
City, some 200km from its origin (see Figure 11.1). The Yoshino basin has an area
of 3,750 km2 (some 20 percent of the total area of the island) and covers parts of
four prefectures: Koehl, Tokushima, Kagawa, and Ehime.
The Sameura Dam Development Project was started in 1963 and completed in
1970. It is a multipurpose reservoir project involving river management (flood con-
trol and minimum streamflow maintenance), irrigation, domestic and industrial
water supplies, and hydroelectric power. A significant complication is that the
users are distributed over four prefectures, which have substantially different
interests in the project. Tokushima prefecture, which is located downstream and
covers more than half of the basin area, looked for flood control as well as the
development of water supplies for irrigators and cities. Tokushima City, the scat
of the prefecture, had planned a large-scale industrial development and therefore
needed increased water supplies. It had, however, been reluctant to allow the
other prefectures to gain access to the water of the Yoshino River. Kochi prefec-
ture, south of the mountain range, was eager to develop water for power, indus-
trial and domestic uses, and claimed a special position as the prefecture command-
ing the river source. Ehimc and Kagawa prefectures had suffered water shortages
over a long period and were therefore interested in gaining access to the Yoshino
River for industrial and domestic water supplies, power, and irrigation.
As the four prefectures began discussing the possible allocation of the pro-
ject costs, it became clear that the mechanical application of the AJE method gave
unsatisfactory results. Various proposals were developed and tested by the Minis-
try of Construction with regard to the requirements and claims from the prefec-
tures. After much wrangling - including threats of withdrawal from the project -
an alternative allocation method, combined partially with the SCRB method,
emerged as a compromise solution. This marked the turning point in Japanese cost
allocation practices in multipurpose reservoir development; since then the SCRB
has been used exclusively in this field.
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3 The SCRB Cost Allocation Procedure
The Specified Multipurpose Reservoir Development Act (as amended in 1967)
provides that the SCRB method be employed in the allocation of costs of any mul-
tipurpose reservoir development covered by the Act - with the exception that in
any case in which the straightforward application of the SCRB is found "unjustifi-
able" the so-called priority expenditure method (PEM) or some other (unspecified)
method be employed. In fact the PEM method has rarely been used and the SCRB
method is applied to almost all multipurpose reservoir developments.!
The SCRB method employs essentially four clements:
(1) "Direct" costs directly attributable to each specific use.
(2) The "individual" costs of providing each use by some ot.her means.
(3) "Benefits" accruing from each use.
(4) The "separable" or "incremental" costs of including each use in the pro-
ject last.
The calculation of each of these items proceeds by a definite method prescribed
by the Act, and the terms are combined to give the allocation of costs. To illus-
trate how such a method works in practice, we will show how these prescriptions
apply to the specific case of the Sameura Dam project.
3.1 Storage Allocation Design
The Act provides that the storage allocation design precede the cost alloca-
tion for multipurpose reservoir development. The storage allocation design phy:,;i-
cally assigns the storage capacity to different uses. This work is based on the
hydrological and geophysical conditions of the construction site and on the amount
of water claimed by each use (see Figure 11.2).
A distinction is made between flood and non-flood time. This means simply
that the usable capacity of the reservoir is different during flood time and non-
flood time. No specific assignment of storage is made to the power sector: it i:,;
assumed to share storage with the rest of the uses since its use of water is non-
consumptive.
It is assumed in Figure 11.2 that out of a total of 85 million m3 in flood time,
41.49 million m3 is assigned to municipal (domestic) water supply, 5.26 million m3 to
industrial water supply, and 38.25 million m3 to minimum streamflow maintenance.
On top of this, 35 million m3 of storage is reserved for accommodating the peak
flow of a flood. During non-flood time the operation of the reservoir is adjusted to
that of the increment of 35 million m3 , of which 17.085 million m3 is allocated to
municipal water supply, 2.165 million m3 to industrial water supply and 15.75 mil-
lion m3 to minimum streamflow maintenance. Thus, the total storage amounts to 130
million m3 , including 10 million m3 dead storage.
Next a storage cost curve is estimated as in Fipure 1.1.3. This ser'ves as the
basis for calculating the various co:,;t components of the SCRB method.
~1.2 Direct and Alternative Costs
Only the power sector needs direct facilities attached to the reservoir in the
form of generating and distribution equipment. These direct costs are calculaled
for the Sameura Project as DC(P) = 3.911 billion yen.
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35.0 Flood-time regulated storage Non·flood·time
water supply and
river management Net Gross
total total
Flood·time water supply and 120.0 storage storage
river management storage
120.0 130.0
Minimum
streamflow
85.0 maintenance
Minimum streamflow 54.0
maintenance
38.250 Municipal
water supply
'[
Municipal water supply 58.575
41.490
Industrial
Industrial water supply water supply
5.26 7.425
10.0 Dead storage
(unit: million m3)
Figure 11.2
As defined by the Act, the individual alternative cost for a particular use is
the estimated cost of an alternative facility offering the same level of service as
that provided by the joint facility. The location of the alternative facility is not
necessarily limited to the site where the joint faciE ty is to be constructed. Com-
mon practices show, however, that the site is usually presumed to be the same. It
is also true that the alternative facility is, in practice, assumed to be identical to
a dam designed exclusively for the particular use.
The estimation of individual costs utilizes the "storage cost curve" of Figure
11.3 which is obtained by plotting the cost of constructing a reservoir, be it
sinple- or multipurpose, against different designs. Based on the storage cost
curve estimated for our example, individual costs for the different uses are calcu-
lated as follows:
(1) River Management. The storage needed: SR = 35.000 (for flood con-
trol) + 38.250 (for minimum streamflow maintenance) + 10.000 (for dead
storage) = 83.250 million m3 . The individual cost: C(R) = 12.600 billion
yen.
(2) Municipal Water Supply. The storage needed: SM = 58.575 (for sup-
ply) + 10.000 (for dead storage) = 68.575 million m3 . The individual
cost: C(M) = 11.300 billion yen.
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(3) Industrial Water Supply. The storage needed: SI ::: 7.425 (for supply)
+ 5.000 (for dead storage) ::: 12.425 million m3 . The individual cost: C(1)
=2.500 billion yen.
(4) Fbwer. Since the individual cost of power is generally far greater than
its benefit (to be calculated later), its estimation is omitted. (The claim
that power's benefits generally exceed its alternative costs is rat.her a
crucial and tricky point which favors the power sector, but may not
always hold, as we shall see later.)
3.3 Benefits
The incorporation of benefit terms as distinct from individual opportunity
costs differentiates the SeRB method from the previous methods such as the AJE.
It is defined by law that the benefit from a particuli'lr usc. u, is to be calculated
by the following formula:
U11. -011.
B ::: ----'=-----=:...
11. /11.
where U11. represents the estimated annual benefit (in money terms), 011. is the
estimated annual cost of operation and maintenance, and /11. lS the capital
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recovery factor. By definition the estimated annual utility Vu is the worth of the
services, measured in monetary terms, which the joint project is designed to pro-
vide for a particular use, u. If there are direct facilities that exclusively serve a
particular use, the worth of these facilities must also be included in the utility of
the particular use. The estimated annual operation and maintenance costs for a
particular use, 0u. merely refer to that portion of the costs of operating, main-
taininp, and repairing (OMR) those clements of the joint facility associated with a
particular use.
Note that OMR costs appear in the benefit terms and not in the cost terms.
The implication is that the cost terms merely concern the costs of implementing
fixed costs of the project and that the annual OMR costs that corne out after pro-
ject implementation are treated as benefits. According to law the annual OMR
costs refer to those clements of the joint facility associated with a particular use.
The difficulties with isolating those elements from the entire joint facility are sup-
posed to be overcome by simply allocating the joint OMR costs to uses in propor-
tion to the share of the joint project costs assigned to the respective uses.
This, however, involves a circular definition: the calculus of OMR costs requires
the knowledge of the share of the joi:".t project costs assigned to the respective
uses, which in turn is what is needed as input. This adds to the difficulty and
inconsistency in brin(!inp, benefits directly into the mechanism of cost allocation
as the SeRB method attempts to do.
The capital recovery factors f u prescribed by law arc listed in Table 11.1.
Differences in the value of f u for different uses reflect the differences in the
interest rates available, durability (physical depreciation), property tax rates,
etc.
Table 11.1 Different discount factors adopted for the SCRB procedure.
Use
Flood control
Irrigation
Type A*
Power Type B*
Type C*
Interest
rate r u
0.045
0.055
0.08
0.07
Du rabi l i ty
(tifetime)
80 years
45 years
45 (0.1H
45 (O.lH
Property
tax rate
0.014
0.017
Capital
recovery
factor f u
0.0464
0.0604
0.0932
0.0785
* Type A - n'ne major private power enterprises; type B - the Dengenkaihatsu Co. Ltd.
(a semi-governmental power development enterprise); type C - public power develop-
ment enterprises.
t The figures in parentheses show the leftover rate.
The interest rate for construction investment, r u' is introduced only when
interest is to be paid out over the construction period for the accumulated invest-
ments related to a given use, u. Law prescribes that in this case the benefit of
this use be discounted by this interest; that is, the benefit formula is modified:
The empirical fOl'mula for determining the value of r u for power P is
rp = 0.4 ipT for i p = 0.08 or 0.07
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where i p is the interest rate used to obtain the capital recovery factor for power,
and T is the construction period in years.
Another empirical formula is prescribed for use by irrigation. Letting A
stand for irrigation, r A =0.25 x 0.42 i u T, wher'e i u =0.065, and 0.25 is a factor
representing the average share of the farming sector of the costs of an irrigation
project; the rest is borne partly by the local governments and partly by the Min-
istry of Agriculture.
The interest rate for construction investment is not taken into account for
flood control, because such works are considered to be entirely of a public
nature.
Municipal and industr'ial water supplies also do not rely on an interest rate.
According to law, the benefit of a water supply, whether industrial or municipal, is
assumed to be identical to its individual cost. Accordingly, the benefit of a water
supply can be estimated with no regard to capital recovery or interest factor for
construction investment.
This completes the development of formulas for estimating the benefits of
different uses. Based on these, the benefits are computed as follows:
1. River Management (R).
(a) Flood Control. The annual utility: URF = expected annual savings from
decreased damages = 0.7~8 billion yen. The annual OMR costs, 0RF =
0.016 billion yen. The benefit BRF = (0.758 - 0.016) /0.0464 = 15.991
billion yen.
(b) Minimum Streamflow Maintenance. The benefit DRS = its alternative
cost = 4.023 billion ycn.
It is simply postulated that the benefit of minimum streamflow maintenance is
identical to its alternative cost, i.e. the individual cost for that particular
purpose only. Combining (a) and (b), the benefit of river management, B(R),
is calculated to be 20.014 billion y,en.
2. Industrial and Municipal Water Supply (1M). A joint alternative facility (a
dam) is assumed for both industrial and municipal water supplies (this
assumption is notably inconsistent with the former assumption that an alter-
native joint facility be contemplated only by all uses except for a particular
use). The storage needed for the two used together is calculated as 58.575
(for municipal water supply) + 7.425 (for industrial water supply) + 10.000
(for dead storage) = 76.000 million m3 . Based on the storage cost curve (see
Figure 11.3) the alternative cost for the two joint uses is identified as 12.000
billion yen.
It is specifically prescribed by law that in the above case the joint
alternative cost be divided as follows to obtain the individual benefits. The
1
benefit of municipal water supply is obtained as B(M) = 12.000 x "'- (dcmand
3
share ratio + storage share ratio + individual cost ratio)
= 12.000 x 1..[ 14.2 + 58.575 + 11.300 1= JO.::mo billion en
3 16.0 66.000 13.800 I Y
)
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In a similar manner, the benefit of industrial water supply, B(l), is
obtained as:
B(1) =12.000 x 1.- r-.1:.JL + 71125 + 2.5000 ] =1 620 b'll'
3 l16.0 66.000 13.8000 .' 1 10n yen
This implies that the joint benefit is divided in proportion to the average
over the three ratios, i.e., demand share, storage share, and individual costs.
This is another example of an ad hoc assumption whose justification is
highly debatable; it also contradicts the former assumption that the benefit
of a water supply, either industrial or municipaL eqllals its individual cost.
There seems to be no particular reason why estimates of the benefits of
water supply should differ case by case. It amounts to an ad hoc manipula-
tion to make the allocation more favorable for the water supply sector.
3. Power (P). The law prescribes that the annual utility of power generation,
Up, be estimated by the formula: Up =effective kW x kW price + effective
kWh x kWh price. In our example:
Up =12.'134 kW xl0,658 yen/kW +59,213,OOOkWh x4.84 yen/kWh
=0.419 billion yen
The first term refers to the utility of power plant capacity; and the second
to the utility of plant operation.
The annual operating and maintenance costs for power, Op, arc calcu-
lated to be 0.049 billion yen. Accordingly, the benefit of power is estimated
as:
Bp =(0.419 - 0.049) / [0.0785 x (1 + 0.4 x 0.07 x 3)]
=4.3~3 billion yen
It should be observed that the interest rate for construction invest-
ment is empl.oyed to discount the benefit.
3.4 Separable rosts
It is defined by law that the separable cost is the amount that will be saved if
a particular use is eliminated from the multipurpose project. The separable cost
of a particular use, u, is calculated as follows.
(1) Specify that portion of storage which would have to be added if a particular
use enters the joint. project at the mar-gin.
(2) Deduct that amount of storage from the total storage to obtain the remaining
portion servir.[~ the rest of the uses.
(3) Identify the separable cost. with the cost corresponding to the remaining
portion of storage on the st.orage cost curve.
In our example separable costs are calculated as follows:
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(1) River Management (R). The storage needed for the rest of uses: SplM =
130.000 (gross total) - 35.000 (for flood control) - 38.250 (for minimum
streamflow maintenance) = 56.750 million m3 . The construction cost of the
joint project without river management, C(PIM) = 10.300 billion yen. The
separable cost, SC(R) =C(RPIM) -C(PIM) =20.140 -10.300 =9.840 billion yen.
(2) Municipal Water Supply (M). The storage needed for the remaining uses:
SRPI =130.000 (gross total) - 41.'190 (for municipal water supply) =88.510
million m3 . The separable cost, SC(M) = C(RPIM) - C(RPI) = 20.140 - 13.10
=7.04 billion yen.
(3) Industrial Water Supply (1). The storage needed for the rest of uses: SRPM
= 130.000 (gross total) - 5.260 (industrial water supply) = 124.740 million
m3 . The construction cost of the joint project without industrial water sup-
ply, C (RPM) 19.400 billion yen. The separable cost,
SC(l) =C(RPIM) -C(RPM) =20.140 -19.400 =0.740 billion yen.
(4) Fbwer (P). There is often some difficulty in specifying the separable cost
for power since inclusion of the power sector into the joint project as the
last participant would not necessarily require any substantial increase in
storage if the amount of storage designed for the other uses and its design
head are larger than or as large as the hydropower plant necessi.tates in gen-
erating the planned power output.
This is particularly true of our example. Nevertheless, the present procedure
adheres to bringing in the "incremental storage", which may not have a reasonable
physical implication. The pitfall is in basing the estimation only upon the storage
allocation, while disregarding the fact that power's water use is not consumption,
but mostly utilizes the kinetic energy of falling water. The legislation attempts to
overcome this difficulty by axiomatica;lly specifying the incremental storage attri-
butable to power as follows.
The amount of water, q, as defined below is regarded as the incremental
storage needed exclusively for power:
q =3,600t (q max - q mean) m3 ,
where
q max is the peak-time water discharge (m3 /s),
q mean is the average water discharge (m3 /s), and
t is the duration of peak-time (hr).
The cost of the joint project without power, C(RIM) is estimated by locating
the cost versus total storage minus q on the storagc cost curvc. The separable
cost of power, SC(P) is the difference between the cost of the joint project,
C (RPIM) and C(RIM). By applying the formula to our example, we have
q =3,600 x 6 x (10.0 -2.35) =0.170 million m3 .
The storage needed for the rest of uses is 129.83 million m3 . Accordingly, the con-
struction of the joint project without power, C (RIM) =20.116. Therefore thc
separable cost of power, SC(P) =C(RPIM) -C(RIM) =0.024 billion yen.
Cost Altocation in Multipurpose Reservoir Development 203
This completes the calculation of all the parameters needed. Application of
the SeRB formula yields the cost allocation as shown in Table 11.2.
Table 11.2 Cost allocaLion (billion yen) based on SCRB.
Use
Calculation River Municipal Industrial Power Subtotal
items management water supply water supply
----- ---------
---------~--
-----------------------
AlternaLive 12.6 11.3 2.5
cost (C)
JusLifiable 20.014 10.38 1.62 4.353
cost (ll)
Min (E,C) 12.6 10.38 1.62 4.353
DirecL cost (DC) 0 0 0 3.911
Min (B,C)-DC 12.6 10.38 0 0.442
Separable 9.84 7.04 0.74 0.024 17.644
cost (SC)
Remaining 2.76 3.34 0.88 0.418 7.398
benefit (RE),
Min (B,C)-DC-SC
Ratio thereof % 37.3 45.1 11.9 5.7 100.0
Allocation of 0.931 1.126 0.297 0.142 2.496
nonseparable
costs
Net allocation 10.771 8.166 1.037 0.166 20.14
Ratio thereof % 53.5 40.5 5.1 0.8 100.0
Gross allocation 10.771 8.166 1.037 4.077 24.05
Ratio thereof % 44.0 33.9 4.3 17.0 100.0
---------
4. Problems in Cost Allocation: Conclusion
To sum up, based upon the above discussion an attempt will be made to
specify the major problems of cost allocation in the field of Japanese multipurpose
reservoir development and to examine how they should be approached.
The purpose of this example is to illustrate how an apparently simple method
such as the SeRB involves a host of complications and ad hoc assumptions in its
implementation. In particular, the manner of including benefits opens the door to
an arr"ay of possible manipulations. Specifically, for the river management sector
(flood control and minimum streamflow maintenance) and domestic and industrial
wa ter supplies, it is assumed that the "benefit" (the minimum of "justifiable" cost
and alternaUve cost) coincides with the alternative costs, since the justifiable
cost is estimated to be higher than its alternative cost for the river sector, and
both terms are designed to be equal for the water supply sectors. On the other
hand, for the irrigation and power sectors the situation is reversed and alter-na-
tive costs are assumed to exceed justifiable costs.
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There seem to be many causes involved. One of the primary ones is that
the river management sector is not a profit-making entity, whereas the irrigation
and power sectors are. Any profit-making enterprisc is naturally inclined to
underestimate its justifiable expenditure for participating in a particular project
way below its alternative cost, as long as its cost sharing is determined by the
minimum of either of the two terms. On the other hand, a public enterprise which,
by nature, should not and cannot make profits tends to be rather generous about
cost sharing compared with profit-making enterprises. This is particularly true
when public financing conditions are not tight. As is always the case with public
works, a project may not be funded if its benefits are expected to be below its
costs, and this naturally leads to the outcome that for any justifiable project its
minimum term should coincide with its alternative cost.
In the case of the Sameura Dam development project, the existence of subsi-
dies by the national government compounds the problem of cost allocation. That is
to say, an allocation to a usc based on an officially adopted method is not neces-
sarily what it has to pay in all. For instance, the domestic water supply sector
gets one-half to one-third of its (allocated) cost subsidized by the national govern-
ment. An exception is the autonomous Okinawa Island, which had been under US
control after the war and was designated by the Japanese government as a special
region for promoting regional developments with top priority when it was returned
to Japan. All of its allocated costs are subsidized by the national government; the
industrial sector commonly gets twenty to forty percent of its allocated costs sub-
sidized. As far as the irrigation sector is concerned, its subsidy ratio is ninety
percent, which means that it is charged only ten percent of the totals.
It is very common that the entire cost allocation is structured in hierarchical
form. Namely, at the first level of cost allocation the total costs are allocated to
each sector. Thcn at the second level the costs allocated at the first level are
further allocated to subsectors. This is followed by the third level at which the
costs allocated to each subsector are again allocated to sub-subsectors. This con-
tinues until the lowest level of cost allGJcation is reached. There seems to be a ten-
dency that, as we come down t.o lower levels of cost allocation, the allocation
methods become simpler and more straightforward. For instance, we start off with
the SeRB method and terminate the process by splitting the costs in proportion
to the amount of water withdrawals. This suggests that there is a practical need
for introducing the notion of hierarchical levels in discussing any typc of cost
alloca tion.
Notes
1. An exception is the Kuzuryu Dam construction project in thtl early 1960s. A power
company had started the construction of the dam, when the flood sector joined the
project. which required the st.ructure to be elevated by 4 meters. It was reasoned
that since the power company carried the original costs on its own, priority should
be given to the power sector. The flood sector (the latecomer) was requested to
pay the additional costs.
2. The first term is called "kW value" and the second term "kWh value". It should be
noted that both kW value and kWh value are measured in terms of the opportunity
cost that a thermal plant would have to spend if the same service was produced by
an alternative facility. That is, the kW value refers to the annual fixed costs of a
thermal plant with a given kW capacity and the kWh value to the annual variable
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costs of the thermal plant with a given kWh operation ability. What is tricky with
this assessment is that no evaluation is made of what really char'acterizes the value
of service of a hydroelectric power plant, which is far more responsive and adap-
tive to fluduations in power demand than is a thermal plant. ThoURh the construc-
tion of a hydropower plant is several times more expensive than that of a thermal
plant, its operation is far less expensive. Moreover, the lifetime of a hydropower
plant is generally three times that of a thermal plant and it may even be the ease
that a hydropower plant continues to be used even after its design lifetime is over.
Additionally, in the face of ever-increasing prices for fuel oil, hydropower is
becoming increasingly cost-effective. In light of these considerations, it may be
said that the assessment formula for the benefits of a hydropower plant, as
prescribed by law, grossly underestimates the worth of its service, thus almost
always resulting in estimated benefits that are far less than its individual cost.
This, in turn favors the power sector. The ad hoc way in which benefits are
estimated (and in a sense manipulated) immediately casts doubt upon the SCRB
method.
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